Bates v. Neva
2014 MT 336
Mont.2014Background
- In 2009 Neva agreed to lease commercial property from Bates for an art gallery; they worked together on repairs and Bates allegedly engaged in repeated sexual harassment during that period.
- Neva filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau alleging sexual harassment in violation of the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA); a hearing officer found harassment but concluded MHRA did not cover commercial leases.
- The Montana Human Rights Commission reversed, holding the MHRA covers commercial property transactions; the District Court vacated on due-process grounds but this Court previously reversed on due process and remanded to decide whether the MHRA applies to commercial leases.
- On remand the District Court held the MHRA’s real-estate provisions cover commercial real estate; this appeal presents the question of statutory interpretation of the phrase “housing accommodation or improved or unimproved property.”
- The Supreme Court reviews statutory interpretation de novo and affirms: it holds that the plain meaning of “improved or unimproved property” includes commercial real estate and therefore the MHRA applies to Neva’s commercial lease.
Issues
| Issue | Neva's Argument | Bates' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the MHRA’s real-estate provision apply to commercial leases? | MHRA’s phrase “improved or unimproved property” has plain meaning that includes commercial real estate; sexual harassment is discrimination under MHRA. | The phrase “housing accommodation or improved or unimproved property” should be read as limited to housing property (i.e., residential only), consistent with federal Fair Housing Act and agency practice. | The Court held MHRA’s “improved or unimproved property” is not limited to housing and includes commercial real estate; MHRA applies to Neva’s commercial lease. |
| How should the phrase be parsed grammatically? | The disjunctive series separates “housing accommodation” from “improved or unimproved property”; “housing” modifies only “accommodation.” | The modifier “housing” should extend to “improved or unimproved property,” producing a residential-only meaning. | The Court applied ordinary grammar rules and the series-qualifier canon to conclude “housing” modifies only “accommodation,” not the subsequent phrase. |
| Does statutory text or context require limiting the provision to residential housing? | Statutory wording (defined term for housing accommodation, undefined term for improved/unimproved property) and legislative structure support separate meanings. | Section contains extensive housing-related language and headings; agency practice historically treated it as housing-only. | The Court prioritized the statute’s plain language and structure, finding separate meanings and that the Legislature’s choices were deliberate; agency practice and section title do not overcome plain text. |
| Should the Court interpret MHRA to mirror the federal Fair Housing Act? | The statute’s language differs from the federal act; where Legislature mirrored federal text previously it adopted federal terms, but it did not do so here. | MHRA should be read in harmony with federal housing law (which covers dwellings only). | The Court declined to import federal restrictions because the MHRA’s text does not adopt the federal definition; statutes must be construed according to their own language. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bates v. Neva, 371 Mont. 466 (2013) (previous appellate decision addressing due process and remanding for statutory-interpretation issue)
- Harrison v. Chance, 244 Mont. 215 (1990) (sexual harassment held to be sex discrimination under MHRA)
- BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 365 Mont. 359 (2012) (MHRA to be interpreted consistently with federal discrimination statutes where text aligns)
- In re Marriage of Rudolf, 338 Mont. 226 (2007) (statutory interpretation follows Legislature’s plain language)
- Giacomelli v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 354 Mont. 15 (2009) (undefined statutory terms given plain and ordinary meaning)
- Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (canon that literal words may be limited by statute’s spirit and context)