Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach
216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306
| Cal. | 2017Background
- Banning Ranch is a 400-acre undeveloped coastal‑zone property with oil facilities and wildlife habitat; most development there requires a Coastal Development Permit from the California Coastal Commission because the City of Newport Beach lacked a certified local coastal program covering the site.
- The City served as CEQA lead agency for a proposed large residential/commercial development by Newport Banning Ranch LLC (NBR); NBR's biological reports and Coastal Commission staff indicated multiple areas that likely qualify as Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Areas (ESHA).
- The City circulated a draft and final EIR that: described biological impacts generally, acknowledged the Coastal Commission would determine ESHA for permitting, but declined to identify or analyze potential ESHA (except to note two sites addressed by consent orders) or to integrate Coastal Act ESHA constraints into alternatives and mitigation analysis.
- Coastal Commission staff and others repeatedly commented that the EIR should map probable ESHA and evaluate alternatives/buffers because Coastal Act §30240 mandates protection and siting/design constraints adjacent to ESHA.
- Banning Ranch Conservancy sued under CEQA and the City’s general plan; the trial court granted relief on the general plan claim but rejected CEQA claims; the Court of Appeal upheld the EIR as sufficient on CEQA but rejected the general plan remedy; the California Supreme Court took the case.
- The Supreme Court held the EIR was legally inadequate under CEQA because it failed to identify and analyze potential ESHA and to account for the Coastal Act’s regulatory constraints when evaluating feasible alternatives and mitigation measures, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CEQA required the EIR to identify potential ESHA and analyze impacts, mitigation, and alternatives in light of Coastal Act ESHA protections | The EIR must identify probable ESHA given credible evidence and analyze impacts, mitigation (buffers), and alternatives constrained by Coastal Act §30240 | City argued EIR need not make ESHA determinations or account for Coastal Commission legal findings; those are for the permitting stage and another agency | Held: Lead agency must discuss potential ESHA and integrate Coastal Act constraints into EIR analyses of impacts, mitigation, and alternatives when credible evidence indicates ESHA may be present; City’s EIR was inadequate |
| Whether a lead agency must integrate CEQA review with other permitting/regulatory regimes (Coastal Act) | Integration required; failing to consider Coastal Act requirements frustrates CEQA’s informational role and public participation | City argued integrated review unnecessary here because Coastal Commission will decide ESHA during permitting; local CLUP did not cover Banning Ranch | Held: CEQA requires integration to the maximum feasible extent; deferring ESHA analysis to later permitting undermines CEQA and is improper where credible evidence exists |
| Whether the City was required to adopt ESHA identifications consistent with Coastal Commission staff or could disagree | BRC argued City should at least analyze and present potential ESHA and discuss staff findings so public and agencies can compare positions | City argued it could refuse to prognosticate and need not adopt commission staff determinations; EIR is not a forum for another agency’s legal determinations | Held: EIR must fairly present disagreements and competing expert views; lead agency need not adopt other agencies’ legal conclusions but must analyze and disclose disputes and their implications |
| Whether the EIR omission was prejudicial requiring reversal | BRC: omission prevented informed decisionmaking and public participation, impairing alternatives/mitigation analysis | City: any omission is nonprejudicial because permit stage will address ESHA; errors were not substantial | Held: Omission was prejudicial because it materially impaired information about alternatives/mitigation and the Commission’s permitting function; reversal and remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal.3d 553 (EIR ‘‘core’’ purpose and rule of reason for alternatives)
- Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal.4th 412 (standard of review: de novo for procedural adequacy; substantial evidence for factual findings)
- Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of Univ. of California, 47 Cal.3d 376 (EIR informational duty; forecasting and best efforts)
- Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry, 7 Cal.4th 1215 (procedural review of CEQA compliance)
- Citizens for Quality Growth v. City of Mt. Shasta, 198 Cal.App.3d 433 (lead agency responsibility to evaluate mitigation rather than defer to permitting agency)
- California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova, 172 Cal.App.4th 603 (importance of coordination and that lead agency may disagree with other agencies but must document disputes)
- Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority, 57 Cal.4th 439 (prejudice standard for CEQA omissions)
- Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Assn., 42 Cal.3d 929 (need for reasoned response to expert comments)