Beatrice Luna v. Texas Department of Pub Sf, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24067

This §1983 excessive force case arises from Mullenix firing on Leija during a high-speed interstate pursuit, resulting in Leija’s death.
The district court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity, finding material factual disputes.
Pursuit involved spike locations ahead of the route; multiple units coordinated; Leija claimed he had a gun but no weapon was found.
Mullenix waited atop a bridge, discussed shooting to disable the car, and fired six rounds as Leija approached.
Video evidence and testimony are used to assess whether the force was objectively unreasonable; the case turned on whether deadly force was justified.
Plaintiffs contended that alternative, less dangerous means were available and that Mullenix acted without reasonable immediacy of threat.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mullenix’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment	Leija’s flight did not present an imminent, substantial threat	Officers acted to protect others and stop a dangerous chase	Yes, no; the force was objectively unreasonable given the facts viewed in plaintiffs’ favor
Whether the right was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity	The law clearly prohibited deadly force absent a substantial immediate threat	Plumhoff and Thompson show contextual limits; facts here differ	Yes, it was clearly established that deadly force without sufficient immediate threat violates the Fourth Amendment

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1985) (deadly force must be reasonable; fleeing suspect in some cases may be shot only under immediacy of threat)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (objective reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment excessive force claims)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (U.S. 2007) (video can resolve disputed facts in reasonableness inquiry)
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (S. Ct. 2014) (limits on deadly force in high-speed chases; context matters)
Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2014) (not clearly established where four attempts at alternate seizure occurred; context-dependent)
Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2009) (no immediate threat means deadly force may be unreasonable)
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2004) (clearly established standard; danger context limits depending on immediacy)
Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2001) (excessive force inquiry focused on whether officer was in danger at moment of shooting)
Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1991) (historical context for imminent threat assessment)