Benge v. State of Oklahoma, 16-5108

Background

In April 2013 Benge bought artwork from a pawn shop; about a year later he tried to sell some pieces to Linda Greever, who claimed they had been stolen from her store.
Tulsa Police seized the artwork and told Benge the items would be stored pending a property hearing; he was informed ownership had not been judicially determined.
Tulsa County DA later charged the alleged thief; Benge sued in state court in October 2015 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants deprived him of property without due process.
The case was removed to federal court; defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district court dismissed, finding no final deprivation.
Benge filed a motion to amend after the dismissal order but before entry of judgment; he appealed. The district court later denied the motion to amend, and Benge did not file a new or amended notice of appeal challenging that denial.
The Tenth Circuit concluded it had jurisdiction to review the dismissal but not the denial of leave to amend and affirmed the dismissal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Benge suffered a "final" deprivation of property for § 1983 due-process purposes	Benge argued that the delay and the return/storage arrangement with Greever effectively amounted to final deprivation of his property	Defendants argued the state statutory remedy (post-seizure property hearing under Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1321) provided adequate post-deprivation process and no final deprivation occurred	Court held no final deprivation; Benge had not shown the property was finally disposed and failed to show delay ripened into a permanent deprivation
Whether the district court’s dismissal order was appealable despite a pending post-judgment motion to amend	Benge treated his motion to amend as raising issues that would affect the dismissal	Defendants argued the appeal could proceed under Rule 4(a)(4) timing rules	Court held Benge’s notice of appeal ripened under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i) so the dismissal was reviewable
Whether the Tenth Circuit could review the denial of Benge’s motion to amend after the district court disposed of that motion	Benge argued the denial should be reviewable as part of the appeal	Defendants argued Benge failed to file a timely amended notice of appeal as required to challenge the post-dismissal ruling	Court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to amend because Benge did not file a timely (amended) notice of appeal
Whether Benge waived additional arguments raised late or without authority support	Benge raised delay-as-deprivation and planning/prearrangement theories in briefing and reply	Defendants urged waiver and failure to brief with authority	Court held those theories were waived or not preserved because they lacked developed argument or were raised first in reply

Key Cases Cited

Adams v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (jurisdictional obligation to ensure appellate jurisdiction)
Trotter v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 219 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (motions that challenge correctness of judgment may be treated as Rule 59(e) motions)
Hilst v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1989) (Rule 59 timing may include motions filed before formal entry of judgment)
De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2011) (notice of appeal ripens when district court disposes of last Rule 4(a)(4) motion)
Coll v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 2011) (timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional; failure to file amended notice bars review of post-judgment orders)
Warren v. Am. Bankers Ins. of Fla., 507 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2007) (appellant must file amended notice to preserve review of post-judgment rulings)
Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must state a plausible claim to survive dismissal)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: factual content must permit reasonable inference of liability)
Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 774 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1985) (post-seizure state statutory hearing characterized as predeprivation process)
Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985) (discussing § 1321 framework for resolving ownership of allegedly stolen property prior to disposition)
Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999) (court will not consider undeveloped or unsupported issues)
Mitchell v. State, 972 P.2d 888 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (§ 1321 allows return of property without hearing only when ownership is undisputed)
Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (dismissal without prejudice can be final and appealable if it effectively ends federal proceedings)
Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527 (10th Cir. 2000) (issues raised first in a reply brief are generally not reviewed)