Biglin v. S (In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L. L.C.)
124 N.E.3d 787
Ohio2018Background
- Black Fork Wind Energy received a Power Siting Board certificate in Jan. 2012 to build a wind farm; condition No. 70 required commencement of continuous construction within five years (deadline Jan. 23, 2017).
- On Sept. 12, 2014 Black Fork filed (a) a motion in the original docket seeking a two-year extension of the commencement deadline to Jan. 23, 2019, and (b) a separate application to amend the certificate to add turbine models (new docket).
- The board approved the turbine-model amendment in Aug. 2015 under the amendment process, but later (Mar. 24, 2016) granted the two-year extension by motion in the original docket without treating it as an amendment or using the amendment procedures.
- Appellants challenged the extension, arguing it was an amendment under R.C. Chapter 4906 and therefore required an application, staff investigation, and possible hearing; they also argued the board’s approach let Black Fork evade newer turbine-setback statutes enacted in 2014.
- The Ohio Supreme Court held the board’s grant of the two-year extension amounted to an amendment, the board unlawfully bypassed the statutory amendment process, appellants showed prejudice, reversed the board’s orders, and remanded for further proceedings; the Court declined to rule on setback statutes’ applicability in this appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether extending the certificate deadline constitutes an "amendment" of the certificate | Extension changed material term (condition No.70) and thus is an amendment requiring an amendment application | "Amendment" requires a proposed change to the facility; timeline changes are not changes to the facility and may be handled by motion; board practice supports this | Yes. The court held the deadline extension was an amendment and had to follow the amendment procedures. |
| Whether the board may rely on its longstanding practice and broad discretion to treat extensions by motion instead of amendment applications | Agency practice cannot override statute; board limited to powers granted by legislature | Board has exercised consistent administrative practice since 1996 and its interpretation deserves deference | The court rejected deference here: statutory text controls and the board lacked authority to amend via motion in this case. |
| Whether appellants were prejudiced by the board’s failure to follow amendment procedures | Lack of staff investigation/report and the realistic possibility of a different outcome (e.g., triggering new setback laws) caused prejudice | Prior staff investigations and other amendment proceedings adequately covered issues, so no prejudice | Appellants demonstrated prejudice (no tailored staff report; realistic possibility of different outcome), so reversal was warranted. |
| Whether current turbine-setback statutes apply to Black Fork’s project due to the extension | Appellants argued the amendment procedure could have triggered new setback statutes enacted in 2014 | Board and Black Fork argued statutes did not apply or raise constitutional issues; board treated some separate amendment as not triggering the new setbacks | Court declined to decide setback statutes’ applicability or constitutionality here; reserved those issues for a record where they are squarely presented. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St.3d 43, 3 N.E.3d 173 (Ohio 2013) (prior appeal regarding original certificate)
- In re Application of Champaign Wind, L.L.C., 146 Ohio St.3d 489, 58 N.E.3d 1142 (Ohio 2016) (standard of review for Power Siting Board orders)
- In re Application of Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 131 Ohio St.3d 449, 966 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio 2012) (Power Siting Board authority over major utility facilities)
- Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 67 Ohio St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio 1981) (purpose and importance of staff reports in administrative proceedings)
- Weiss v. Pub. Util. Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d 15, 734 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 2000) (statutory interpretation; apply plain language when unambiguous)
