Bell v. City of Chicago
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16002
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- In Sept. 2012, Chicago police arrested Dawain Bell while he was driving Alice Spinks’s car; police impounded the car under Chicago Mun. Code § 7-24-225 (probable cause vehicle contains/was used with controlled substances).
- Spinks challenged the impoundment at a city administrative hearing; ALJ found probable cause and later assessed $2,000 penalty plus towing/storage; Spinks did not pursue judicial review in Cook County Circuit Court.
- Plaintiffs (Spinks and Bell) sued the City in state court in 2014, alleging the impoundment ordinances violated Illinois law and were facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment; the City removed the case to federal court.
- The district court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) and remanded state-law claims to state court; Plaintiffs appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo and considered two principal facial challenges: (1) that the ordinances permit warrantless seizures in all instances; and (2) that post-seizure review by a City ALJ (non-judicial officer) is unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the impoundment ordinances are facially invalid because they permit warrantless vehicle seizures in all instances | Ordinances authorize warrantless seizures categorically and thus violate the Fourth Amendment | Ordinances require probable cause for listed use- or status-related offenses (including § 7-24-225 for drugs), and warrantless seizures supported by probable cause are constitutional | Rejected. Ordinances as applied here permit warrantless seizure only with probable cause; Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent allow such seizures |
| Whether post-seizure procedures are facially invalid because a non-judicial City ALJ (not a neutral judicial officer) determines continued possession | ALJ review is non-judicial and not neutral, so post-seizure retention lacks proper judicial oversight and violates Fourth Amendment | The Fourth Amendment challenge is misplaced: seizure is complete upon impoundment; challenges to continued retention are Due Process matters, not Fourth Amendment; Plaintiffs waived any due process claim | Rejected as a Fourth Amendment claim. If pursued, post-seizure retention is examined under Fourteenth Amendment due process, but Plaintiffs waived that argument |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (property seizure occurs when government meaningfully interferes with possessory interests)
- Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (seizures generally unreasonable without a warrant, but exceptions exist)
- Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (reasonableness is the ultimate Fourth Amendment standard)
- Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (warrantless seizure of vehicle permissible when officer has probable cause that vehicle was used in illegal drug activity)
- G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (vehicles may be seized without a warrant on public streets when probable cause exists)
- United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir.) (forfeiture-based warrantless vehicle seizures constitutional with probable cause)
- Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.) (seizure is complete upon impoundment; Fourth Amendment challenge ends there)
- United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (continued governmental retention of property after seizure implicates due process)
- Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619 (7th Cir.) (due process challenge to impoundment procedures)