Bey v. Rasawehr
2019 Ohio 57
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Petitioners Joni Bey (sister) and Rebecca Rasawehr (mother) each obtained five‑year civil stalking protection orders (CSPOs) against respondent Jeffrey Rasawehr after a bench hearing in Mercer County Common Pleas Court.
- Petitioners presented evidence of multiple internet posts (Craigslist, CountyCoverUp.com, Lima News comments) and a billboard that identified or featured Rasawehr and repeatedly accused petitioners of causing their husbands’ deaths and participating in conspiracies with county officials.
- Petitioners testified the posts caused significant mental distress (counseling, medication, loss of sleep, fear, changed routines); a private investigator retained by Rasawehr allegedly misrepresented himself when interviewing a petitioner.
- The trial court found by a preponderance that Rasawehr engaged in a pattern of conduct in violation of Ohio’s menacing-by-stalking statute (R.C. 2903.211) and granted CSPOs.
- As a specific condition, the court ordered Rasawehr to refrain from posting about petitioners on any social media/service and to remove related posts from CountyCoverUp.com, and to refrain from posting that petitioners were culpable in their husbands’ deaths.
- Rasawehr appealed, arguing the speech-related condition was an unconstitutional prior restraint/overbroad, unconstitutionally vague, not rationally related to the evidence, and that petitioners failed to meet statutory CSPO requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. First Amendment/prior restraint: Does the posting ban unconstitutionally restrain protected speech? | Petitioners: posts were targeted harassment causing mental distress and not protected; statute permits CSPO to prevent such conduct. | Rasawehr: the order broadly bars speech on matters of public concern and functions as a prior restraint. | Court: Upheld the posting restriction as a narrowly tailored, temporary remedy addressing unprotected or proscribable conduct directed to petitioners and supported by the record. |
| 2. Vagueness/due process: Is the order too vague to enforce (risk of contempt)? | Petitioners: order is sufficiently specific to notify respondent what conduct is prohibited (posts about petitioners and culpability claims). | Rasawehr: language like “refrain from posting about Petitioners” and “remove all such postings…that relate to Petitioners” is ambiguous and could prohibit innocuous posts. | Court: Majority rejected vagueness challenge—found the order sufficiently definite and narrowly tailored; concurrence/dissent would sever or strike the broad first sentence as ambiguous but uphold the sentence prohibiting postings that express/imply culpability. |
| 3. Scope/rational relation: Is the relief rationally related to the findings and not overly broad? | Petitioners: restriction targets only petitioners and content that caused mental distress; five‑year, petitioner‑specific ban is appropriate. | Rasawehr: blanket ban on social media posts is overbroad relative to evidence and First Amendment. | Court: Found the scope reasonable and related to petitioners’ safety and the pattern of abusive postings; compared scope favorably to common protective‑order restrictions. |
| 4. Sufficiency of evidence / statutory elements: Did petitioners meet the R.C. 2903.211 burden? | Petitioners: presented testimony and exhibits tying posts and billboard to respondent; demonstrated pattern and resulting mental distress. | Rasawehr: contested authorship and motive; argued petitioners failed to prove elements. | Court: Affirmed CSPOs—evidence supported findings of a pattern of conduct, knowledge, and resulting mental distress by a preponderance of the evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (standard for abuse of discretion)
- Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34 (Ohio 1997) (preponderance standard for civil protection orders)
- Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (U.S. 1985) (speech on matters of public concern receives heightened First Amendment protection)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (constitutional protection for speech about public affairs)
- United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (U.S. 2012) (speech integral to criminal conduct not automatically protected)
- Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (U.S. 1949) (laws may prohibit conduct partly carried out by speech)
- Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (U.S. 1926) (void‑for‑vagueness principle)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (distinction between public concern and private speech)
- Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (U.S. 1957) (speech and First Amendment purpose)
- Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1964) (role of speech in self‑government)