Betty M. Smith v. Michael Bokor, 991 F.3d 1145

Background:

Three Florida residents filed a putative class action on behalf of ~3,000 persons who resided in 22 Florida skilled nursing facilities (2014–2018), alleging licensing fraud and seeking >$900 million in damages.
Defendants (Bokor, a Florida citizen, and MMI, a Delaware corporation with a California PPB) removed under CAFA; plaintiffs moved to remand invoking CAFA’s local-controversy (>2/3 same-state citizens) and discretionary (between >1/3 and <2/3 same-state citizens + primary defendants are in-state) exceptions.
Plaintiffs submitted twelve generalized exhibits (CMS compendium, Census mobility data, academic economic studies, surveys/reports) but no individualized evidence (declarations, property/tax/voter records) tying class members to Florida or showing intent to remain.
The district court relied on those generalized materials to find by a preponderance that two-thirds of the putative class were Florida citizens and that Bokor was a “significant defendant,” then remanded; defendants appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit held the generalized, non-party studies/surveys/census data were insufficient, alone, to meet plaintiffs’ burden to prove class citizenship for CAFA exceptions; it affirmed that a defendant’s ability to pay is not required to find a “significant defendant,” but reversed the remand because plaintiffs failed to prove citizenship thresholds and the discretionary-exception primary-defendant requirement was unmet.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether generalized studies, surveys, and census data suffice to show >2/3 of putative class are citizens of Florida for CAFA local-controversy exception	The studies/statistics show most nursing-home residents live locally and seniors rarely move across states, so >2/3 likely Florida citizens	The materials lack any nexus to the actual class members and do not prove intent to remain; plaintiffs must produce class‑specific evidence	Generalized evidence alone is insufficient; plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to prove >2/3 are Florida citizens and the district court erred
Whether a court must assess a defendant’s ability to pay to determine a “significant defendant” under §1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)	Plaintiffs treated Bokor as a significant in‑state defendant from whom significant relief is sought	Bokor argued the court must consider his ability to pay before finding him a significant defendant	Statute unambiguous: "significant relief is sought" means relief sought from that defendant; ability to pay need not be examined; Bokor qualifies as a significant defendant under the complaint
Whether the discretionary exception applies (threshold % and whether primary defendants are in-state)	Plaintiffs argued >1/3 but <2/3 are Florida citizens and primary defendants are Florida citizens	Defendants argued plaintiffs failed to prove the citizenship threshold, and MMI is a primary defendant but is not a Florida citizen	Plaintiffs failed to prove the citizenship percentage; MMI is a primary defendant and not a Florida citizen; discretionary exception does not apply

Key Cases Cited

Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (supremacy of CAFA minimal-diversity and amount rules)
McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2002) (domicile/citizenship principles)
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (domicile requires residency plus intent to remain)
Travaglio v. American Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2013) (residency vs. citizenship distinction)
Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006) (local-controversy exception standards)
In re Hannaford Bros. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2009) (class definition limiting citizenship defeats CAFA jurisdiction)
Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2013) (generalized evidence insufficient without some class‑specific facts)
Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2007) (burden and practicality in proving many plaintiffs’ domiciles)
Hunter v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 859 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2017) (definition of “primary defendant” under discretionary exception)
Coffey v. Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, 581 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2009) (statutory construction: "sought" vs. "obtained")