Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222

Background

Andre Barton, a Jamaican national and longtime lawful permanent resident (LPR), committed aggravated-assault offenses in 1996 and was later convicted; he was also convicted of state firearms and drug offenses in 1996, 2007, and 2008.
The Government initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2) based on the firearms and drug convictions; Barton conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a).
Cancellation for LPRs requires, inter alia, 7 years of continuous residence after admission; the stop-time rule (§1229b(d)(1)(B)) provides that continuous residence “shall be deemed to end” when the alien commits ‘‘an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible under §1182(a)(2) or removable under §1227(a)(2) or (a)(4).’’
An Immigration Judge, the BIA, and the Eleventh Circuit held that Barton’s 1996 aggravated-assault (a crime involving moral turpitude covered by §1182(a)(2)) committed during his first seven years triggered the stop-time rule and made him ineligible for cancellation, even though those assaults were not the offenses of removal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split (Ninth Circuit had taken the opposite view) and affirmed: a §1182(a)(2) offense committed during the initial seven years can preclude cancellation of removal even if it is not the offense of removal; for moral-turpitude crimes, conviction or admission renders the alien inadmissible.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Barton)	Defendant's Argument (Barr)	Held
Whether the §1182(a)(2) offense that triggers the stop-time rule must be an offense of removal	The stop-time rule applies only when the §1182(a)(2) offense is the actual offense of removal in the removal proceeding	The statute is a recidivist-style rule that looks to prior crimes listed in §1182(a)(2) committed during the first 7 years, regardless of which crime triggered removal	Held for Government: the triggering offense need not be the offense of removal; prior §1182(a)(2) crimes committed in the initial 7 years can bar cancellation
Whether “renders the alien inadmissible” requires an adjudication of inadmissibility or denial of admission	‘‘Rendered inadmissible’’ requires an actual inadmissibility adjudication or denial of admission, which typically cannot occur for a previously admitted LPR	§1182(a)(2) itself treats conviction or admission as rendering a person inadmissible; conviction or admission suffices to make the status relevant for stop-time	Held for Government: for moral-turpitude offenses, conviction or admission renders the alien inadmissible and satisfies the clause
Whether the stop-time rule requires that the offense at least be chargeable as an inadmissibility ground in a removal charging instrument	The alien must have been capable of being charged with a §1182(a)(2) inadmissibility as the basis for removal	Whether the offense could have been charged as removal is irrelevant; statute functions as a recidivist rule and looks to commission + inadmissibility status under §1182(a)(2)	Held for Government: chargeability as the offense of removal is irrelevant to stop-time’s operation

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (Supreme Court presumption about Congress adopting established meanings of borrowed terms)
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (interpretation of mandatory-detention and inadmissibility context)
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (discussion of IIRIRA’s change from exclusion/deportation to removal and retained two-track structure)
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (canon against treating statutory terms as superfluous)
Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (redundancy in statutory reading can sometimes be acceptable)
Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (statutory-reading principles on redundancy)
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (duty to give effect to every clause and word of a statute)