Beunka Adams v. Rick Thaler, Director
679 F.3d 312
| 5th Cir. | 2012Background
- Adams was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death; execution date set for April 26, 2012.
- On April 13, 2012, Adams filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from a prior federal habeas judgment and a stay of execution, plus a separate second-in-time habeas petition and stay request.
- The district court stayed execution pending resolution of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
- The district court transferred Adams’s second-in-time petition to the Fifth Circuit to determine if it is a successive petition.
- The court later vacated the stay, dismissed the successive federal habeas petition, and denied Adams’s stay request.
- The opinion holds that the district court abused its discretion by granting the stay and that Adams’s petition is successive and thus jurisdictionally dismissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting a stay of execution | Adams argues Martinez created extraordinary circumstances for Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Thaler contends Martinez is not extraordinary and the stay was improper | Yes; the stay was vacated and improper relief denied |
| Whether Martinez provides extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Martinez creates an exception to Coleman extending relief | Martinez is an equitable ruling, not extraordinary and does not warrant relief | No; Martinez does not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief |
| Whether the Rule 60(b)(6) motion is properly considered and whether the petition is non-habeas in this context | Rule 60(b)(6) challenges the default ruling, not the merits of habeas claims | Rule 60(b)(6) cannot reopen merits; it is not a habeas petition | Rule 60(b)(6) properly before district court but relief denied on merits |
| Whether Adams’s second-in-time habeas petition is a second or successive petition | Martinez removed procedural default; petition not successive | Second-in-time petition raises same claims as prior petition and is successive | Yes; the petition is successive and barred under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(1) |
| Whether the district court had jurisdiction to transfer and whether this court has jurisdiction to review | District court transferred for efficiency; we should decide jurisdiction | Transfer under 28 U.S.C. §1631 requires lack of jurisdiction; petition is successive | We have jurisdiction to review but petition is barred as successive; dismissal appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (U.S. 2005) (Rule 60(b) not for habeas claims when attacking integrity, not merits)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (S. Ct. 2012) (Narrow exception to Coleman for inadequate postconviction counsel)
- Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1990) (Change in decisional law after judgment not extraordinary)
- Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 1995) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires extraordinary circumstances)
- Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2011) (AEDPA context; change in law not extraordinary for Rule 60(b)(6))
- In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1998) (Second or successive petition analysis standard)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (U.S. 2000) (Not a second or successive petition when merits unresolved)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (U.S. 2007) (Guidance on successive petitions pre-AEDPA)
- Martinez–Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (U.S. 1998) (Second-in-time petition not successive when raising Ford-based claim)