16 F.Supp.3d 1218
D. Or.2014Background
- Barnett, a Seaside police detective and former sheriff candidate, alleges Clatsop County DA Marquis and Chief Deputy Brown retaliated after Barnett published criticism of Marquis and that they thereafter refused to vouch for or use him as a witness and refused to work with him.
- Alleged actions: DA’s office announced it would not vouch for Barnett’s credibility or accept cases where he was an essential witness; instructed Seaside PD to assign his duties to others; Brown refused to correspond or work with Barnett on investigations.
- Barnett claims violation of First Amendment free speech (retaliation and public/private citizen speech) and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process (employment-related deprivation) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing absolute prosecutorial immunity.
- The court accepted the complaint’s allegations as true for the motion-to-dismiss standard and concluded that defendants’ acts were protected by absolute immunity, granting the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether declining to use Barnett as a witness is protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity | Barnett: prosecutors may not vouch for or denigrate a witness to punish speech; action is not advocatory immunity-worthy | Defendants: decision whether to use a witness is part of prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity | Court: Declining to use Barnett as a witness is protected by absolute immunity (analogous to Roe) |
| Whether instructing Seaside PD to reassign Barnett’s responsibilities is immune | Barnett: instruction harmed employment prospects and was retaliatory (relies on cases limiting immunity for job-sabotage) | Defendants: directing which officers the DA’s office will work with is part of prosecutorial discretion and advocacy | Court: Instruction to PD is within prosecutorial function and absolutely immune |
| Whether refusing to work with Barnett during investigations is immune | Barnett: refusal to cooperate violated free speech and due process | Defendants: choice about who to work with and how to gather evidence is prosecutorial discretion entitled to absolute immunity | Court: Refusal to work with Barnett falls within absolute immunity (preparation/evaluation functions) |
| Whether directing DA office employees not to use Barnett is immune | Barnett: internal communications furthered deprivation and are not protected | Defendants: communicating and instructing staff about witness choices is part of the same advocatory function | Court: Communications/instructions to DA employees are also absolutely immune |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (prosecutorial immunity for initiating prosecution and presenting the state’s case)
- Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (absolute immunity for advocatory acts; distinction between advocatory and investigative acts)
- Roe v. City & County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578 (9th Cir.) (prosecutor’s evaluation of a witness entitled to absolute immunity)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (acts preparing or presenting a case entitled to absolute immunity)
- Fletcher v. Kalina, 93 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing advocatory vs. administrative/investigative functions)