166 Conn. App. 408
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- Alison Barlow was convicted after a 1998 jury trial of attempted murder, conspiracy, assault, and firearm alteration; he received an effective 35‑year sentence. His direct appeal was affirmed.
- Barlow filed multiple habeas petitions; in his third (amended) habeas petition he alleged trial counsel Sheridan Moore rendered ineffective assistance regarding a plea offer and general trial preparation, and that prior habeas counsel Christopher Neary was ineffective for not litigating Moore’s ineffectiveness.
- The habeas court (Judge Sferrazza) dismissed portions of the petition sua sponte invoking deliberate bypass and denied the remainder; the Appellate Court reversed in part, holding Moore’s performance concerning plea advice was deficient and remanded on the prejudice issue.
- On remand Judge Sferrazza presided, questioned whether a new evidentiary hearing was required, and denied Barlow’s motion to recuse himself (citing his view of the remand scope). He also concluded no new hearing was required and later denied the petition on prejudice.
- The Appellate Court in this opinion holds (1) Judge Sferrazza should have recused under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51‑183c and Practice Book § 1‑22(a) because his prior nonjury decision was reversed in part, and (2) the remand order permitted further proceedings including a new evidentiary hearing; the case is reversed and remanded for a new hearing before a different judge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Barlow) | Defendant's Argument (Commissioner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judge must recuse under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51‑183c / Practice Book § 1‑22 after partial reversal | § 51‑183c and Practice Book require disqualification because judge tried the nonjury habeas matter and part of his judgment was reversed | The remand was limited, reversal was only "in part," and the judge had not decided the particular prejudice issue previously, so § 51‑183c does not apply | Held for Barlow: § 51‑183c applies; judge should have recused and case remanded to a different judge |
| Whether the remand required a new evidentiary hearing or merely articulation/review of existing record | Appellate Court’s remand for ‘‘further proceedings’’ encompassed a new evidentiary hearing and admission of additional evidence relevant to prejudice | The remand only required the habeas court to resolve the prejudice issue on the existing record (an articulation‑style proceeding) | Held for Barlow: remand allowed further proceedings including a new evidentiary hearing; habeas court erred by refusing new evidence |
| Whether the habeas court could decide prejudice without further evidence | Barlow argued he had new, relevant evidence (e.g., trial transcripts, codefendant testimony, expert opinion) that could show he would have accepted the plea if properly advised | Commissioner argued prejudice could be decided on the existing record | Court: Because remand permitted further proceedings and evidence, petitioner should have opportunity to present additional admissible evidence on prejudice; remanded for hearing before a different judge |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and resulting prejudice)
- Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn. App. 781 (2014) (Appellate Court held counsel’s plea advice was deficient and remanded on prejudice)
- State v. Brundage, 320 Conn. 740 (2016) (principles for interpreting scope of appellate remand and trial court duties on remand)
- State v. Santiago, 245 Conn. 301 (1998) (recusal and impartiality considerations on remand)
- State v. Lafferty, 191 Conn. 73 (1983) (trial court must conform to views expressed by reviewing court on remand)