Beylund v. Levi
2017 ND 30
| N.D. | 2017Background
- Beylund and Wojahn were arrested for DUI, read North Dakota’s implied-consent advisory, and submitted to warrantless blood tests that showed BAC over the legal limit.
- The U.S. Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, holding warrantless breath tests permissible incident to arrest but warrantless blood tests generally are not; it remanded Beylund’s administrative-suspension case to reconsider voluntariness of consent given the advisory’s partial inaccuracy.
- On remand the state court consolidated Beylund and Wojahn and asked (1) which forum should decide voluntariness and (2) whether, if consent was involuntary, the blood-test results must be suppressed in an administrative license-suspension proceeding.
- For purposes of these appeals the court assumed consent was involuntary and addressed only whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression in the administrative proceedings.
- The court concluded that the federal exclusionary rule does not require suppression of blood-test results in civil administrative license-suspension hearings and affirmed the suspensions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntariness findings should be made on remand and by which forum | Beylund/Wojahn: Birchfield establishes consent coerced where consent secured "on pain" of criminal sanction; voluntariness should be scrutinized and, if involuntary, remedy follow | Dept: Administrative hearing (and appellate review) can address voluntariness but even if involuntary, administrative proceedings may still admit the test results | Court assumed consent involuntary for purposes of decision but treated voluntariness as a factual issue for the administrative/district court review process under existing procedures |
| If consent is involuntary, must blood-test results be suppressed in administrative license-suspension proceedings? | Beylund/Wojahn: Exclusionary rule and state statutes require suppression; implied-consent threat is an unconstitutional condition and denies due process | Dept: Exclusionary rule does not apply to civil administrative proceedings (Scott, Holte); alternatively, good-faith exceptions (Davis/Leon) apply | Held: Exclusionary rule does not require suppression in these civil administrative proceedings; results admissible and suspensions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (warrantless breath tests permissible incident to arrest; warrantless blood tests generally require a warrant; remand to reassess voluntariness of consent)
- Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1998) (federal exclusionary rule need not be applied in administrative parole revocation proceedings)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (exclusionary rule is a judicially created deterrent remedy, not a personal constitutional right)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (U.S. 2011) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule when officers rely on binding precedent later overruled)
- Holte v. N.D. State Highway Comm’r, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989) (North Dakota precedent holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to administrative license-suspension proceedings)
