Biagio Stragapede v. City of Evanston
865 F.3d 861
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Biagio Stragapede, a water‑services worker for Evanston since 1996, suffered a traumatic brain injury in Sept. 2009 and was placed on leave while rehabilitating.
- After a neurologic exam in spring 2010, Dr. Zoran Grujic initially cleared him to return; the City conducted a three‑day work trial which Stragapede passed and reinstated him on June 7, 2010.
- The City made two workplace accommodations (permission to consult supervisors and use of maps/notes/recorder); Stragapede worked without major problems until late June 2010.
- From June 23 to July 1 the City recorded several work problems (momentary inattention while driving, inability to finish a meter job, multiple location errors, a trip on steps); the City placed him on administrative leave July 2 and terminated him Sept. 24 after further medical letters from Dr. Grujic.
- Stragapede sued under the ADA; a jury returned verdict for him ($225,000) and the district court awarded backpay with interest, for a total judgment of about $354,071. The City’s post‑trial motions were denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stragapede was a "qualified individual" under the ADA (able to perform essential functions with/without accommodation) | Stragapede could perform essential functions; accommodations and work trial showed capability | City argued he could not generally perform the job based on post‑return incidents, coworker testimony, and attendance | Jury could rationally find him qualified; Court affirmed denial of JMOL |
| Whether Stragapede posed a "direct threat" to safety (statutory defense) | He did not pose a significant, unmitigable risk; incidents were isolated and explainable | City relied on driving incident, location errors, supervisor testimony, and Dr. Grujic’s later opinions | Jury reasonably found no direct threat; employer’s subjective belief insufficient; JMOL denied |
| Admissibility of prior pre‑injury auto accident as evidence of dangerous character | N/A (City sought admission to support direct‑threat defense) | City proffered prior accident to show propensity for unsafe driving | District court excluded as Rule 404(b) character evidence; even if error, exclusion was harmless to outcome |
| Whether backpay should be reduced for failure to mitigate (remittitur/Rule 59(e)) | N/A (Stragapede submitted backpay calculation) | City argued plaintiff failed to mitigate and proposed different mitigation standard (Second Circuit approach) | Court applied Seventh Circuit two‑part mitigation test; no manifest error; denied remittitur |
Key Cases Cited
- Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.) (defines "qualified individual" under ADA)
- Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (direct‑threat defense must be grounded in objective medical/other evidence; employer’s good‑faith belief alone insufficient)
- Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.) (four‑factor test for direct threat: duration, nature/severity, likelihood, imminence)
- EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir.) (ADA does not protect erratic/unexplained absences, but no rigid rule on tolerated absences)
- Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff must submit evidence supporting backpay; burden shifts to defendant to show failure to mitigate)
- Fleming v. County of Kane, 898 F.2d 553 (7th Cir.) (two‑part test for mitigation: unreasonable failure to exercise diligence and reasonable likelihood of finding comparable work)