Beverly Nettles-Nickerson v. John Free
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11030
| 6th Cir. | 2012Background
- Nettles-Nickerson, intoxicated and seated in a running Hummer that was legally parked, was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
- The state trial court dismissed the charge, finding Nettles-Nickerson was not 'operating' the Hummer under Michigan law; license restoration was not suspended.
- Nettles-Nickerson sued Officers Free, McCready, and Harris in federal court asserting unlawful detention without reasonable suspicion and arrest without probable cause.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on qualified immunity grounds, concluding a reasonable basis existed to believe she was operating the vehicle under Michigan law.
- Michigan defines 'operating' as 'being in actual physical control of a vehicle'; Nettles-Nickerson sat behind the wheel, the car was running, and she could move the vehicle, supporting a reasonable belief she was operating.
- The court considered Wood (Michigan Supreme Court) as controlling, acknowledging possible distinctions but finding the officers could reasonably rely on the plain language of statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the detention and arrest violated a clearly established right | Nettles-Nickerson argues lack of probable cause and unreasonable detention. | Officers had a reasonable basis to believe operation occurred under state law. | Qualified immunity; no clearly established right violated. |
| Whether Nettles-Nickerson was 'operating' under Michigan law | Not operating since the vehicle was legally parked and stationary. | By entering the driver’s seat, starting the car, and being able to move it, she was in actual physical control. | Yes, reasonable basis to conclude operation under statute. |
| Whether Michigan case law clearly established the unlawfulness in this scenario | Wood-based interpretation is distinguishable due to parking context. | Wood controls; officers could reasonably apply it to find operation. | The law was not clearly established as unlawful; Wood supported the officers. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Wood, 538 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. 1995) (defined operating as continuing to operate once vehicle poses collision risk)
- People v. Pomeroy, 355 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. 1984) (older standard prior to Wood redefinition)
- Burton v. Mich. Ct. App., 651 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (distinguishable factuals; asleep in parked vehicle in some contexts)
- Longeway, No. 300493 2012 WL 933597 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (not included due to WL citation; referenced as context)
- Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2005) (clearly established right standard for qualified immunity)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step approach to qualified immunity)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (overruled strict sequence; pre-litigation questions doctrine)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (clarified clearly established inquiry for immunity)
- King v. Ambs, 519 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2008) (state-law interpretation relevance to federal constitutional claims)
- Nails v. Riggs, 195 F. App’x 303 (6th Cir. 2006) (state-law interpretation in federal immunity context)