Belkis Nolasco-Amaya v. Merrick Garland, 14 F.4th 1007

Nolasco‑Amaya, a Honduran national, was ordered removed in absentia in 2005, reentered the U.S. in 2019, and the government reinstated the prior removal order, making her ineligible for asylum and placing her in withholding‑only proceedings.
At the merits hearing the IJ (1) credited her testimony, (2) found past persecution, but (3) denied withholding and CAT relief because the Honduran government was deemed able/willing to protect her, internal relocation was feasible, and she had not shown past torture or government acquiescence.
Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of Appeal asserting that Honduran police “didn’t do nothing to help me” and that “MS‑13 [is] there in all the places in Honduras,” and checked a box saying she would file a separate brief but did not do so.
The BIA summarily dismissed her appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A) and (E) for failure to specify grounds sufficiently and for failing to file the promised brief.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether summary dismissal violated due process and concluded the pro se Notice of Appeal was sufficiently specific as to government protection and internal relocation; it granted the petition as to due process, remanded for merits, and dismissed the collateral‑attack challenge to the reinstated removal order for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether BIA permissibly summarily dismissed pro se Notice of Appeal under 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A),(E)	Nolasco‑Amaya argued her pro se Notice—stating police did nothing and MS‑13 is everywhere, and intending to file a brief—gave adequate notice of errors on government protection and internal relocation.	BIA argued the Notice was too vague to meaningfully apprise it of specific legal/factual grounds and petitioner failed to file promised brief.	Court held the Notice was sufficiently specific (given pro se status and withholding‑only posture) on at least two issues; summary dismissal violated due process; remanded for BIA to consider merits.
Whether Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear collateral attack challenging service of the original Notice to Appear / reinstatement	Petitioner contended initial service was defective, so reinstatement should be invalidated.	Government relied on Morales‑Izquierdo (reentry + prior removal bars collateral attack) and argued no gross miscarriage of justice.	Court held petitioner was barred from collateral attack; lacked jurisdiction to review reinstatement; no gross miscarriage of justice shown.

Morales‑Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reentry after prior removal bars collateral attack on prior order)
Vega‑Anguiano v. Barr, 982 F.3d 542 (9th Cir. 2019) (standard for showing "gross miscarriage of justice" to permit collateral attack)
Garcia‑Cortez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2004) (BIA may not summarily dismiss pro se appeal when notice gives valid and specific grounds; due process violation)
Rojas‑Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2003) (purpose of specificity requirement is to avoid forcing BIA to search the record and speculate)
Casas‑Chavez v. INS, 300 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (notice may specify reasons on the form or by separate brief; strict specificity applied)
Toquero v. INS, 956 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1992) (explains what level of factual/legal detail the BIA’s specificity rule requires)