Lead Opinion
Opinion
At common law, barratry was “the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels” (4 Blackstone, Commentaries 134) and was punished as a misdemeanor. A statutory version of the crime survives today, although it is seldom prosecuted, perhaps because of the requirement that the proof show the defendant “excited” at least three groundless suits “with a corrupt or malicious intent to vex and annoy.” (Pen. Code, §§ 158, 159.)
The modern successor of common law barratry, solicitation, is not only, a misdemeanor when accomplished through the use of agents, but is also subject to discipline by the State Bar. We granted review in this case to consider whether a defendant in an impending civil action may sue the attorneys for the opposing party on the ground that they wrongfully “solicited” the litigation against him. We conclude that this proceeding not only undermines the established policy of allowing access to the courts, but that,
I
The present action grows out of a “notice of intention to commence action” mailed on August 28, 1989, to Gerald Rubin by Norma Green. The notice was purportedly on behalf of all of the approximately 450 San Bernardino County residents of Cedar Village Mobilehome Park, a park co-owned by Rubin. In her notice, Green, herself a Cedar Village resident, enumerated 23 alleged defects in the operation of the park and sought a variety of remedies under California and federal law.
Rubin’s attorney replied on his behalf to Green’s letter, offering to meet with a park residents group to discuss the grievances and “attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution.” The reply went on to assert that Green had “made threatening statements to various residents” of Cedar Village “in the process of soliciting clients” as an agent for her attorneys’ law firm. It concluded by warning Green that Rubin would “not tolerate such conduct and will seek appropriate compensation in the event of any loss or injury to Mr. Rubin’s contractual and business relationship with his tenants and employees.” Green’s attorneys responded to Rubin’s letter, contesting many of its assertions but indicating a desire to discuss a resolution of their clients’ grievances.
Approximately a week after receiving the law firm’s response, Rubin filed this action in the superior court against both Green and the law firm. Rubin’s verified complaint alleged several tort claims, the gist of which was that the defendants had solicited Cedar Village residents as clients in anticipated litigation against Rubin over park conditions, thereby interfering in Rubin’s contractual relations with them.
The complaint alleged that, with Green as their agent, the law firm had “embarked on a malicious effort to harm [Rubin’s] economic and business standing by stirring up animosity among [Cedar Village] residents, utilizing fear, intimidation and coercion against residents, and communicating the false promise of frivolous litigation as a means to profit unjustly at [Rubin’s] expense.” The complaint sought damages as well as equitable relief enjoining defendants from soliciting “non-client residents at Cedar Village ... to become legal clients of [the law firm] on any matter concerning Cedar Village . . . .” Meanwhile, on December 7,1989, Green and over 120 other residents of Cedar Village, represented by the defendant law firm, filed the action noticed in Green’s letter of August 28 to Rubin, alleging a failure to
After the superior court denied his application for interim equitable relief and refused a request that the failure-to-maintain suit be consolidated with this action, Rubin filed an amended complaint, adding a claim against defendants for “unfair business practices” and narrowing the request for injunctive relief to encompass only acts of alleged harassment against him. The amended complaint also offered a more detailed account of the solicitation allegedly practiced by the defendants on the residents of Cedar Village.
According to the amended complaint, the law firm had engaged in a pattern of soliciting residents of several mobilehome parks for the purpose of commencing litigation against park owners. Allegedly, the firm’s modus operandi was to arrange for an invitation to meet with park residents to help negotiate a resolution of complaints regarding park conditions with the owner; this, in turn, would lead to a prоmise by the firm to obtain substantial monetary settlements for those residents who agreed to join in litigation against the owner. A lawsuit, preceded by a “form” notice of suit, followed. After filing suit, often on behalf of a hundred or more mobilehome park residents, the law firm would seek an early trial preference on the basis of the advanced age of some of the resident-plaintiffs, thereby (according to the amended complaint) truncating the defendant owner’s opportunity for full discovery.
The superior court sustained a general demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend on the ground that defendants’ conduct was privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (section 47(b)), the so-called “litigation privilege.” A divided Court of Appeal reversed that judgment, ruling that the privilege did not apply to the acts of the law firm and Green for alternative reasons.
First, a majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that although the acts of defendants leading to the law firm’s retention by the Cedar Village
One justice dissented, reasoning that the litigation privilege of section 47(b) applied to the conduct in suit, that the acts of the law firm and Green, alleged in the amended complaint, amounted to inducing the Cedar Village residents to file a lawsuit and were thus protected by a separate immunity, and that the unfаir competition statute did not confer a cause of action on plaintiff against defendants for solicitation. We agree with the dissenting justice, albeit for somewhat different reasons, that plaintiff’s suit cannot be maintained.
As we explain, the acts of defendants alleged in the amended complaint were communicative within the meaning of section 47(b). They were thus within the scope of the privilege and immune from tort liability. We also conclude that because plaintiff’s wrongful solicitation claim lacks an essential attribute of a malicious prosecution action and is brought against attorneys representing litigation adversaries in a related proceeding, it is not maintainable in any event. Finally, we hold that plaintiff may not avoid the bar of section 47(b) by pleading his claim as one for injunctive relief under the unfair competition statute. We will accordingly direct that this action be dismissed.
II
For well over a century, communications with “some relation” to judicial proceedings have been absolutely immune from tort liability by the privilege codified as section 47(b).
(2) Undergirding the immunity conferred by section 47(b) is the broadly applicable policy of assuring litigants “the utmost freedom of access to the courts to secure and defend their rights . . . .” (Albertson v. Raboff, supra,
In light of this extensive history, it is late in the day to contend that communications with “some relation” to an anticipated lawsuit are not within the privilege. Following Albertson v. Raboff, supra,
Nor does the fact that defendants’ communications with the Cedar Village residents necessarily involved related acts destroy the privilege. In concluding that the gravamen of the amended complaint involved noncommunicative conduct, the Court of Appeal relied on our opinion in Kimmel v. Goland (1990)
To further emphasize the distinction between communicative acts and noncommunicative conduct—“traditionally ... a threshold issue in determining the applicability of section 47[b]” (Kimmel v. Goland, supra,
In Kimmel v. Goland, supra,
Ill
Having concluded that the acts at issue here are within the scope of section 47(b), and are thus protected from tort liability, we must determine the extent of that protection. As we explain, because plaintiffs claim of attorney solicitation lacks an essential feature of other derivative tort actions, restrictions affecting the maintenance of such actions—limitations on the timing of such claims and the elements of the alleged wrong that must be established—are inapplicable. Instead, given the gravamen of the amended complaint, we are led to conclude that plaintiffs claim is not maintainable at all.
The core policy protecting access to the courts underlying section 47(b) has led to the requirement that a derivative tort action seeking redress for communications within the privilege be delayed until the original suit is terminated in favor of the derivative plaintiff. Its maintenance is further conditioned on a heightened showing of abuse, amounting in effect to a species of bad faith, by the plaintiff in the initial suit. The filing of retaliatory claims has thus been limited by incorporating conditions borrowed from the venerable common law tort of malicious prosecution. (See, for example, Silberg, supra,
Here, however, the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is not that the claims of the Cedar Village litigants are themselves groundless, but that the methods employed by the law firm (through the use of Green) in being retained as counsel for the residents amounted to solicitation, conduct the Legislature has made criminal. Because the alleged wrong which plaintiff seeks to redress is not the filing of an unjustified lawsuit but of soliciting
In Sheldon Appel, supra,
Instead, we said that “the better means of addressing the problem of unjustified litigation is through the adoption of measures facilitating the speedy resolution of the initial lawsuit and authorizing the imposition of sanctions for frivolous or delaying conduct within that first action itself, rather than through an expansion оf the opportunities for initiating one or more additional rounds of malicious prosecution litigation after the first action has been concluded.” (Sheldon Appel, supra,
Considered from the perspective of Sheldon Appel, supra,
It is not difficult to imagine the consequences likely to follow in the wake of a rule permitting the defendant in a civil action to institute parallel
On the other hand, given the regulatory and prosecutorial sanctions available to remedy attorney solicitation, together with those available to litigants within the scope of the predicate action itself, the utility of a proceeding such as this one is marginal. As noted, attorney solicitation through the use of “runners” or “cappers” is a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6152-6153;
Plaintiff and supporting amici curiae assert that these remedies are insufficient. They argue that the growing litigiousness of society has been fueled by the uncontrolled growth of attorney solicitation, and that the practice is malum in se, an evil that, although it may lead to the filing of meritorious
We are unpersuaded. Attorney solicitation may indeed be perceived as a growing problem, entwined as it is with an ongoing trend toward loosening restrictions on attorney advertising and related controls on the marketing of legal services. (See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977)
That, in effect, is what plaintiff seeks. A continuation of this action itself would add yet another layer of litigation. And that will not be the end of it. It is argued on behalf of рlaintiff that if this action should itself fail on the merits, the law firm and Green will not be without a remedy. That remedy, according to one of the amici curiae, is nothing less than another malicious prosecution action, this one against the plaintiff by defendants. In short, the remedy urged upon us is, if anything, as bad as, or worse than, the illness it is said to cure.
We are certain, in any event, that a lawsuit such as this one is inconsistent with the choice made in Sheldon Appel, supra,
IV
Despite the applicability of section 47(b), plaintiff argues that he is nevertheless entitled to pursue injunctive relief because Business and Professions Code section 17204 grants any member of the public standing to seek such relief against “unfair competition.” He points out that the courts have given the phrase “unfair competition” a broad meaning, embracing “any unlawful business practice . . . .” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983)
We recently traced the history and purpose behind the unfair competition statute in Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992)
(7) Although the act’s coverage is indeed sweeping, embracing “ ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law’ ” (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972)
In evident conflict with the policy of permitting members of the public to police the spectrum of “unfair competition” is the policy embodied in section 47(b), discussed above, of insuring litigants open access to the courts. Confronted with an apparent conflict between these two statutes, we must harmonize them insofar as possible. (People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984)
The closest precedent in point is our decision in Ribas v. Clark, supra,
In upholding her claim of immunity, we expressly considered “the applicability of Civil Code section 47 to statutory causes of action.” (Ribas v. Clark, supra,
In an analogous context, the Courts of Appeal have considered variations on plaintiff’s claim that the unfair competition statute grants him unqualified standing to seek injunctive relief against defendants notwithstanding the absolute bar imposed by section 47(b). These decisions have rejected the claim that a plaintiff may, in effect, “plead around” absolute barriers to relief by relabeling the nature of the action as one brought under the unfair competition statute. Notably in the case of actions arising out of an insurer’s alleged bad faith refusal to settle insurance claims, formerly brought under
In atypical case, Safeco Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990)
The Courts of Appeal reached the same result in Maler v. Superior Court (1990)
The reasoning underlying these results was succinctly summarized by Justice Kaus, writing for the Court of Appeal in a case in which the applicability of section 47(b) itself was at issue. In Thornton v. Rhoden (1966)
That, in effect, is the result plaintiff seeks to achieve here. As noted, the conduct of defendants alleged in the complaint is clearly communicative and
We emphasize that the result we reach is propelled in part by the precise circumstances before us. Plaintiff is an adversary in the collateral failure-to-maintain action brought by the Cedar Village residents; the latter are represented in that action by the same attorneys who are defendants in this action; and defendant Green is one of the plaintiffs in that same action. Apart from spawning yet another layer of litigation, placing in the hands of a litigation adversary a weapon with the tactical potential of a statutory unfair competition claim for injunctive relief would promote all of the evils we have described above as accompanying retaliatory suits based on litigation-related communications. (See, ante, at pp. 1195-1196.)
Permitting plaintiff to proceed would produce other distortions. In the typical derivative action filed in the wake of allegedly tortious litigation-related communications, the aggrieved plaintiff had been a party in the antecedent proceeding in which the challenged communications occurred, and now seeks redress for injuries alleged to have resulted from them. Unless the conditions requisite to a malicious prosecution action are рleaded and proven, section 47(b) denies relief in such circumstances, not only because that result is deemed necessary to secure the greater interest in ensuring unhindered access to the courts, but also because, as we noted in Silberg, supra,
In short, permitting plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief here would upset the carefully constructed balance between “the freedom of an individual to seek redress in the courts and the interest of a potential defendant in being free from unjustified litigation” (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., supra,
Our conclusion that plaintiff’s tack of pleading his claim under the unfair competition statute does not override the litigation privilege in this case is reinforced by the fact that the policy underlying the unfair competition statute can be vindicated by multiple parties other than plaintiff under the broad standing provision of Business and Professions Code section 17204. Apart from the overreached client, these litigants include the Attorney General, district attorneys, and certain city attorneys. (Ibid.) Importantly, members of the public who, unlike plaintiff, are not adversaries in collateral litigation involving the same attorneys also have standing to pursue unfair competition claims under the statute. (Ibid.) Finally, as noted, ante, both the State Bar and prosecutorial authorities are authorized to pursue additional sanctions against attorney solicitation of the sort alleged in the amended complaint.
Given the importance of the policy favoring judicial access, and of the role played by the litigation privilege as a means of effectuating that policy, we conclude that plaintiff may not avoid the bar of section 47(b) by casting his claim as one for injunctive relief under the unfair competition statute.
V
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Lucas, C. J., Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., concurred.
Notes
Relations between park and mobilehome owners are extensively regulated by statute. The Mobilehome Residency Law (Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.) requires a written rental agreement and specifies its contents, regulates rents and related charges that park owners may impose on residents, provides for meetings between residents and park management, regulates the termination of tenancies and the transfer of mobilehomes and mobilehome parks, and provides judicial remedies and penalties. The latter provision includes a requirement that before an action for the alleged failure to maintain common park facilities or levels of service—a so-called “failure-to-maintain” suit—is instituted by park residents, 30 days written notice of the intention to file such an action must be given management. (Civ. Code, § 798.84.) It was this 30-day “suit letter” from Green to the plaintiff that precipitated the present proceeding.
As pertinent here, Civil Code section 47 provides: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:
“(b) In any ... (2) judicial proceeding . . . .”
(See, e.g., Drasin v. Jacoby & Myers (1984)
Whether we should judicially notice the outcome of the failure-to-maintain litigation filed by the defendant law firm on behalf of Green and other Cedar Village residents is a question that is vigorously contested by the parties. In light of our conclusion that the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim goes not to the merits of the failure-to-maintain litigation but to antecedent matters, we decline to judicially notice any matter related to that suit beyond the fact that it was filed.
The Legislature recently amended the attorney solicitation statute (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6153) to increase the penalty for a first offense from six months to one year in the county jail and to permit a sentence of state imprisonment for a second offense for between sixteen months and three years, together with a $10,000 fine. (Stats. 1991, ch. 116, § 7.)
Because it is not presented on this record, we do not reach the question whether, in such a subsequent malicious рrosecution action, evidence of the defendants’ alleged acts of solicitation would be admissible on the issues of malice and the absence of probable cause.
We went on to note in Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1254, that “damages are not available under [the act]. [Citations.] The only nonpunitive monetary relief available under the Unfair Business Practices Act is the disgorgement of money that has been wrongfully obtained or, in the language of the statute, an order ‘restarting] . . . money . . . which may have been acquired by means of . . . unfair competition.’ ” (Id. at p. 1266.) This holding is dispositive of plaintiff’s claim for damages here.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the majority’s reasoning and result as to plaintiff’s claim for damages. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to the extent that it precludes plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. In an attempt to impose its view of good public policy, the majority judicially repeals a detailed and considered legislative remedy. The result is even more anomalous than the approach. A person who is entirely unaffected by illegal attorney solicitation can bring an action to enjoin the misconduct. A рerson, however, who is directly harmed by an attorney’s illegal solicitation has no direct judicial recourse. The result is even more troublesome on a broader level. In an era of increased budgetary and time constraints on this state’s judiciary, the majority precludes effective enforcement of the ban on unlawful attorney solicitation.
These statutes point to one simple conclusion. Unlawful attorney solicitation may be enjoined. For the most part, the majority does not contend otherwise, acknowledging that almost any member of the public has standing to bring an action to enjoin such misconduct. The majority’s only exception is the person directly harmed by the illegal conduct, that is, the person against whom the litigation was unlawfully solicited. I shall explain why I cannot concur in this strange result.
1. The majority’s view of public policy
I think it important to meet the majority’s fundamental premise that sound public policy supports the majority’s choice to disregard the statutory provisions for injunctive relief. The majority’s view appears to be that this court may disregard a statute whenever doing so facilitates our personal policy preferences. This is not tenable. No matter how strongly this court might believe that good public policy should prevent injunctive relief, the Legislature has determined for good or bad that injunctive relief is available. “Our function is not to judge the wisdom of statutes.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991)
The majority’s reliance on nonparty enforcers is questionable in another respect. There is no evidence in the record that any of the public officials identified by the majority have ever intervened in a private dispute to enjoin unlawful attorney solicitation. Even more unrealistic is the notion that private citizens with no stake in a dispute will expend time and resources to seek injunctive relief that will not benefit them. The majority’s reliance on private enforcers is contradictory. Either, as noted above, it defeats unfettered access by allowing an unlimited class of enforcers or, alternatively, the reliance is unrealistic, thereby undercutting the majority’s view that unaffected citizens will solve the problem of unlawful attorney solicitation.
Perhaps most interesting is that the majority’s rule sows the seeds of its own demise. Under the majority’s rule, a person against whom an attorney unlawfully seeks litigation cannot seek injunctive relief. Any nonaffected member of the public, however, is allowed to seek such relief. Thus, all the solicitation victim need do to avoid the majority’s restriction of his ability to seek injunctive relief is to persuade a friend, relative, or colleague to bring an injunctive relief action as a member of the public—a procedure the majority explicitly approves. Indeed, there is no legal or ethical reason why the solicitation victim could not agree to fund such an action, e.g., by paying the citizen-plaintiff’s costs and legal fees. The majority serves little purpose by creating a rule under which a victim can do indirectly that which he cannot do directly.
2. Statutory conflict
1 also depart from the majority’s approach to the “apparent conflict” it perceives between Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (hereafter, Civil Code section 47(b)) and the Business and Professions Code provisions for injunctive relief from unlawful business practices. Civil Code section 47’s privilege for communications in the course of a judicial proceeding was first enacted in 1872, more than a century ago. Business and Professions Code sections 6152 and 6153, the statutory proscriptions of attorney solicitation, were enacted more than 60 years later, in 1939. I find it difficult to believe the Legislature intended to prohibit—indeed, make criminal—that which was privileged.
Moreover, when, in 1977, the Legislature enacted Business and Professions Code sections 17203 and 17204, providing for injunctive relief from an unlawful business practice, it was clear that attorney solicitation was an unlawful practice under already-enacted Business and Professions Code section 6152. It is not reasonable to conclude that the Legislature would have provided for injunctive relief against an unlаwful practice (attorney solicitation) if the Legislature believed such relief was prohibited by Civil Code section 47(b). The majority presumably believes the Legislature was unaware of a prohibition in Civil Code section 47(b) against injunctive relief and inadvertently created a conflict by providing for such relief under Business and Professions Code sections 17203 and 17204.1 am reluctant to attribute such ignorance to the Legislature. I am also nonplussed as to how the majority finds a conflict between the two statutes. When the Legislature enacted Business and Professions Code sections 17203 and 17204 allowing for injunctive relief, there was no decision by this court holding that solicitation is privileged under Civil Code section 47(b). Thus, when it enacted sections 17203 and 17205, the Legislature could not have created a conflict between those provisions and something that did not then exist—the privilege for unlawful attorney solicitation that we announce for the first
Subsequent events also refute the majority’s view that injunctive relief is available only to those not harmed by the unlawful solicitation. In 1991, the Legislature amended Business and Professions Code section 6154 to provide that “Any contract for professional services secured by an attorney at law or law firm in this state through the services of a runner or capper is void. In any action against any attorney or law firm under the Unfair Practices Act . . . any judgment shall include an order divesting the attorney or law firm of any fees and other compensation received pursuant to any such void contract.” At a minimum, this amendment makes clear that the State Bar disciplinary system was not viewed by the Legislature as the exclusive means of enforcing the statutory ban on attorney solicitation. Moreover, the majority creates an anomaly in light of this divestiture provision. The victim of unlawful attorney solicitation is precluded from any relief—compensatory or injunctive. Any other citizen, however, can obtain not only injunctive relief, but also the additional monetary relief under Business and Professions Code section 6154. The litigation equivalent of a bounty hunter can obtain monetary relief without showing any harm. A demonstrably harmed litigant, however, is handed only a platitude as to the need for more litigation. Under the majority view, it seems as if everyone but the victim is protected or compensated.
3. Majority’s authorities
Nor am I persuaded by the authorities on which the majority relies. The obvious point should be made first. None of the decisions cited by the majority dealt with attorney solicitation and, more important, none of them
In Ribas v. Clark (1985)
Equally inapposite and unpersuasive is the majority’s reliance on Court of Appeal cases applying our decision in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988)
In the subsequent Court of Appeal cases noted by the majority, the plaintiffs sought to overcome the effect of Moradi-Shalal, supra,
In only one of the cases cited by the majority is there even a reference to injunctive relief. In Safeco Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990)
In short, the majority relies on five Court of Appeal decisions—four of which have no relevance at all, and one of which has a three-word reference to the issue.
The majority’s reliance on the progeny of Moradi-Shalal, supra,
Second, in the post-Moradi-Shalal context, the courts were faced with two statutes. We held in Moradi-Shalal that the Legislature intended no private cause of action under one statute (Ins. Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)). To allow the same relief under a different statute would require the conclusion that the Legislature intended to give with one hand what it took away with another. That is not the situation now before us. To the contrary, the Legislature has in one statute provided for injunctive relief for unlawfiil business practices. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203.) There is no competing statute in which the Legislature has manifested an intent to preclude such relief.
4. The majority’s practical result
Rather than buttressing the integrity of the judicial system, today’s decision taints it. Adequate access to the judicial system is one thing. Illegal access is another. No one disputes that attorney solicitation is wrong and repugnant—sо much so that the Legislature has made it unlawful, even criminal. The court, however, refuses to allow the victim of this crime any direct redress. Up to a point, I agree, as reflected by my concurrence in the majority’s decision not to allow recovery of damages. But prohibiting the victim from seeking injunctive relief tips the balance too far in favor of criminal conduct.
Conversely, allowing injunctive relief does not in any meaningful way restrict legal access to the courts. Unlike a separate claim for damages, a request for injunctive relief can be decided quickly and relatively easily. If solicitation is not found, that will be the end of the matter, and the attorney (as well as his clients) will have full judicial access. If solicitation is found, it will be nipped in the bud, as it should be, but any right to legal access remains unimpeded. Moreover, regardless of whether any unlawful solicitation is found, the underlying action is allowed to proceed, regardless of whether it has any merit. That alone ensures full judicial access for litigants. The only person whose access is restricted is the attorney who engages in unlawful solicitation.
Prohibiting injunctive relief also makes no sense to the victim. Why must he stand idly by while litigation against him is unlawfully solicited? That is a crime in and of itself, regardless of the possible merit of the litigation. The
Finally, I am troubled by the majority’s fundamental premise that we must take the draconian measure of refusing a victim of unlawful solicitation his specific, concrete statutory right so that we can ensure unfettered access to the courts. California has tens of thousands of competent, ethical attorneys. Any person with even a remotely meritorious claim can and will find an attorney. (One consequence of the majority’s rule is to penalize that vast majority of attorneys who refuse to engage in unlawful solicitation.) By enforcing the statutory remedy for unlawful solicitation, we would not be restricting judicial access for any claim or any person. The only person who would be stopped at the courthouse door would be the attorney who stoops to engage in unlawful solicitation. His client can come through that door and have his full day in court. We need not encourage the сrime of solicitation to ensure judicial access.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent that the judgment allowed plantiff to seek damages for the unlawful solicitation. I would affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment, however, to the extent that it allowed plaintiff to seek injunctive relief.
Panelli, J., and George, J., concurred.
Although I have referred to the person against whom litigation is unlawfully solicited as being a victim, I also believe the prospective client who is unlawfully solicited is a victim as well. Apparently, the majority would allow the prospective client to seek injunctive relief. This result creates an unfair distinction between victims. The person against whom litigation is unlawfully solicited suffers at least as much, probably greater, harm than the person who is a prospective client.
The majority states that “[I]t is late in the day to contend that communications with ‘some relation’ to an anticipated lawsuit are not within the privilege.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1194.)
This statement misses the mark. Although some communications have been held to be privileged, in none of the cases cited by the majority has unlawful solicitation been deemed privileged. (Albertson v. Raboff(1956)
The majority suggests the victim has adequate recourse in the form of a malicious prosecution action. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1200.) That is impractical. It ignores the fact that unlawful solicitation is a crime in and of itself. Whether the solicitation is unlawful has nothing to do with whether the action solicited is meritorious. Thus, even if the underlying litigation proves successful, that does not retroactively eliminate the fact that a crime was committed. The defendant in such an action, however, could not thereafter recover for malicious prosecution because he could not show that it had terminated in his favor. Nor is it clear that the majority would allow recovery even for solicitation of an action that ultimately proves meritless. The majority would apparently allow recovery of damages for malicious prosecution of the action, but not for the wrongful solicitation itself. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1200, fn. 6.)
