Bennett v. State
46 So. 3d 1181
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- Bennett was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia based on circumstantial evidence of constructive possession.
- Evidence included contraband found in plain view in the living room and in a closed box in the bedroom of a cottage where Bennett said he sometimes stayed.
- Bennett was found inside a rear cottage; the main residence belonged to his grandmother, and the State did not prove who owned the rear dwelling.
- A warrantless entry occurred after Bennett refused to come out; an officer forced entry following a broken window and conducted a search after Bennett gave consent.
- The trial court denied a judgment of acquittal; the appellate court must assess whether sufficient circumstantial evidence proves constructive possession.
- On appeal, the court concluded the State failed to prove Bennett had dominion and control over the contraband.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there sufficient evidence of constructive possession? | Bennett, as the possessor or user of the cottage, had dominion and knowledge. | No independent evidence tied Bennett to the drugs beyond proximity and plain view. | No; insufficient evidence of constructive possession. |
| Did plain-view contraband in the living room establish dominion and control? | Knowledge plus proximity supports possession. | Premises control lacking; Bennett was a visitor, not a resident. | No; plain-view presence alone does not prove dominion without premises control. |
| Was there independent evidence linking Bennett to the drugs found in the bedroom box? | Items near Bennett's belongings could indicate knowledge and control. | There is no evidence Bennett owned the cottage, and items could belong to others. | No; no independent evidence to prove constructive possession. |
| Was the warrantless entry into the cottage proper under the 901.19/Payton framework? | Pick-up order authorized warrantless entry for arrest. | Payton prohibits warrantless home entry for routine felony arrests absent exigent circumstances. | No; warrantless entry violated Payton principles; suppression issue moot due to lack of constructive possession. |
| Did Bennett have standing to challenge the entry? | State may raise standing on appeal. | Bennett lacked a clear expectation of privacy in the cottage. | Not reached as convictions reversed on sufficiency grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sundin v. State, 27 So.3d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (constructive possession requires dominion and knowledge beyond mere proximity)
- Jackson v. State, 995 So.2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (actual possession shown by possession of contraband or within defendant's control; infer dominion in proximity cases)
- Evans v. State, 32 So.3d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (constructive possession defined; knowing presence and ability to control necessary)
- Brown v. State, 428 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1983) (constructive possession requires knowledge and dominion over contraband)
- Law v. State, 559 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1989) (reversal standard for circumstantial-evidence-based convictions; must exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980) (warrantless home entry for routine felony arrests is generally unlawful absent exigent circumstances)
- Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (U.S. 1990) (recognizes Payton limitations on overnight guest entry; warrants required for home arrests absent exigency)
- Stevens v. State, 552 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1989) (Florida's earlier stance on warrantless home arrests keyed to Payton framework)
- Taylor v. State, 319 So.2d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (proximity alone not enough to infer possession of contraband)
