Bennett v. County of Rockland, 61 F.4th 322

Rockland County Probation employees sent a June 9, 2016 letter opposing an office relocation; several signatories received an identical Memorandum of Warning and were ordered to attend mandatory staff meetings.
The Memorandum cautioned that further communications could result in disciplinary action; meetings were emergency, department-wide sessions.
Plaintiffs (signatories and their union) sued Tower-Bernstein and the County for First Amendment retaliation, claiming the letter was private-citizen speech on a matter of public concern and that the Memorandum and meetings were adverse employment actions.
At trial the district court granted JMOL that the speech addressed a matter of public concern and later JMOL that the employees spoke as private citizens; a jury then found the Memorandum and meetings were not adverse actions.
Post-trial the district court granted plaintiffs’ renewed JMOL on adverse action, calling the measures a “textbook example” of adverse action and entered a permanent injunction requiring removal of the Memorandum.
On appeal the Second Circuit reviewed the Rule 50 JMOL de novo, concluded there was sufficient evidence for the jury’s verdict (e.g., rarity of discipline at the department, briefness/minimal nature of the measures), reversed the district court’s JMOL and injunction, and directed entry of judgment for defendants.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Memorandum and meetings were adverse employment actions under the First Amendment standard	The Memorandum and mandatory meetings would deter an ordinary employee from protected speech	The measures were minor, typical workplace management actions that would not deter an ordinary employee	Reversed district court: adverse-action determination was fact-specific for the jury; JMOL for plaintiffs was improper
Whether the district court properly granted renewed JMOL (Rule 50) overturning the jury on adverse action	JMOL was appropriate because the measures were clearly adverse as a matter of law	JMOL was improper because record evidence reasonably supported the jury’s verdict for defendants	JMOL standard requires viewing evidence in nonmovant’s favor; district court erred in substituting its judgment for the jury
Whether a reprimand is per se an adverse action	Reprimands here are sufficiently severe to be adverse as a matter of law	Not all reprimands are adverse; context matters and jury should assess deterrence	Court held reprimands are not categorically adverse; label alone insufficient — factfinder must apply the ordinary-firmness deterrence test

Wolf v. Yamin, 295 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2002) (Rule 50 standard reviewed de novo)
Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (JMOL granted only when evidence is absent or overwhelmingly one-sided)
Hoyt v. Andreucci, 433 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006) (adverse-action question is fact-specific)
Sanders v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 2004) (jury may find negative evaluations non-adverse)
Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2007) (test: would action deter a similarly situated person of ordinary firmness)
Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (reprimand may be de minimis; context matters)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (material adversity standard and examples of petty slights)
Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2006) (reprimands sometimes adverse but not automatically)
Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2011) (criticism not automatically an adverse employment action)