Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales
20 Cal. App. 5th 924
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2018Background
- Bel Air Internet sued former employees Morales and Delabra for intentional interference with contractual relations, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion (Morales only), alleging they encouraged co‑employees to quit, refuse to sign a release, and "pursue employment‑related lawsuits."
- Appellants moved to strike under the anti‑SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16), arguing the allegedly encouraging communications were protected petitioning activity; they submitted declarations denying the conduct and supporting facts.
- The trial court's tentative ruling granted the motion (finding the complaint alleged protected prelitigation activity), but after supplemental briefing reversed as to prong one, concluding the defendants were not "in good faith seriously considering suing" in their prelitigation conduct; it denied the motion overall.
- Appellants appealed; the Court of Appeal reviewed de novo whether the complaint and supporting declarations showed the challenged claims arose from protected petitioning activity and whether a movant may rely on the plaintiff's pleadings alone for prong one.
- The appellate court held the complaint (with plaintiff’s declarations explaining factual basis) alleged protected prelitigation solicitation of litigation and reversed: Bel Air's interference claim dismissed; portions of two contract claims stricken. Appellants awarded fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant must submit declarations proving its conduct was in anticipation of litigation to satisfy anti‑SLAPP prong one | Bel Air: defendant must provide evidence that prelitigation communications were made in "good faith and serious consideration" of litigation | Appellants: the face of the complaint controls prong one; defendant may rely on plaintiff's allegations | Held: If the complaint itself alleges protected activity (bolstered by plaintiff’s declarations), the defendant may rely on those allegations for prong one; no independent evidentiary showing by the movant is required |
| Whether encouraging third parties to sue is protected petitioning activity under § 425.16(e) | Bel Air: prelitigation protection requires a recipient's serious consideration; here communications were not protected or were incidental | Appellants: counseling/encouraging others to sue is protected prelitigation petitioning activity | Held: Encouraging or counseling others to bring suit is protected prelitigation petitioning activity; the focus is the speaker's conduct, not the recipient's subjective intent |
| Whether the alleged encouragement to quit and sue was merely incidental/contextual (thus not subject to anti‑SLAPP) | Bel Air: the encouragement to breach employment (stop doing their jobs) was the real wrong; urging to sue was incidental | Appellants: the complaint alleges the encouragement to quit and sue was the actionable wrong | Held: The complaint alleges encouragement to quit and sue as the basis of the claims, not mere background; thus the speech itself is the wrong complained of and falls within § 425.16 |
| Entitlement to attorney fees if motion succeeds on appeal | Bel Air: even if successful, fees unwarranted because motion had minimal practical effect | Appellants: prevailing defendants under § 425.16(c)(1) are entitled to fees | Held: Appellants prevailed in full on the anti‑SLAPP motion; they are entitled to attorney fees and costs on motion and appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016) (anti‑SLAPP purpose and procedure; two‑step analysis)
- Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (Cal. 1999) (counseling others to pursue legal remedies can be protected prelitigation activity)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (Cal. 2002) (court must consider pleadings and supporting/opposing affidavits in prong one)
- City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69 (Cal. 2002) (claim "arises from" protected activity when based on that activity)
- Comstock v. Aber, 212 Cal.App.4th 931 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (the question is what is pled, not what is later argued or disproved)
- Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal.4th 1187 (Cal. 1993) (soliciting litigation by others is communicative and within litigation privilege's scope)
- Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.App.4th 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (instigating lawsuits by others is protected conduct)
- Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232 (Cal. 2007) (litigation privilege applies to prelitigation communications only if litigation is seriously contemplated)