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66 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 1275, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,421 Greta L. Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic Supply, Inc., and Terry Sterman
42 F.3d 1037
7th Cir.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 weapon people and shoots several Tisdale, burglar into automatic broke In ties. subject evening. weapon The of his is not in one with one burst in one mall stores three breaking provisions and enter- of this statute. On the other held that Tenth Circuit hand, within the separate steps stores if he takes several around a room ing of the three separate others, locations burglaries of were the statute mall divider and shoots several simultaneously. More- because, not occur operative that could at least in some becomes court, over, the defen- because sense, concluded to think metaphysical he had time burglaries after his chose to continue dant pull trigger. the second of the The about one, engaged he had successfully completing no doubt deserve se- crimes described above episodes. Id. at 1099. separate criminal However, it is difficult to punishment. vere of the rather terse treatment The court’s intend, see, Congress certainly did any difficult to assess with makes it issue one, other, individual be that but not the cases are similar be- accuracy whether the treated as a recidivist. they involve break- yond the fact that both Bright-line devices have a mechanistic evening. It is mall in one shopping in a ins However, Congress place in the law. when a conceive of situation not difficult to here, clearly that requires, as it has we dis- other, to each the location of the stores tinguish between individuals committed involved, operandi the modus time repetitive acts of violence and those who have than one that more would make it clear lives, pattern such a in their me- not shown Tisdale, therefore, place. took aggression task, may simplify tests but chanistic ACCA, a purposes of the may present, for great they make it a deal less accurate. also one before very from the different situation easy approach court has chosen the Here the hand, If, factually it is on the other us. also, undoubtedly, bring indi- that will more case, suggest I indistinguishable from our within the ambit of the statute. Our viduals analysis that we it cannot fit within task, however, statutory not to stretch years to carefully developed over the have responsive to the will of language, but to be it and to deal with identify behavior recidivist majority a Congress. The has chosen Here, the con- Congress has mandated. as objective. fulfill that Ac- that will course .not stores, very layout short tiguous of the cordingly, respectfully I dissent. of the entire involved in the execution time fact that the thieves treated plan, and the planning and its execu-

operation, both its it,

tion, pur- unitary matter make as intent, fulfilling congressional

poses of robbery to the of the six restaurant

similar En- Petty. It both the patrons stretches HUTCHISON, Plaintiff- L. Greta realities of the situa- glish language and the Cross-Appellant, Appellee, any- this situation was tion to conclude that single thing-other than a occasion. careful, Today, the court abandons the SUPPLY, ELECTRONIC AMATEUR past thoughtful work-produet of its decisions Sterman, INC., Terry Defendants- that, superficially, approach an

in favor of Appellants, Cross-Appellees. It “bright-line” approach. presents a more 94-1733, 94-1778. Nos. price of the great so at a does —abandonment be congressional mandate that the statute Appeals, United States Court identify the true recidivist and used to Circuit. Seventh differently person because treat Argued Sept. 1994. danger person poses to the rest special precedent of our of us. The abandonment Dec. Decided on regrettable when one reflects even area. litigation the future course the as- majority appears to admit that an apartment an with

sailant who enters *4 Counsel, E.E.O.C., Davis, of Gen. Office

C. DC, curiae E.E.O.C. amicus Washington, for Madison, WI, Olson, Fox, for Fox & Jeff S. Law- Employment amicus curiae Wisconsin Liberties and American Civil Un- yers Ass’n Foundation, Inc. ion of Wisconsin CUMMINGS, ESCHBACH Before MANION, Judges. Circuit CUMMINGS, Judge. Circuit Hutchison juryA awarded Greta on her claims from defendants back retaliatory discharge. sexual harassment and Ms. court denied Hutchison’s The district damages as well as a new trial on request for prejudg- requests reinstatement *5 $67,538.88in and awarded her interest ment as well as attorneys’ defendants fees from $80,000 jury’s Defendants award. on sup- sufficiency the evidence challenge of jury’s finding of a hostile envi- porting cross-appeals the denials Plaintiff ronment. reinstatement, damages, on a new trial well as the as interest attorneys’ fees.1 amount of

BACKGROUND began work Amateur Hutchison Ms. (“AES”) as a file Supply, Inc. Electronic her termi- By time of in 1968. clerk to office progressed she had nation job and the enjoyed her manager. she While received, she increasing responsibility than was less ideal. working environment a formidable ob- encountered Hutchison Ms. in the professional contentment to her stacle Sterman, owner and Terry person of regularly Sterman president AES. frequen- about employees quizzed female He relations. sexual cy nature of their Kings- Jeffrey A. (argued), Heitzer Arthur sexually explicit engaged in numerous also Milwaukee, WI, plaintiff-appellant. ley, brother, with his conversations telephone Esser, Diete- (argued), W. Stevens Daniel open to ensure that leaving his office door Falls, WI, for Stevens, Menomonee rich & primarily fe- other Hutchison and Ms. defendants-appellees. his sala- would overhear workers male office Hutchison com- Ms. comments. When Reams, Nee- cious R. Gwendolyn Young James the office on behalf plained to Sterman Jr., Gregory (argued), Lorraine ly, Robert J. Foundation, seeking brief an amicus Inc. filed Opportunity Commis- Equal Employment The court’s to the district support plaintiff. as and remand reversal filed an amicus brief sion attorneys’ Lawyers fees. Employment plaintiff's Association Wisconsin reduction Union of Wisconsin Civil American Liberties staff, stop offensively he refused to brought loud Ms. Hutchison the instant suit on 23,1991, (1) conversations. December claiming that she was discriminatorily terminated on the basis of engaged Sterman egregious be- age Age in violation of the Discrimination in Peters, Peggy havior as well. He referred to (“ADEA”), Employment § Act U.S.C. one of supervisees, Ms. Hutchison’s as “Ms. (2) seq., discriminatorily et terminated on the Boobs,” both to her face and to others includ- basis of her sex in violation of Title ofVII ing representatives manufacturer from out- 1964, Rights the Civil Act of 42 U.S.C. company, side the and told Ms. Hutchison (3) § seq., sexually 2000e-2 et harassed in that Ms. Peters did not have to work and (4) VII, violation of Title terminated in kept strictly that he on her staff because of opposition retaliation for her to Sterman’s her looks. When Ms. Hutchison confronted harassing behavior in violation of Title VII. Sterman about these statements and Ms. Pe- jury The case was to a beginning tried on production, responded ters’ lack of he “that if September September 1993.2 On Peggy, he ever fired he would hire someone special returned a verdict find- just like her. He said that once we moved to ing for Ms. Hutchison on her claims of sexual headquarters our new ... company retaliatory harassment and firing and award- (Pl.Br. buy sexy would her outfits to wear” ing in back from defendants. 6). Sterman went on to “console” Ms. Hutchison, telling appeal her that he had Defendants now taken a the trial court’s survey of the denial of their they judgment salesmen and found that renewed motion for Peggy rather date her than as a matter of Peters. law. Plaintiff Ms. Hutchison cross-appeals the district court’s denial of her regularly Sterman also commented on Ms. motion for a new trial on the issue of dam- appearance, telling Hutchison’s her “I like *6 ages, denial of her motion for reinstatement way you today” looking look while up her interest, and and the amount of objected and down. When Ms. Hutchison to attorneys’ fees awarded. comments, these responded by Sterman com- menting frequently in front of male DISCUSSION

employees, prefacing often his remarks with (Pl.Br. “I you know don’t like this but ...” Appeal I. 7). challenge Defendants the sufficien frequently Sterman attempted physical cy supporting of the evidence jury’s ver contact with Ms. Hutchison and other female dict finding a hostile environment. In re employees. Several times a week ap- he viewing this claim we are limited to deter proached desk, Ms. Hutchison at her brush- mining “whether presented, the evidence ing against in, pinning her and say- combined with all reasonable inferences that ing response inquiry just to her “I’m it, may be drawn from support is sufficient to

watching you.” Def.Br. 8. He would also the verdict when light viewed most partially block employees’ way his female [plaintiff].” favorable to the E.E.O.C. v. Cen office, through forcing them to brush tury Broadcasting Corp., 1446, 1457 957 F.2d against him or take detours to avoid contact. (7th Cir.1992). We particularly “are careful Sterman announced his employment intention to fire discrimination cases to avoid Ms. Hutchison October 1989 and in No- supplanting our credibility view of the vember 1989 replacement. hired a (in On De- evidence for that jury of both the its 22, 1989, verdict) cember working day (in the last before judge and the not interfering Christmas, verdict).” he “punch told Ms. Hutchison to Hybert with the v. Corp., Hearst out.” 1050, Cir.1990). 1054 jury 2. The case was tried to a under the trial treating district court are jury now the use of the judge’s Rights mistaken belief that the Civil Act as consensual. Since no one contests this after- applied retroactively. 1991 See Hutchison v. appeal, the-fact characterization on we will ac- Inc., Supply, Amateur F.Supp. Electronics 840 cept it. 612, (E.D.Wis.1993). parties The and the strictly at VII, treatment women. a his offensive Title under actionable To be argument that a male worker stemming from a Defendants’ harassment claim of sexual by having to brush equally offended con would be based on must be environment hostile the file pass between against to alter Sterman pervasive “sufficiently or severe duct by him at by pinned employment being cabinets or the victim’s the conditions true, desk, if is irrelevant. Ster- even working environment.” their an abusive and create Vinson, against him to brush man did not force men 477 U.S. Savings Bank v. Meritor up them 2405, past, nor did he look 2399, get L.Ed.2d 49. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. ap- be, pleasure in their express his down and not, by cannot its nature is “This more than am- was pearance. ... But we can The evidence mathematically precise test jury’s finding support the verdict sexu- ple ‘hostile’ an environment say that whether only by look al harassment. be determined can or ‘abusive’ Harris v. the circumstances.” ing at all — U.S. - , -, Inc., Systems, Forklift Cross-Appeal II. (1993). 126 L.Ed.2d 114 S.Ct. pre Damages Trial on totality of the circumstances for a New A. Motion

From case, easily jury could have in this sented court’s deni appeals the trial Plaintiff environment that an actionable hostile found 59(a) trial on for a new her Rule motion al of existed. 59(a) reviewing a Rule mo damages. When only trial court and Ster- defer to the argue that because tion we Defendants its discretion. the hos if the court has abused which created reverse acts man’s individual to find the this case is we would have clear upon To do so tile environment against ver “equally weight offensive” of the evidence been would have based Corp., 6 Rail women, support Scaggs a Title they dict. Consolidated cannot men or (7th Cir.1993). long before ponder F.3d We need VII claim. hope argument. One disposing of this in back jury awarded offended” “equally would be that men Plaintiff asserts that pay. pay and no front Hutchison and of Ms. treatment Sterman’s puts her lost back undisputed evidence That conduct employees. female his other $120,000, assuming she at more than *7 sensibilities the enough to offend egregious promised raises and not have received would to cannot serve as as well women of men fringe including benefits not bonuses purposes. it for Title VII immunize (which jury have included the was to instructions). according to their award reality that sexual to claim It blinks more than replacement earned Plaintiffs by man in a a demeans women conduct $147,000 salary between Jan- and bonuses at a not directed power, even if position 31, Plaintiff 1, 1993. uary and March victim, impacts male equally specific woman way jury could only have that the asserts disparate ef This subordinates.3 and female by finding figure was at the arrived discriminatory in a hostile element is the fect damages, and mitigate her she failed to that Moreover, directed Sterman environment. wrong. his Whatever is also men and women” erroneously that this claims 3. concurrence The attributes, apparently hetero- a is not Sterman “[t]his because other is irrelevant observation Therefore, by the sexual comment on men's men are did not where offended sexual. he case money Defen- coworkers." anatomy, of their female men harassment did he offer dress and nor however, dants, argument precisely this themselves, make attempt to did he expose nor Ms. Pe- treatment of respect Sterman’s with they passed between cabi- against them as brush ters, "Ms. Boobs”: to as whom he referred nets, pin in at their desks. did them nor he exposed have been women would men and "Both Sterman treated that do not claim Defendants and Ms. Sterman banter between Mr. to the They instead claim women the same. men and and, therefore, to be- is no reason there Peters things to done these men had that if Sterman Hutchison, a she is wom- that Ms. because lieve (Br. equally offended they have been would an, a any offended than would have been 20, 21, 23). conjecture neither relevant This have been.” Br. man defense. nor a that "here much The concurrence's claim demeaning equally at issue was conduct ison, support evidence does not such experienced a an manager per office with failure. background, sonnel diligently did not act by failing temporary to utilize or full-time em A presumptive Title VII victim is ployment specializing services in placing per ly entitled to Paper full relief. Albemarle skills, especially sons with her period as her 405, 421, Moody, Co. v. 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. unemployment years.” exceeded several 2362, 2373, plaintiff 45 L.Ed.2d 280. Once a Id. This conclusion was not an abuse of has damages established the amount of she discretion. it quite Indeed seems reasonable conduct, employer’s claims resulted from her jury concluded, given to have going the burden of forward shifts to the conflicting expert opinions long peri and the plaintiff defendant to show that the failed to unemployment, od of plaintiffs efforts mitigate damages damages or that were in “might have been if period sufficient plaintiff fact less than Gaddy asserts. unemployment shorter; they had been were Cir.1989). Corp., Abex 884 F.2d good enough years for five [here four] To establish the affirmative defense of a just ... You cannot leave the labor force plaintiffs mitigate damages, failure to being wrongfully after discharged in the (1) defendants must plaintiff show that: hope someday being made whole a failed to diligence exercise reasonable to mit judgment at law.” Hunter v. Allis-Chal (2) igate damages, her a there was rea Div., Corp., Engine 1417, 1428 mers plaintiff sonable likelihood that might (7th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). comparable have found by exercising work diligence. reasonable Id. argues Plaintiff if even defendants Plaintiff contends that the evidence fails to by showing met their burden a lack of rea- support either of required prongs. the two diligence part, they sonable on her still did In denying trial, her motion for a new howev- not establish that comparable there existed er, the trial court determined that a reason- employment which she could obtain with rea- jury able could have found both of the re- diligence. jury sonable was instructed quired elements pre- based on the evidence position that “a comparable constitutes em- noted, sented. As the trial court the reason- ployment if it would afford the virtu- plaintiffs job ableness of search “came down ally promotional identical opportunities, com- experts.” battle of Hutchison v. Ama- pensation, job responsibilities, working condi- Inc., teur Supply, Electronic F.Supp. tions and position status as the from which (E.D.Wis.1993). She introduced tes- discharged.” she was timony registered that “she with the State of Plaintiff contends that a reasonable (“WJS”), Wisconsin Job Service attended could not have found that she could obtain seminars, joined a networking group, took comparable employment because it un- was upgrade skills, courses to computer an- *8 disputed not, and, “that Plaintiff despite will ads, newspaper swered nearly and submitted not, her best job efforts could obtain a in the prospective 600 resumes to employers.” Id. salary range same as the one from which she In years, almost four these efforts resulted in wrongfully was terminated.” Pl.Br. 26. personal 40 telephone or interviews but no Plaintiff bases this claim on the fact that at job offers. the time of her being termination she was expert Defendants’ found these ef paid employment $15/hour. Defendants’ ex- lacking plaintiff forts in that register failed to pert testified that “cream of crop” the office temporary with a employment agency which jobs pay from for bookkeeper $10.25/hour a expert the put claimed would have her to to for an manager. $13.25/hour office Defen- work within two expert weeks. Defendants’ expert dants’ further contended that it was further plaintiffs testified that if description likely” “not could obtain one of job accurate, of her search was she should jobs these experience because she lacked us- have found work within three or four months ing popular office software. of termination. The trial court concluded jury that a reasonable accepted could have The bottom appears line to be that Ster- expert’s defendants’ opinion “that Ms. Hutch- man paid plaintiff had far above the market

1045 the also contends Plaintiff presented that Ster- Testimony was rate. failing pay. The jury in to award front erred high sala- in the form “generosity” man’s pre-1991 pay under the availability of front buy to was meant large bonuses ries and open question this Circuit. an in Act remains plain- gist his behavior. The for tolerance Extel/JWP, Inc., 330, 332 Tobey v. “premi- this is that because argument tiffs available, (7th Cir.1993). if But even the norm, she salary the above elevated her um” in not abuse its discretion court did district comparable duty take otherwise no to had jury could have finding that a reasonable market rate. paid at the jobs which present in case. award front failed to testimony by expert of [de “Persuaded that a rea found The district court reasonably jury may expert], the fendants’ that “as it concluded jury have sonable could a date termination have set between that, level given her skill to her clear became Hutchison, using rea Ms. judgment an identi not demand training, she could ‘compa diligence, should have found sonable in the mar position salary for the same cal adjusted time.” employment, as over rable’ adjust duty] her em ket, to [her failed she Hutchison, F.Supp. The district 840 at 629. Hutchi accordingly.” expectations ployment explain of the on that because court went wheth son, The issue is F.Supp. at 629. calculating the value uncertainty present in in abused discretion district court its er the discrepancy the obtain future between jury within the acted determining that salary at plaintiffs wage and able market Was implicit this conclusion. reaching law in AES, concluded jury properly could have “premium to subtract free candle. We not worth that the effort was comparable determining what was abuse” trial court’s agree with the conclusion: relied on The district employment? court discussion reasonable light of our earlier prop in a footnote for noncommittal dicta plain jury may have determined simply notion adjust must her a plaintiff osition that any premium future not tiff was entitled extended employment after comparable longer subject to Ster no because she was v. job States searches. United unsuccessful thus did The trial court maris abuse. 572, n. 3 Chicago, 853 F.2d City of denying plaintiffs abuse its discretion EEOC, Cir.1988) Motor Co. v. (citing Ford 59(a) on dam for a new trial Rule motion 3057, 16, n. 102 S.Ct. 458 U.S. ages. 721). not over L.Ed.2d This n. Nonetheless, dis authority. whelming 59(e) to Amend Motion Rule B. Plaintiffs concluding that the correct trict court was Full Relief Judgment Grant above properly have excluded jury could a motion to amend filed Plaintiff paid plaintiff premium that Sterman market 59(e). The district Rule judgment under comparable employment. defining plaintiffs re as to the motion court denied relief, reinstatement, injunctive quest for purpose of Title VII The remedial interest, granted re they have “where place the victims attorneys’ fees costs and quest for reasonable unlawful discrimina it not for the been were $67,538.88. ap Plaintiff amount of in the (1972), quoted in Cong.Rec. 7168 tion.” 118 rulings. We review these peals all of Moody, 422 U.S. Paper Co. Albemarle *9 rulings for abuse of discretion. court’s 2362, 421, A 2373. reasonable 95 S.Ct. from evidence have concluded could 1. Reinstatement discrimination, unlawful absent Stermaris Reinstatement, usually although market” “in the plaintiff have been would required. remedy, always at is not wages preferred she received premium because F.2d Corp., 973 Motors McKnight toleration v. General were continued AES tied Cir.1992). (7th is decision 1366, Comparable nonabusive 1370 abuse. Stermaris of the dis consigned at to the sound discretion compensated be employment then would 1369, court, should duty id. rate, a trict plaintiff had and the market result would “where the grant reinstatement accept it. seek 1046 controversy.” may

be undue friction betrayed long- statement have less than McKnight AES, Corp., v. General Motors 908 F.2d term devotion to but the court district (7th Cir.1990). 104, may 115 jumped quickly equating have too this strategic buyout. with the threat of a forced ease, In a number of consider Moreover, having job if a is a benefit in ations led the district court to conclude that another, seeking plaintiff it is a benefit inappropriate. reinstatement would be enjoyed have but for her unlawful termi- First, small, closely because AES is a held nation, and thus not inconsistent with the (Sterman owner), organization is the 100% make-whole nature of Title VII remedies. reinstatement would be difficult for the court Despite these reservations over the district degree to administer because of “the of inter interpretation plaintiffs testimony, court’s required among action employees.” Pl.App. grounds because there were sufficient other Sterman, Though primary wrong 49. relied, upon which the district court it did not doer, leave, is on indefinite medical he re finding abuse its discretion in reinstatement (who mains the sole owner and his brother inappropriate. was on the other end of defendant Sterman’s conversations) phone salacious now runs the Prejudgment interest business. Prejudgment interest is an element The court also cited friction and ani complete compensation and a normal inci mosity which developed plaintiff has between dent of relief under Title VII. v. Loeffler management. employ AES While mere Frank, 549, 558, 1965, 486 U.S. 108 S.Ct. hostility developed during litigation er cannot 1971, 100 L.Ed.2d 549. This Court has is reinstatement, I, alone McKnight defeat 908 conflicting pronouncements sued on whether 116, F.2d at parties friction between the is a prejudgment required interest or discre legitimate concern, particularly where the tionary. Compare City Chicago v. United employer relatively a operation small (7th Labor, Dept. 606, States 753 F.2d the district court potentially is faced with the Cir.1985) (“Prejudgment interest is a neces expensive difficult and monitoring task of sary part compensation.”) with Don parties’ employment future relationship. nelly Inc., Freight System, v. Yellow Moreover, if AES decided to cut back its (7th Cir.1989) (“The F.2d decision to salaries to the market level in Sterman’s grant deny or prejudgment an award of in absence, the court it feared would be re terest lies within the discretion of the district quired disputes to referee over cutbacks and court.”). If a district court does have discre future retaliation claims. grant tion deny prejudg whether to or interest, ment very discretion is limited. Finally, the district plain court cited As Enterprises we stated Gorenstein expressed tiffs own ambivalence at trial as to Care-USA, Quality 874 F.2d job back, whether she wanted her based on Cir.1989), come, think, “The time has we her concerns problems that the at AES sur generalize, and to pre announce rule that departure vived Sterman’s and her fear of judgment presumptively interest should be his return. The court particularly was con available to victims of federal law violation.” plaintiffs cerned with testimony despite See also Hanna v. Corp., American Motors her concern that the environment at AES (7th Cir.1984) (refusal hostile, remained she continued to seek rein prejudgment award liability interest because statement job because “it is better to have a discretion). question was close is an abuse of looking job.” [] when PLApp. another 50. The district court found that this state The district grant plaintiff court refused to ment ‘strategic “smacks of the explic interest, motive’ reasoning that itly rejected McKnight I.” Id. jury’s The con award of must have included I, expressed cern in McKnight 908 F.2d at an implicit determination that “effec- *10 116, involved the situation in tively which an em job abandoned the market at some ployee sought reinstatement in point during order to force period unemployment.” her of employer “buy the to him out.” Plaintiffs This jury’s pay meant that the “back award subject dispute. to fair we evidentiary amount is Once degree of significant required mini- pay re- that back is at least some interpolation of the facts and know balancing, mum, testimony”: the eco- it safe to award interest on that thus is over the flection Id. “easily was not plaintiff suffered amount. loss nomic interest was prejudgment and ascertainable” Button, Handy sought plaintiff In the fu- Pl.App. 51. inappropriate. $205,000. earnings pay totaling ture and back $130,000 jury The awarded without differen- relied on Donnel The district court tiating pay back and future earn- between ly, proposition the F.2d at for Nonetheless, ings. held that the this Court in Title only be awarded VII “interest should computation “impossible hope- or was neither plaintiff to the is if loss cases the economic ” lessly suggested a number speculative” and 42). (Pl.App. This ‘easily ascertainable.’ possible apportionment of which methods Donnelly too broadly reads conclusion court could choose between on the district other, ignores Gorenstein later Seventh Id. at 1298. Not only was the remand. Donnelly In this Court precedent. Circuit jury pay by awarded the amount of back court abused its discre that the district held Button, Handy so too was the uncertain denying prejudgment interest because tion in way apportioned it be over the should diligence seeking plaintiff’s the issue plaintiff was out of work. decade that In an employment was close. alternate Id. at said, Yet we reversed the denial of interest. nouncing result the Court “Wheth this should be not an award of interest er or the amount of granted upon turns whether jury in the case present Because ascertainable, easily whether damages is pay, as back specified the total award ” Id. Any mitigation is ‘close.’ the issue of only ambiguity appor is in the calculational prejudgment interest authority denying years plaintiff’s between tionment over the Donnelly dicta, Donnelly is since the thus jury judgment. If the did termination court’s denial of reversed the district court job at a certain find that she left the market event, any amount of back In interest. (an assumption at consis point that is least to be awarded pay on which interest is jury’s required by the award tent with if not $80,- jury ease is not uncertain —the awarded pay pay), partial and no front inter back had to make 000. The fact pay calculated on the back she est should be to that amount implicit calculations reach day. That up received until that would have presumption favor of does not defeat the is, yearly on her she should receive interest See Williamson interest. year first after ter salary starting from the Co.,

Handy Button Mach. was continuing until she mination and Cir.1987) (“The award of back i.e. market, job have left the deemed to ‘equitable’ rather than a under Title VII is an post-termination total date however, ‘legal’remedy, and the common law $80,000. This earnings would have been certainty ap requirement of has never been inter obviously give her the maximum would it.”). plied to minimum would result est. The interest question correct for the district pro-rata treating from as earned discretion, court, assuming it has is whether judgment every year from termination jury’s uncertainty introduced find accordingly on an annual calculating interest mitigate suffices to ing partial failure judge’s discretion It the trial basis. is within prejudg presumption in favor of defeat the meth these calculational to choose between given fact that it “[w]ithout ment interest It is any other reasonable method. ods or incomplete is compensation of the the district court’s discretion not within delay.” an incentive to and the defendant has deny award of interest because the whole Gorenstein, 874 F.2d at 436. The answer ambiguities. “Absolute these calculational Button, Handy F.2d at 1299. no. what kind certainty unavailable no matter jury; it is also given to the by allowing of instruction is be served purpose No Button, 817 F.2d at unnecessary.” Handy keep time wrongdoer the entire be to make otherwise would just 1299. To hold money, because the exact value *11 1048 explanation’.” a

prejudgment interest unavailable whenever Smith v. Great American (7th Restaurants, Inc., mitigate partial finds a failure to or 969 F.2d 439 Cir.1992) anything exactly what quoting Sheedy, otherwise awards but Tomazzoli v. 804 (7th Cir.1986). sys- plaintiff seeks. Such a rule would F.2d 97 The district tematically deny plaintiffs full relief under above-quoted explanations court’s for its 10% reaching Title VII. cut further subtractions in its and drastically figure reduced lodestar are insuf- Attorneys’ 3. fees expression general ficient. of The court’s accompanied by seemingly concerns arbi- attorneys’ sought Plaintiff fees and costs trary cuts in billable hours is neither fair to prevailing party a under Title Plain- as VIL litigants appropriate nor an basis for mean- $122,124.87 delineating in tiff filed affidavits Second, ingful appellate and review. objected expenses. fees and Defendants to important, “plaintiffs counsel is entitled to of the reasonableness the bill but did not signifi- be heard on the matter before such a specifically challenge any provisions. of its in cant reduction hours is made nonetheless, The district court without the (citations Smith, court.” 969 F.2d hearing, benefit of a reduced the amount omitted). $67,538.88. by plaintiff recoverable began by cutting proposed court 10% of the In her brief asserts that her coun- plaintiffs spent fee for the time counsel on essentially practitioner sel was a sole with her unsuccessful ADEA claim. The court only part-time associates and law clerks dur- unnecessary, duplica- then subtracted “other true, ing litigation. much of this If the dis- tive, charges light or unreasonable of the top- trict court’s reduction for what it saw as case, straightforward factual nature of this heavy staffing cannot be sustained. Similar- discovery (although lack of intense battles ly, plaintiff claims that her counsel did not the defendant was twice sanctioned for rela- normally paralegal sup- bill clients for and tively benign transgressions) clear and ab- port staff hours and thus did not include complex legal Pl.App. sence of issues.” 53. so, request. them in his fee If the district $78,538.88 figure The result was a lodestar court’s further subtraction for uti- failure to representing attorney a cut hours from support lize staff is also unfounded. Plaintiff proceeded 843.75 to 536.2. The court given her counsel should have been an figure further in this make cuts lodestar opportunity arguments make these based on the factors delineated in v. Johnson district court before reductions were made. Inc., Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d oppose Counsel who a fees have “re (5th Cir.1974). The court trimmed $3000 sponsibility objections particu to state with unnecessary for what it considered written larity clarity.” Ohio-Sealy Mattress regarding evidentiary motions in limine is- Inc., Mfg. Sealy Co. v. sues, paralegals for failure to utilize $5000 Cir.1985). When, case, as defense staff, support and other for the $3000 so, counsel fails to do the district court seemingly high partner to 2 ratio by denying should not reward the defendants Pl.App. associate hours. 54. plaintiffs opportunity counsel an to de The amount of fee awards is left against specific challenges, fend his claim to the discretion of the district court because whatever their source. Because of the dis “superior understanding litiga its hearing trict court’s failure to conduct a desirability tion and the avoiding frequent insufficiency explanation its of its lode appellate essentially review of fac what are star calculation we remand for a new fee Eckerhart, Hensley tual matters.” 461 award. 424, 437, 1933, 1941, U.S. 103 S.Ct. must, nevertheless, L.Ed.2d We remand CONCLUSION First,

for a new award this case. a “dis may trict arbitrarily court reduce the We affirm the district court’s denial of requested; number of hours if it judgment reduces defendants’ renewed motion for as provide hours it should a ‘concise but clear plaintiffs matter of law and its denial of *12 damages. age case as an discrimination for a new trial on We suit. Hutchin- motion re- son did not succeed on that claim. There- denial of reinstatement but affirm the fore, any attorney’s she was not prejudg- of entitled to and remand on the denial verse stemming prosecution fees from the of and remand the ment interest. We also reverse age Finally, discrimination claim. while it attorneys’ award of fees with instructions might be difficult to sustain a cut-off of what evidentiary an that the trial court hold hear- top-heavy the district court staffing saw as ing plaintiffs in which counsel can defend charges, may appropriate some reduction be proposed against the district court’s cuts. charged

so that the fees are reasonable in MANION, light complexity of the of concurring. per- the tasks Judge, Circuit formed. join disposition I the court its Finally, this is a closer case on the merits discussed, empha- several issues but wish to implies. than court Hutchinson worked points. size a few twenty years. at Amateur Electronic for over Handy In Button Mach. Williamson Spreading complained-of conduct over Co., Cir.1987), 1297-99 817 F.2d period negates this extended of time the district court’s denial this court reversed severity pervasiveness portrayed by so, prejudgment doing In we of interest. court. She did not define environment may be de- noted interest years she worked as hostile until after readily nied because it is not determinable. Moreover, Sterman, she was fired. a 400- to However, in Williamson we reasoned man, 500-pound behaved towards all of his properly interest could be determined under boorish, employees in a rude and obnoxious and, therefore, at least two methods the dis- equally manner. Much of his behavior was denying prejudgment in- trict court erred in women, demeaning making to men and thus Similarly, terest. as the court in this case charges sexual harassment doubtful. Rabi forth, period represented by sets the time Co., Refining due v. Osceola 805 F.2d $80,000 verdict is determinable under (6th Cir.i986) (“instances complained- and, therefore, prejudgment in- two methods prove equally of sexual conduct that offensive appropriate. Although terest is we reach the sup to male and female workers would not here, emphasize I correct result some port charge a Title VII sexual harassment underlying damage cases the facts award both men and women accorded because were may make the determination of interest too treatment”); like Ebert v. Lamar Truck Pla complex and it is then within the trial court’s (10th Cir.1989) za, (rough F.2d deny prejudgment discretion to interest. language indiscriminately by male used both (“[i]f Williamson, 817 F.2d at 1298 some fact employees hos female did constitute parties or consideration the have not drawn workplace environment based on sex tile to our attention makes the ascertainment of harassment). apparently this boor He used portion representing award back personal ish behavior to cover certain short may complex, too the district court psychology comings. Whatever the of his none”). choose to award banter, vulgar his behav loud and sometimes attorney’s The court remanded the fees to male and ior was sometimes offensive merely example, employees award to allow the district court to female alike. For Ster- reducing routinely women set forth its basis for the award. man asked both men and Nevertheless, your Greeting employ all a reduction the case was “How’s sex life?” way, clearly appropriate. straight- regardless gender their this This case was ees— —in complex, yet not sexual harassment. forward and not while obnoxious is Ebert, Rabidue, 620; sought attorney than fees 805 F.2d at $80,000. fact, employee In when the awarded Hutchinson a male Sterman’s Moreover, originally brought complained vulgarity.1 his Ster- Hutchinson this also about reality Opn. While female subordinates.” true, at 1043. 1. The court states: "It blinks to claim that by ignores statement the nature of the sexual conduct which demeans women a man position power, a case in a even if not directed at a conduct at issue in this case. This is not victim, specific equally impacts are the sexual harass- woman male and where men offended perva had to be severe man’s conduct enough Hutchinson’s conditions to alter

sive *13 on a hos employment, for her to succeed Meritor Sav claim.

tile work environment Vinson, 57, 67, 106 477 U.S.

ings Bank v. (1986). 2399, 2405, L.Ed.2d 49

S.Ct.

Nonetheless, we owe a given the deference were sufficient to

jury, presented facts as

affirm this case. reasons, respectfully I concur.

For these VOELKER,

In the Matter of Mitchell W.

Debtor-Appellant.

No. 94-2271. Appeals, United States Court Ellisen, Allen, Gary R. William S. R. Bruce Seventh Circuit. Estabrook, Dept, (argued), Alice L. Ronk Div., Section, Justice, Appellate Tax Wash- Argued Nov. 1994. DC, ington, appellee. for Decided Dec. 1994. (ar- Goyke Byrne, George Terrence J. Wausau, WI, debtor-appellant.

gued), FLAUM, CUMMINGS, Before ROVNER, Judges. Circuit FLAUM, Judge. Circuit debtor, Voelker, appealed Mitchell holding a decision of the District Court from (“IRS”) Revenue Service’s the Internal personal property to his tax lien extended § levy exempt from under U.S.C. affirm. We I. voluntary Chapter

Mitchell Voelker filed bankruptcy petition July 1992. On on 19,1992, proof filed a of a November IRS delinquent claim for taxes secured $27,736, covering years amount of objected through 1989. Voelker to this Rabidue, coworkers; rather, harassment. here not constitute sexual ment much of the conduct at issue was their female equally 620; Ebert, de- 878 F.2d at 339. F.2d such, meaning to men and women. As it does

Case Details

Case Name: 66 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 1275, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,421 Greta L. Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic Supply, Inc., and Terry Sterman
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Dec 5, 1994
Citation: 42 F.3d 1037
Docket Number: 94-1733, 94-1778
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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