Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887

Bielskis, a carpenter, was injured when a Louisville Ladder mini-scaffold collapsed at a Motorola job site in 2005.
He had used the Louisville scaffold sporadically since 1997, and his employer had supplied other scaffolds; he retrieved his own scaffold for the project.
Bielskis retained Neil Mizen to testify on the caster stem failure; the district court barred Mizen's testimony as unreliable under Daubert and Rule 702.
After excluding Mizen, the district court granted summary judgment to Louisville Ladder, concluding Bielskis could not prove his claim without expert testimony.
The district court addressed jurisdiction and Rule 58 judgments, concluding the Rule 58 judgment effectively ended the action despite a remaining third-party claim.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, focusing on Daubert reliability, lack of testing, and insufficient evidence tying the defect to manufacturing/design at shipment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mizen's testimony was admissible under Daubert and Rule 702	Bielskis argues Mizen's experience suffices and need not rely on testing.	Louisville Ladder contends Mizen's methodology was unreliable and not testable.	No; district court did not abuse discretion in excluding Mizen.
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a continuance to obtain another expert	Bielskis should be allowed another expert due to lost opportunity to present testimony.	Court acted within its case-management discretion given discovery had closed.	No; denial did not constitute reversible error.
Whether summary judgment was proper without expert testimony under Illinois law	Tweedy allows proof of defect without expert testimony in some circumstances.	Tweedy is distinguishable; Bielskis failed to show defect at shipment or lack of abnormal use.	Yes; summary judgment proper.
Whether the Rule 58 judgment resolved all claims including the third-party claim	Rule 54(b) certification was not expressly addressed, so judgment should be incomplete.	Rule 58 judgment effectively ended the dispute;	Yes; Rule 58 judgment closure adequate; jurisdiction proper.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (established gatekeeping for admissibility of expert testimony)
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (extends Daubert to non-scientific experts)
Myers v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 629 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (three-step Daubert framework for expert admissibility)
Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2000) (limits on exclusion of experts; focus on admissibility of testimony and not solely on factual underpinnings)
Lang v. Kohl's Food Stores, Inc., 217 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2000) (flexible Daubert inquiry; not any single factor dispositive)
Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasizes need for testing in design cases)
Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 64 Ill.2d 570 (Ill. 1976) (prima facie defect proof without expert testimony in certain cases)
Livingston Service Co. v. Big Wheels, Inc., 96 Ill. App. 3d 591 (Ill. App. 1981) (distance from Tweedy supports need for defect at time of shipment absent other evidence)
Smith v. Ford Motor Co., No additional citation provided (7th Cir. 2000) (reiterates approach to expert admissibility and methodology)
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir. 1981) (Rule 54(b) signaling and final judgments across multiple claims)