Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services, 63 F.4th 967

Bernstein was fired in March 2019 and filed an EEOC charge on October 17, 2019 alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.
The EEOC mailed a right-to-sue notice on April 12, 2021 to Bernstein, his attorney, and employer counsel; the attorney received it but Bernstein did not (wrong address) and the first notice was returned.
The EEOC reissued the notice on June 3, 2021 to Bernstein’s corrected address with a cover letter stating the 90-day filing window begins upon receipt of this second notice.
Bernstein filed suit on September 7, 2021—about 148 days after the first notice was mailed but 89 days after he received the second notice.
The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely, holding the 90-day period began when counsel received the first notice and denying equitable tolling; Bernstein appealed.
The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding the district court abused its discretion by failing to treat EEOC’s misleading second letter as a potentially tolling “exceptional circumstance” and directing further factual development on Bernstein’s diligence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the 90‑day Title VII filing period begin?	Bernstein: the running period should be measured from the notice that actually reached him (the second notice) or tolled due to EEOC misinformation.	Maximus: the period begins when the right‑to‑sue letter is delivered to claimant or formally designated counsel (counsel here received it first).	The 90‑day period begins upon delivery to counsel or claimant; counsel receipt started the clock (Ringgold rule).
Does equitable tolling apply because the EEOC’s second letter misled Bernstein about the deadline?	Bernstein: the EEOC’s second, authoritative‑format letter told him the 90‑day period started on its receipt, so he reasonably relied and tolling should apply.	Maximus: Bernstein failed to show exceptional circumstances or diligence; no tolling.	The court held precedent recognizes a two‑letter misleading situation can justify equitable tolling; district court abused discretion by not applying that precedent and must develop the record on Bernstein’s diligence.

Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., 796 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1986) (establishes rule that Title VII 90‑day period begins on delivery to claimant or formally designated counsel).
Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1977) (two‑letter EEOC situation where a second letter advising a new 90‑day period can warrant equitable tolling because it affirmatively misleads).
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (endorsing Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that parties are chargeable with notice of facts known to counsel).
Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling may be available where the EEOC misleads a claimant about rights).
Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 2002) (to mislead, EEOC must have affirmatively given wrong information about a claimant’s rights).
Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2002) (when equitable tolling is raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) context, courts assume pleaded facts true and may remand if tolling is plausibly pleaded).
Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff invoking equitable tolling must show diligent pursuit of the action).
Taylor v. Books-A-Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (presumption on mailing: notice is received within a few days of mailing for limitations calculations).