Barneck v. Utah Department of Transportation
2015 UT 50
| Utah | 2015Background
- During a heavy rain in July 2011, a culvert under SR-35 in Duchesne County became obstructed, causing water to back up and flow across the road; UDOT workers attempted but failed to clear the culvert and left after concluding the roadway itself was not obstructed.
- Water pooled adjacent to the roadway for hours, allegedly causing hydraulic piping that undermined the road base and produced a 20 ft deep, 30 ft wide chasm.
- Later that night Heidi Paulson drove into the chasm and was severely injured; Michael Barneck and his daughter Justine later drove into it, killing Justine and injuring Michael.
- Plaintiffs sued UDOT for negligent maintenance of the road and culvert and wrongful death; the district court granted summary judgment for UDOT on the ground that immunity applied under Utah’s Governmental Immunity Act.
- The statutory conflict: the Act waives immunity for injuries caused by a "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition" of a highway or culvert (waiver), but preserves immunity for injuries that "arise out of, in connection with, or result from" the "management of flood waters" or the "operation" of a flood/storm system (exceptions).
- The Supreme Court reviews de novo whether UDOT established entitlement to summary judgment and interprets the relevant Act provisions, focusing on meanings of "dangerous condition," "flood waters," "management," "storm system," and the applicable causation standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the culvert condition falls within the Act's waiver for "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition[s]" | Barneck/Paulson: blockage was a dangerous property defect that created foreseeable risk (hydraulic piping → collapse) | UDOT: even if culvert was defective, immunity applies because injuries arose from management/operation of flood or storm systems | Court: Statutory waiver adopts premises-liability meaning; culvert blockage plausibly a dangerous condition — waiver properly invoked on these facts |
| What constitutes "flood waters" for the exception | Plaintiffs: "flood waters" should be limited to major/rare flooding events | UDOT: broad meaning covering the water here | Court: "Flood waters" are water that has joined a watercourse and spilled beyond its banks (not dependent on rarity); some water that flowed over SR-35 qualified as flood water |
| Scope of "management" of flood waters (active vs. omission) | Plaintiffs: "management" requires active, successful efforts to control flood waters | UDOT: "management" includes planning, supervising, and omissions (decisions not to act) | Court: "Management" includes executive planning/organizing/supervising and studied decisions (including some omissions), but not mere absence of any studied action |
| Causation standard to trigger an immunity exception (but‑for vs. proximate cause) | Plaintiffs: require meaningful causal nexus, not mere but‑for link | UDOT: any causal connection (but‑for) suffices to reinstate immunity | Court: Rejects expansive but‑for test; exceptions reinstate immunity only when the excepted conduct proximately causes the injury (proximate-cause standard) |
Key Cases Cited
- Glaittli v. State, 332 P.3d 953 (Utah 2014) (statutory waiver language incorporates premises-liability terms)
- Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996) (prior case applying but-for causation under immunity exceptions)
- Blackner v. Dep’t of Transp., 48 P.3d 949 (Utah 2002) (prior decision using but-for causation for immunity analysis)
- Hoyer v. State, 212 P.3d 547 (Utah 2009) (prior case relying on but-for causation to invoke immunity)
- Williams v. Carbon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 780 P.2d 816 (Utah 1989) (distinguishing management of flood waters from surface-water runoff)
- Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 221 P.3d 219 (Utah 2009) (discussion of proximate cause in statutory tort contexts)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011) (Supreme Court treatment of "results from" phrasing and causation)
- Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (explains when "results from" can imply but-for causation absent contextual indicators)