G. M. LEASING CORP. ET AL. v. UNITED STATES ET AL.
No. 75-235
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 4, 1976—Decided January 12, 1977
429 U.S. 338
Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Stuart A. Smith, Leonard J. Henzke, Jr., and Stephen M. Gelber.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case, 423 U. S. 1031 (1975), limited to the Fourth Amendment issue arising in the context of seizures of property in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments.1
I
Petitioner G. M. Leasing Corp. is a Utah corporation organized in April 1972; among its stated business purposes is the leasing of automobiles. George I. Norman, Jr., although apparently not an incorporator, officer, or director of petitioner, was its general manager.
In 1971 Norman was tried and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on two counts of aiding and abetting a misapplication of funds from a federally insured bank, in violation of
The Normans also sought and were granted an extension of time within which to file their return for the calendar year 1971. A check for $405,125 was given to the Service on April 15, 1972, for application on their 1971 tax. This check evidently was dishonored. Although further extensions of time were granted, neither of the Normаns ever filed a 1971 return.
In October 1972, after Norman‘s conviction was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, the Service assigned the Norman account for 1970 and 1971 to Agent P. J. Clayton for investigation. Mr. Clayton, however, took no immediate action. Id., at 66; Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25.
In March 1973, after Norman‘s petition for a writ of certiorari had been denied, and after his petition for rehearing had also been denied, 410 U. S. 959 (1973), he surrendered to the United States Marshal for the serving of his sentence. By a ruse, however, he immediately disappeared. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Norman thereupon became a fugitive from justice; he was still one at the time of the oral argument. App. 15; Brief for Petitioners 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6.
Upon Norman‘s becoming a fugitive, the Service activated its investigation. On March 19, it determined deficiencies in Norman‘s income tax liability for 1970 and 1971 in the
The following day revenue agents called at the Norman residence in Salt Lake City to endeavor to collect the taxes.
While the agents were at the Norman residence, they observed automobiles parked in the driveway. Later, upon checking with the Utah Motor Vehicle Division, they learned that these vehicles were registered in the name of petitioner or in the name of another corporation owned by Norman, and that no automobile was registered in Norman‘s name or in that of his wife. Id., at 73-74. They also learned that petitioner had no license to conduct business within Salt Lake County and had no telephone listing. Id., at 74. It was further ascertained that, pursuant to the request of the Utah Department of Employment Security, petitioner had filed a Status Report. That report described the corporation‘s principal business activity as “Leasing Luxury Automobiles, Boats, etc.” It recited that the corporation‘s “average number of employees” was zero and that it had paid no wages while it was in existence during the last three quarters of 1972 or thus far in 1973. Id., at 91-92. On its Utah Sales and Use Tax Return for the second quarter of 1972, the corporation reported no sales. Id., at 93. The agents regarded the automobiles seen at the Norman residence as “show” or “collector” cars and not the type “that would normally be used in a leasing business.” Id., at 74.
All these facts suggested to the agents that petitioner corporation was not engaged in any business activity but, instead, was Norman‘s alter ego and a repository of at least some of his personal assets. The agents consulted with the Service‘s Regional Counsel. With his concurrence,
On or about March 21, two days after the jeopardy assessments, revenue officers, without a warrant, seized several automobiles. Among them were a 1972 Stutz, a Rolls Royce Phantom V, a 1930 Rolls Royce Phantom I, two 1971 Stutzes, and a Jaguar. Three were taken at two different locations in Salt Lake City; two at the Century Plaza parking lot in Los Angeles, Cal.; and one near Norman‘s residence in Salt Lake City. Id., at 121, 129; Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14. None of the cars was on property in which petitioner had an interest. All werе registered in petitioner‘s name. App. 75-76. The officers left a Chevrolet and a station wagon for the personal use of Mrs. Norman and her family.6
Also on March 21, revenue officers went to petitioner‘s office in Salt Lake County to levy on property subject to seizure, including the building itself. Id., at 19. They had information that one, and possibly two, luxury automobiles might be there. Upon learning that a car was in the garage on the premises, they telephoned their superior, Bert Applegate, and asked him to come out to assist. Id., at 77-79. The premises consisted of a cottage-type building and the garage. When Applegate arrived, a locksmith was there. He already had removed the lock from the garage door
Applegate entered the cottage. He observed that its outward appearance was such that it could be a residence. He noticed a kitchen. He instructed the officers not to proceed with the seizure of any property there until the status of the cottage could be confirmed.7 Id., at 81, 23-24. The officers then left the cottage without taking anything, and its lock was replaced. Id., at 82.
While the officers were in the cottage, Norman‘s son, George I. Norman III, age 19, and listed as a dependent on the 1970 Form 1040, appeared. He told the officers that the Stutz belonged to the petitioner corporation, and not to Norman. Id., at 80, 34. He testified that he was living at the cottage “as security.” Id., at 34. He was asked to provide evidence as to thе car‘s ownership. A decision was made not to seize the automobile at that time.
Information then came to Applegate, primarily from a Mr. Redd who was a contractor for Norman, that the cottage was a place of business and not a residence. Id., at 79. In addition, there was activity at the cottage that night; the lights were on and boxes were being moved. The next morning the Stutz was not in the garage.8 Id., at 83. Sometime during the next two days, a decision was made to seize the cottage, its furnishings and any other assets there.9 On
In May, petitioner corporation instituted this suit. By its amended complaint it asserted a claim for wrongful levy, with a request for the return of the automobiles; a claim for suppression of all evidence obtained from the seized documents; and a claim against the agents for damages. Id., at 105-112. It alleged that the assessments were arbitrary and capricious, that petitioner was not an alter ego of Norman, and that the levy upon its premises and the contents violated the Fourth Amendment. Ibid.
Shortly thеreafter, the Service returned to the cottage the originals of the records and documents that had been seized. In the meantime, however, they had been photocopied.11 By a second amendment to petitioner‘s complaint, id., at 124, punitive damages, among other relief, were requested.
Norman‘s son filed a complaint in intervention, id., at 112-117, alleging essentially the same facts and requesting
At the ensuing trial before the court without a jury there was testimony that Norman himself originally held title to some of the automobiles registered in petitioner‘s name, id., at 37; that petitioner had no employees and did not lease any cars, id., at 37, 39; that petitioner‘s only assets were luxury or vintage model automobiles; that the cars had nоt been transferred to it until at or near the end of 1972; and that petitioner never issued any stock, held any director‘s meetings, or engaged in any business.12 Id., at 43-45.
The District Court entered judgment for petitioner and for the intervenor. It found that the premises in question were the offices of petitioner and the residence of the intervenor; that the revenue-officer defendants had no search warrant; that they forcibly entered the premises on March 23 and again on March 25;13 that they made the entry, search, and seizure “knowing full well that they were violating the rights” of petitioner, the intervenor, “and others“; that Agent Clayton committed the entry “maliciously“; that the defendants returned the books and records that had been seized but photocopied them and retained the photocopies; that the defendants levied upon and sеized all the assets of petitioner, including seven automobiles and a bank account; that they disposed of two of the automobiles and stored the others in Salt Lake City; that the assessments of taxes, penalties, and interest against Norman and his wife for 1970 and 1971 were erroneous; that Norman and his wife had no liability for federal income tax, penalties,
The Court of Appeals, for the most part, reversed. 514 F. 2d 935 (CA10 1975). It ruled that the evidence conclusively estаblished that petitioner was Norman‘s alter ego so that its assets could be seized to satisfy Norman‘s income tax liability; that the District Court‘s finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous; that petitioner had not sustained its burden of proving the assessments to be erroneous; and that the trial court erred in invalidating the assessments and in dismissing the Government‘s counterclaim. In regard to the claim of illegal search and seizures, the Court of Appeals held:
“The refusal to pay authorized appellants to collect the tax by levy, and this included the power of ‘seizure by any means.’ Thus appellants were acting pursuant to
statute and did not commit an illegal search. The trial court‘s order returning the assets and suppressing the documents is improper.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 941.
The court also ruled that there was no evidence to support the trial court‘s finding that Clayton‘s participation “was of a malicious character.” Ibid. In accord with a concession by the Government, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s judgment insofar as it ordered the return of certain shares of stock to the intervenor.14
II
A.
Under
B. Our grant of certiorari was limited to the Fourth Amendment issue, and we declined to review petitioner‘s and Norman‘s son‘s claims that the assessments and levies should have been voided and that petitioner was not Norman‘s alter ego. Pet. for Cert. 2, 3.17 We therefore approach this case accepting the Court of Appeals’ determinations that the assessments and levies were valid and that petitioner was Norman‘s alter ego. Those facts necessarily establish probable cause to believe that assets held by petitioner were properly subject to seizure in satisfaction of the assessments. Petitioner does not claim that there was no probable cause to believe that the automobiles were held by petitioner, nor does it claim that there was no probable cause to believe that its offices would contain other seizable goods. There being probable cause for the search and seizures, the only questions before the Court are whether warrants were required to make “reasonable” either the seizures of the cars or the еntry into and seizure of goods in the cottage.
C. The seizures of the automobiles in this case took place on public streets, parking lots, or other open places, and did not involve any invasion of privacy. In Murray‘s Lessee v.
D. The seizure of the books and records, however, involved intrusion into the privacy of petitioner‘s offices. Significantly, the Court has said:
“[O]ne governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search
of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967).
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 454-455 (1971); id., at 512 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
The respondents do not contend that business premises are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such a proposition could not be defended in light of this Court‘s clear holdings to the contrary. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967); Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). Nor can it be claimed that corporations are without some Fourth Amendment rights. Go-Bart Co. v. United States, supra; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 205-206 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 75-76 (1906). Cf. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 (1974); Federal Trade Comm‘n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 305-306 (1924); Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 375-376 (1911); Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 553-554 (1908).
The Court, of course, has recognized that a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context. Thus, in United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972), a warrantless search of a locked storeroom during business hours, pursuant to the inspection procedure authorized by thе Gun Control Act of 1968,
“When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection.” 406 U. S., at 316.
See also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures to regulate the liquor industry but failed in that case to authorize a warrantless search).
In the present case, however, the intrusion into petitioner‘s privacy was not based on the nature of its business, its license, or any regulation of its activities. Rather, the intrusion is claimed to be justified on the ground that petitioner‘s assets were seizable to satisfy tax assessments. This involves nothing more than the normal enforcement of the tax laws, and we find no justification for treating petitioner differently in these circumstances simply because it is a corporation.
The respondents argue that there is a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment that allows warrantless intrusions into privacy in the furtherance of enforcement of the tax laws. We recognize that the “Power to lay and collect Taxes” is a specifically enunciated power of the Federal Government,
“The General Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of their constitutions the State Governments had in view? If there was reason for restraining the State Governments from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the Federal Government.” 1 Annals of Cong. 438 (1834 ed.).
The respondents urge that the history of the common law in England and the laws in several States prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights support the view that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to cover intrusions into privacy in the enforcement of the tax laws. We do not find in the cited materials anything approaching the clear evidence that would be required to create so great an exception to the Fourth Amendment‘s protections against warrantless intrusions into privacy.
The respondents also rely upon certain dicta in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886)20 (subpoena of private
Finally, the respondents argue that warrantless searches are justified by congressional enactment, as were the searches in Biswell and Colonnade. The statute,
The respondents recognize that one of the Court‘s critical concerns in Camara and See was the discretion of the seizing officers. Brief for Respondents 66. Yet
The respondents assert that the burden on the Government of obtaining a warrant is a relevant factor. Brief for Respondents 67-68. They suggest that the burden is great here because the Government is dealing with persons who may attempt to put their property beyond reach. Yet the statute authorizes distraint and seizure whenever a taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay his tax, and regardless of any indication of risk of concealment. The statute simply does not focus on situations involving a need for rapid action.
The respondents argue that the interest in the collection of taxes is such as to bring this case within the reasoning of Biswell and Colonnade. Those cases involved voluntary
The respondents suggest that the privacy interest in business premises is less than that in a private home. Even if correct, the assertion is irrelevant with respect to the intent of the statute, for the statute makes no distinction between business properties and dwelling areas. If it authorizes entries at all, it authorizes entries into both business premises and private homes.
The respondents offer no legislative history in support of their reading of
The intrusion into petitioner‘s office is therefore governed by the normal Fourth Amendment rule that “except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 528-529.
As an alternative to their argument that a new exception to the warrant requirement should be recognized, the respondents assert that the facts of this case bring it within the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement.21 The agents’ own actions, however, in their
We therefore conclude that the warrantless entry into petitioner‘s office was in violation of the commands of the Fourth Amendment.
III
This takes us to the issue of remedy. Specifically, petitioner, by its second amended complaint, prayed for (a) the return of the photocopies of the books and records; (b) the return of the automobiles; (c) a declaration that petitioner is not the alter ego of Norman or of Mrs. Norman; (d) the suppression of all evidence obtained from the books and records; (e) the suppression of the automobiles as evidence; (f) the release of all levies; and (g) general and punitive damages against the individual defendant-agents. App. 123-124.
The alter ego issue, as has been notеd, was denied review. The books and records were returned, and the photocopies concededly have been destroyed; that claim, thus, is moot. We have decided the issue of the legality of the seizure of the automobiles adversely to petitioner. The suppression issue, as to the books and records, obviously is premature and may be considered if and when proceedings arise in which the Government seeks to use the documents or information obtained from them. See Meister v. United States, 397 F. 2d 268, 269 (CA3 1968); Hill v. United States, 346 F. 2d 175 (CA9), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 956 (1965). And the irreparable injury required to support a motion to suppress, under
This leaves only the issue of damages against the individual agents. The District Court found that Agent Clayton “maliciously committed said forced entry, and search and seizure,” App. 138, and сoncluded that he and other individual defendants acted “knowing full well that they were violating the rights of” petitioner. Ibid. It concluded that petitioner was entitled to judgment for those actions. The Court of Appeals, in the context of its holding that the entry and search were not illegal, ruled that the finding of maliciousness on the part of Clayton was unsupported by any evidence in the record and was clearly erroneous. 514 F. 2d, at 940-941. It also reversed the judgment awarding petitioner damages. Id., at 942.
We have held above, however, that a warrant should have been obtained, under the circumstances of this case, before the forcible entry was effected. This brings into focus and for consideration this Court‘s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), and the reservation there of the immunity question. The Government suggests that, assuming a violation of the Fourth Amendment by the agеnts, petitioner is not entitled to money damages if the agents acted in good faith; that good faith was supported by the “apparent fact” that the agents’ conduct was in conformity with standard Service procedures based upon Murray‘s Lessee, supra; and that the record justifies the conclusion that the agents acted in good faith. That may well be, but we conclude that this aspect of the facts, the existence of proof of any injury to petitioner resulting from the entry and the temporary seizure of the books and records, and the immunity issue all should be addressed in the first instance by the Court of Appeals and, if it so directs, by the District Court.
It is so ordered.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.
While I concur in the opinion of the Court, it may be useful to note that the factual setting of this case provides what seems, to me, a classic illustration of the dividing line between an impermissible, warrantless entry and one permissible under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
After their initial entry into, and retreat from, the petitioner‘s office-cottage, the IRS agents assigned to the investigation of the fugitive Norman‘s tax liability placed the premises under 24-hour surveillance. One night during the course of this surveillance, the agents observed cartons and other materials being removed from the premises by persons unknown to them. Against the background facts, such surreptitious nighttime activity constituted an exigent circumstance that would have justified an immediate seizure of the materials being moved in order to protect the intеrests of the United States. This is especially so since here the premises were controlled by the alter ego of an individual who was not only a delinquent taxpayer, but who was, at the time, a fugitive from justice. Rather than acting immediately, however, the agents chose to wait for approximately a day and a half to two days before making their entry. I agree with the conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances on these facts; however, the Court holds no more than that the agents’ delay after observing these highly suspicious events makes that exception to the warrant requirement unavailable to them. By failing to act at once, the exigency was dissipated, and I do not understand our