943 F.3d 1211
9th Cir.2019Background:
- In 1994 four-year-old Rachel Gray died of blunt abdominal trauma; Barry Lee Jones was convicted (1995) of sexual assault, multiple child-abuse counts, and felony murder and sentenced to death.
- At trial the State’s case depended on a medical/timeline theory that most injuries (including the fatal bowel rupture) occurred the afternoon of May 1 while Rachel was alone with Jones; defense presented minimal investigation on timing or blood evidence.
- Jones’s post-conviction counsel did not press certain ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) allegations in state PCR, leading to procedural default in federal habeas proceedings under Coleman.
- After Martinez v. Ryan, the district court held an evidentiary (Martinez) hearing, received new expert and fact testimony disputing the injury timeline and blood-pattern interpretations, and granted habeas relief on guilt-phase IAC claims, ordering release unless retried.
- The State appealed; the Ninth Circuit (this opinion) holds §2254(e)(2) does not bar using evidence developed at a Martinez hearing when adjudicating the underlying IAC claim, finds counsel deficient and prejudice shown as to Counts 1–3 and felony murder (Count 5), but narrows remedy on Count 4 (failure to obtain care).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jones) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2) bars considering new evidence developed at a Martinez evidentiary hearing when deciding the merits of an underlying IAC claim | Martinez permits development of new evidence to excuse procedural default and that evidence may be considered on the merits | §2254(e)(2) restricts evidentiary development for claims not developed in state court; district court erred by relying on evidence outside the state-court record | Rejected State’s view: §2254(e)(2) does not prevent a district court from considering Martinez-hearing evidence on de novo merits review of the underlying IAC claim |
| Whether trial counsel’s pretrial investigation into medical/timeline and blood evidence was constitutionally adequate | Counsel failed to obtain tissue slides, failed to secure pathologist/blood-pattern analysis, and neglected to impeach state expert testimony — objectively unreasonable | Counsel consulted an independent pathologist and made tactical choices; presumption of reasonableness should apply; record doesn’t show abandonment | Court found deficient performance: counsel knew further investigation (slides, blood analysis, timeline) was necessary but failed to ensure it was done |
| Whether Jones showed Strickland prejudice as to Counts 1–3 and felony murder (Count 5) | The Martinez evidence (alternative timing, older genital/scalp injuries, bloodstain analysis, other possible perpetrators) created a reasonable probability of a different verdict on who inflicted injuries and thus prejudice | Medical evidence is imprecise/double-edged and strong circumstantial evidence at trial supported guilt; no reasonable probability of different outcome | Prejudice proven: new evidence undermined confidence in the outcome such that a reasonable probability of different verdict existed as to Counts 1–3 and Count 5 |
| Effect on Count Four (failure to obtain medical care): culpable mental state and remedy | Inadequate investigation undermined the jury’s finding that Jones acted intentionally/knowingly; prejudice limited to mental-state classification, not complete innocence | Even if timing uncertain, other evidence showed Jones was aware Rachel’s health was endangered; convictions on Count Four and felony-murder predicate should stand | Prejudice as to mental-state: counsel’s errors likely altered whether jury found intentional/knowing vs. reckless; remedy narrowed — resentencing for lesser included reckless offense or State may retry Count Four; otherwise release unless retried |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (procedural-default exception when initial-review collateral counsel was ineffective)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance: deficiency and prejudice)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review ordinarily limited to record before state court that adjudicated claim on the merits)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default doctrine; cause and prejudice standard)
- Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc plurality recognizing need for factual development in collateral proceedings under Martinez)
- Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying Martinez to permit evidentiary development in collateral proceedings)
- Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (Martinez may provide means to show cause to overcome default and reach merits)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (remedies for Sixth Amendment violations must be tailored to the injury)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (rules on death-penalty procedures and retroactivity of Ring)