Barkley v. United States Marshals Service
412 U.S. App. D.C. 310
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Marshals Service contracts private security to supply court security officers for federal courthouses.
- Officers undergo annual medical examinations reviewed by a government physician to assess medical fitness.
- If disqualified, officers may receive additional information requests before removal under contract terms.
- Former officers were medically disqualified and removed; they sued the Marshals Service alleging due process violations and Rehabilitation Act discrimination; private companies were sued under the ADA.
- District court granted summary judgment to the Marshals Service on due process and dismissed most Rehabilitation Act claims for failure to exhaust; denied leave to amend.
- The court of appeals affirms the due process ruling and exhaustion dismissal, but reverses to allow amendment to add Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims for new plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marshals Service medical-review procedures satisfy due process | Plaintiffs claim procedures fail to provide adequate process before removal. | Marshals Service procedures provide notice, an opportunity to supplement information, and neutral medical review. | Procedures satisfy due process. |
| Whether Rehabilitation Act claims lacking individual exhaustion can proceed via vicarious exhaustion | Plaintiffs seek to piggyback on exhausted class or other plaintiffs' remedies. | Exhaustion for federal agency claims is strict and class/vicarious exhaustion does not apply here absent class exhaustion. | Vicarious exhaustion not available; class exhaustion required, and here none occurred. |
| Whether district court erred by denying leave to amend to add Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims | New plaintiffs sought to add Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims; amendment should be allowed. | Delay and prejudice concerns justified denial; motion failed to clearly address these claims. | District court erred; leave to amend should have been granted. |
| Whether class exhaustion framework applies to Rehabilitation Act claims in this context | Class treatment would promote efficient resolution and notice; exhaustion should extend to class claims. | No formal class exhaustion procedure was invoked or exhausted. | Class exhaustion not established; absence defeats ability to proceed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice must be reasonably calculated to reach interested parties)
- Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (pre-termination notice required for protected interests)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Mathews factors govern due-process adequacy)
- Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (exhaustion jurisdictional for Rehabilitation Act claims)
- De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discusses vicarious exhaustion for federal discrimination claims)
- Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (vicarious exhaustion guided by class administrative remedies)
- Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (strict adherence to waiver and exhaustion principles)