311 F. Supp. 3d 82
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Monsanto manufactures Roundup; its label states glyphosate “targets an enzyme found in plants but not in people or pets.”
- EPA reviewed and approved Monsanto’s Roundup labels in 2008 and again in 2014 under FIFRA.
- Plaintiffs filed a D.C. consumer protection suit (DCCPPA) alleging the label is false/misleading because the targeted enzyme exists in human/animal gut bacteria.
- Monsanto moved to dismiss, arguing (1) claims are time‑barred, (2) the label is not false or misleading, and (3) claims are preempted by FIFRA; the Court denied the motion.
- The Court evaluated pleading-stage standards (Rule 12(b)(6)), the three‑year DCCPPA limitations period, and FIFRA preemption principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statute of limitations | Claims timely as to recent sales; discovery rule and continuous conduct tolling apply | Plaintiffs knew or should have known by 2013, so claims are time‑barred | Denied dismissal; repeated sales create separate accruals and factual disputes about discovery preclude dismissal |
| Falsity / misleadingness of label | Label is literally false or at least misleading because enzyme exists in human/animal gut bacteria | Statement is mere "wordplay"; reasonable consumer wouldn’t interpret “in people” to include gut bacteria | Denied dismissal; pleadings plausibly allege literal falsity or misleading impression to a reasonable consumer |
| Scientific‑claim pleading standard | N/A — claim is factual (presence of enzyme) | Cites In re GNC: scientific claims require showing expert consensus | Court rejects GNC as inapplicable; binary factual allegation (enzyme present or not) survives 12(b)(6) |
| FIFRA preemption | DCCPPA claim enforces the same prohibition on false/misleading pesticide labeling; declaratory relief sought, not injunction | DCCPPA imposes different/broader labeling requirements; declaratory judgment would effectively force label change and is preempted | Denied dismissal; DCCPPA as applied is consistent with FIFRA misbranding provision; declaratory relief is not the same as an injunction and is not preempted |
Key Cases Cited
- Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards and that court need not assess truth at dismissal)
- Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (plaintiff entitled to inference of facts at motion to dismiss)
- Figueroa v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 633 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (each repeated unlawful act gives rise to a new cause of action for accrual purposes)
- Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (U.S. 2005) (FIFRA preemption: state duties not preempted if fully consistent with FIFRA misbranding requirements)
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (U.S. 1996) (presumption against federal preemption of state-law claims)
- Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (U.S. 2013) (Supremacy Clause preemption principles)
- Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 953 A.2d 308 (D.C. 2008) (DCCPPA accrual and application of residual three‑year limitations period)