Bernadine Matthews v. Waukesha County
759 F.3d 811
7th Cir.2014Background
- Matthews (African-American) applied for a Waukesha County Economic Support Specialist position in Jan 2006; she also applied for a Supervisor job but later dismissed that claim.
- HR assistant Debbie Rapp screened applications for minimum qualifications; Matthews initially was marked as lacking training/experience but after contacting Rapp additional info was provided and her application was forwarded to Supervisor Luann Page.
- Page, unaware of applicants’ races, sorted qualified applicants into four groups by relevance/recency of public-assistance eligibility experience; Matthews’ resume placed her in Group 4 (least directly relevant).
- Page interviewed Group 1 candidates first and hired Julie Vetter (white) from Group 1; when a second Specialist opening arose in April, Waukesha used the same applicant pool and hired Princella Turner (African-American) from Groups 2/3.
- Matthews sued for race discrimination under Title VII, §1981, and §1983; district court struck certain evidence and granted summary judgment for defendants; Matthews appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred excluding certain newspaper evidence | Matthews argued county-published newspaper is party admission and admissible | Defendants challenged relevance and hearsay; district court excluded clippings; appellate court deemed argument waived for lack of developed briefing | Waived; exclusion affirmed |
| Whether hiring decision violated Title VII under indirect (McDonnell Douglas) method | Matthews asserted she was qualified, rejected, and position filled by non-African-American; also claimed Rapp never forwarded her app or delayed it so it wasn’t fairly considered | County showed legitimate nondiscriminatory reason: grouping by job-relevant experience; Page (decisionmaker) did not know applicants’ races and hired best Group 1 candidate | Summary judgment for County; prima facie assumed but County’s reason legitimate and Matthews failed to show pretext |
| Whether "cat’s paw" liability applies (biased subordinate influenced decisionmaker) | Matthews claimed Rapp’s alleged bias and false statement about position being filled infected Page’s decision | No evidence Rapp provided substantive adverse input to Page or that delay/change affected Page’s evaluation | Cat’s paw claim fails; no evidence of subordinate’s discriminatory input affecting decisionmaker |
| Whether direct method or statistical evidence shows intentional discrimination | Matthews argued circumstantial/direct evidence and statistics show pattern/practice of discrimination | Defendants showed grouping/selection was race-blind; statistical evidence compared County workforce to broad labor market and lacked appropriate comparator/applicant-pool focus | Direct/circumstantial and statistical claims fail; no evidence of intentional discrimination and statistics inadequately tailored |
Key Cases Cited
- O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625 (7th Cir.) (summary-judgment evidence viewed in light most favorable to nonmovant)
- Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir.) (nonmoving party must do more than raise metaphysical doubt)
- Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir.) (summary judgment standards; nonmovant’s burden)
- Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620 (7th Cir.) (requirements for resisting summary judgment)
- Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720 (7th Cir.) (burden-shifting in discrimination cases)
- Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir.) ("cat’s paw" theory in employment discrimination)
- Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.) (pattern-or-practice evidence collateral in individual cases)
- International Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (U.S.) (pattern-or-practice requires proof of regular, not unusual, discriminatory practice)
- Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (U.S.) (proper statistical comparator is qualified labor pool rather than population at large)
- Baylie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 476 F.3d 522 (7th Cir.) (statistical evidence must be coupled with other evidence to meet preponderance threshold)