Benjamin Hescott v. City of Saginaw
757 F.3d 518
6th Cir.2014Background
- Hescotts sued City of Saginaw under §1983 for unlawful demolition and seizure of their rental property and its personal effects; jury awarded $5,000 for the aluminum sold after demolition.
- District court granted summary judgment on most claims; remaining Fourth Amendment claim upheld with $5,000 verdict; inverse-condemnation and punitive-damages claims rejected.
- After trial, district court denied Hescotts’ §1988 attorney’s fees, citing ‘special circumstances’; also denied City’s post-offer fees under Rule 68 after an offer of judgment of $15,000.
- City offered $15,000 under Rule 68; Hescotts rejected and proceeded to trial; post-trial, Rule 68 issues were contested on remand.
- On appeal, Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded for fee calculation using lodestar methodology, and clarified Rule 68 cost-shifting limits for fees under §1988.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused discretion in denying §1988 fees | Hescotts prevailed; no special circumstances justify denial | Special circumstances warranted denial given limited success and impact | Yes; district court abused; fees must be calculated and awarded subsequent to lodestar analysis |
| Whether Rule 68 allows post-offer attorneys’ fees for losing defendants | Rule 68 does not allow plaintiff to recover post-offer costs; Marek controls | Rule 68 costs may include appellate attorneys’ fees when authorized by statute | No for defendants; post-offer fees not properly awardable under §1988; but post-offer costs may apply to City |
| Whether Farrar and Hensley were properly applied to deny fees here | Either case supports reducing or denying fees due to partial success | Farrar/Hensley misapplied; plaintiff’s actual injury and related claims negate denial | Incorrect application; did not support outright denial of fees given actual compensable injury |
| Whether the court should remand for an individualized lodestar calculation | Yes; the appropriate method is lodestar with adjustments for results obtained | No need for further calculation if special circumstances apply | Yes; remand to compute reasonable attorneys’ fees using lodestar and related adjustments |
Key Cases Cited
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (reasonableness and adjustments to fees; related-claims need not bar fee recovery)
- Déjà Vu v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 421 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2005) (case-by-case approach to special circumstances; not easily denied fees)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1983) (nominal damages affect fee entitlement; distinction between victory and damages)
- Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (Rule 68 costs include properly awardable fees under the substantive statute)
- Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes Farrar where actual injury exists from nominal cases)
- Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1994) (lodestar methodology for calculating reasonable fees)