Bauberger v. Haynes, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2643

Bauberger was convicted of second-degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury after driving the wrong way down an exit ramp, causing a fatal collision.
Bauberger admitted guilt to involuntary manslaughter due to recklessness but disputed malice for the second-degree murder conviction.
During deliberations, the foreperson retrieved a dictionary and read definitions of terms like recklessly and wantonly to jurors, while not reading malice itself.
A MAR court denied relief; North Carolina appellate courts affirmed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court left the conviction intact on an evenly divided vote.
Bauberger challenged the dictionary use in federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court granted relief, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, faulting the harmlessness determination.
The Fourth Circuit ultimately held the dictionary use did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict under Brecht, and remanded with directions to dismiss.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether jurors' use of a dictionary during deliberations violated Bauberger's Sixth Amendment rights	Bauberger asserts external influence by dictionary reading biased deliberations.	Haynes contends the dictionary did not alter malice definition or verdict materially.	Dictionary use was unconstitutional, but harmless under Brecht.
Whether Brecht harmless-error standard governs habeas review of this error after Fry	Bauberger argues error prejudicial under Brecht; state court analysis insufficient.	State contends any error was harmless or properly evaluated under AEDPA/Chapman.	Brecht governs, and the error did not have substantial and injurious effect.
If error assumed, whether the prejudice analysis shows substantial and injurious effect	Error likely affected malice determination given central issue and timing of dictionary use.	Evidence of malice was strong; the instruction remained substantially equivalent; prejudice unlikely.	No substantial and injurious effect; relief denied.
Whether the district court's and state courts' analyses were unreasonable applications of Supreme Court precedent	Bauberger contends states misapplied precedent regarding external influences on juries.	State argues decisions were reasonable applications of controlling law.	No reasonable application found; court agrees with harmless analysis under Brecht.

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard in collateral review)
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (standard for prejudicial impact in AEDPA reviews; subsumes Chapman in many cases)
O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) (grave doubt standard for prejudice in Brecht context)
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (difference between correct and given instructions to assess prejudice)
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (instruction must be viewed in context of charge)
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (external influence on jurors is presumptively prejudicial)
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (external influences and juror independence principles)
Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350 (2006) (distinction between external and internal influences on jurors)