Bernerd Young v. SEC
956 F.3d 650
| D.C. Cir. | 2020Background
- Bernerd Young was Chief Compliance Officer at Stanford Group Company (SGC) from 2006–2009; SGC sold CDs issued by Stanford International Bank, later revealed to be part of Allen Stanford’s Ponzi scheme.
- The SEC charged Young; after a 15-day administrative hearing an ALJ found him liable for negligent failures of diligence and for endorsing misrepresentations, imposing cease-and-desist, a $260,000 penalty, a permanent industry bar, and disgorgement of $591,992.46.
- The SEC Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision on March 24, 2016; Young had 60 days to seek review in the appropriate court of appeals.
- On the last day to file (May 23, 2016) Young filed a petition in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (DCCA), which lacks jurisdiction to review SEC orders; the DCCA notified him the next day, and he refiled in the D.C. Circuit on May 24 — one day late.
- The D.C. Circuit assumed (without deciding the statutory category) that the 60-day deadline could be tolled, but held Young failed to meet the heavy equitable-tolling burden: filing in a forum that clearly lacks jurisdiction does not toll the deadline, pro se status and clerks’ guidance do not suffice, and no extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 60‑day filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling | Young/Amicus: Deadline is a nonmandatory claims‑processing rule and equitable tolling is available | SEC: Deadline is jurisdictional and cannot be tolled | Court assumed tolling available for argument’s sake but denied tolling on these facts |
| Whether filing in the DCCA tolled the 60‑day period | Young/Amicus: Filing in DCCA was functionally compliant and should toll | SEC: DCCA lacked concurrent jurisdiction; filing there does not toll | Filing in a court that clearly lacks jurisdiction does not toll the deadline |
| Whether Burnett supports tolling here | Young/Amicus: Burnett allows tolling when suit began in state court | SEC: Burnett applies only where state court had competent jurisdiction | Burnett inapplicable because DCCA did not have concurrent jurisdiction |
| Whether DCCA clerk contact or Young’s pro se status justifies tolling | Young/Amicus: He sought filing instructions from DCCA and was confused; pro se status warrants lenity | SEC: No affirmative misleading by DCCA; ignorance/pro se status insufficient | Pro se status and neutral clerk interactions do not amount to extraordinary circumstances or equitable estoppel |
Key Cases Cited
- Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (tolls limitation where plaintiff timely commenced action in a state court of competent jurisdiction)
- Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988) (functional‑equivalence doctrine for technical defects in filings)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (distinguishes jurisdictional timing rules; historical practice in appeals context)
- Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (equitable‑tolling elements: diligence and extraordinary circumstances)
- Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (disgorgement characterized as a penalty subject to § 2462 limitation)
- New York Republican State Comm. v. SEC, 799 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (equitable tolling may be available for SEC‑review deadlines)
- Shofer v. Hack Co., 970 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1992) (filing in a clearly inappropriate forum will not toll the limitations period)