Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham
225 F. Supp. 3d 1
D.D.C.2016Background
- Banneker Ventures held an exclusive Term Sheet with WMATA to negotiate a joint development (Florida Avenue Project) but no final lease/contract was reached.
- Banneker sued Jim Graham (WMATA Board member and D.C. Council member) alleging tortious interference with contract and business expectancy and civil conspiracy based on multiple alleged actions during the procurement process.
- D.C. Circuit reversed dismissal on absolute-immunity grounds and remanded for the district court to test whether alleged acts were manifestly beyond Graham’s official duties or violated WMATA policies.
- The district court conducted limited discovery into WMATA Compact, Board Procedures, Standards of Conduct, and Joint Development Guidelines to define official duties and restrictions on Board members.
- The complaint identified five categories of alleged improper actions by Graham: (1) extortion/vote bartering; (2) interfering with Banneker’s development team and process; (3) directing WMATA staff; (4) aggressively advocating for a preferred developer/additions to the project; and (5) leaking confidential Board information.
- Court ruled that some alleged actions (extortion/vote bartering, interfering with team, directing staff, leaking confidential information) are not shielded by absolute immunity and allowed those claims to proceed; purely advocacy-type actions were immunized.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Graham is entitled to absolute immunity for alleged misconduct | Graham acted beyond his official duties (e.g., extortion, vote barter, leaks) and thus immunity does not apply | Communications with developers and project advocacy are within Board duties and discretionary, so absolute immunity applies | Denied immunity for alleged extortion/vote-bartering, interference with team, directing staff, and leaking confidential info; immunity upheld for aggressive advocacy of preferences |
| Whether allegations state tortious interference with prospective economic advantage | Banneker had a valid business expectancy (Term Sheet); Graham knowingly and intentionally interfered causing damages | Graham lacked intent or his actions were protected official acts; allegations insufficiently specific | Allegations sufficient to plead intentional interference; claim survives dismissal |
| Whether allegations state tortious interference with contract | The Term Sheet was a binding contract; Graham intentionally disrupted it by acts beyond official authority | Graham argues actions were within duties or not intentionally disruptive | Claim adequately pleaded and survives dismissal |
| Whether allegations state civil conspiracy | Conspiracy alleged via coordinated acts (sharing confidential info, steering partners, involving preferred developer) that produced injury | Graham contests sufficiency and characterizes acts as official, immune conduct | Because underlying torts are sufficiently alleged, civil conspiracy claim survives dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (remanding to assess whether actions exceeded official duties or violated WMATA rules)
- Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) (absolute-immunity two-part test: within outer perimeter of duties and discretionary)
- Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (scope of official duties extends beyond title to entrusted duties)
- Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (discretionary-function inquiry turns on whether statute/regulation leaves no room for choice)
- Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must plead plausible claim)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not presumed true; plausibility standard)
- Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (absolute immunity lost where means manifestly beyond authority)
- McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (supervisor loses immunity when adopting means beyond authority)
- Gray v. Poole, 243 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (subjective bad faith does not defeat immunity for official acts)