Bank of America, N.A. v. Scott Greenleaf
124 A.3d 1122
Me.2015Background
- Greenleaf’s second appeal follows our Greenleaf I decision vacating the foreclosure judgment for lack of standing and remanding to consider disposition; the District Court then dismissed the Bank’s foreclosure complaint without prejudice, subject to conditions, on remand.
- Greenleaf executed a 2006 promissory note to RMS to secure the debt with a Casco mortgage listing RMS as lender and MERS as nominee; BAC later filed foreclosure and was substituted after a merger.
- Trial in 2013 admitted a document purporting to assign the mortgage and note from MERS to BAC, and a merger certification; a foreclosure judgment for the Bank followed.
- Greenleaf challenged the Bank’s standing to foreclose and the merits; Greenleaf I distinguished standing from merits, holding the Bank lacked standing because it did not own the mortgage, and vacated the judgment on that basis.
- On remand, the court dismissed the Bank’s complaint without prejudice; Greenleaf argued the court was compelled to render judgment in his favor, but the Court of Appeals held standing defects do not destroy jurisdiction and dismissal without prejudice was proper.
- The court affirmed the dismissal without prejudice, concluding that a standing defect is cognizable at any stage and does not authorize a merits judgment when the plaintiff cannot establish the predicate interest to sue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effect of standing defect on court power | Greenleaf: court should enter judgment in his favor | Bank: standing defect requires dismissal | Dismissal without prejudice proper |
| Remand disposition after vacating judgment | Greenleaf challenged the Bank’s standing and sought merit judgment | Bank’s standing defect precludes merits judgment; remand allowable | Court correctly dismissed without prejudice on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf (Greenleaf I), 2014 ME 89 (Maine 2014) (standing defect; vacated foreclosure judgment; overlapped standing/merits analysis)
- JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, 2011 ME 5 (Maine 2011) (standing is a threshold concept antecedent to jurisdiction; cognizable at any stage)
- Nichols v. City of Rockland, 324 A.2d 295 (Me. 1974) (standing is distinct from subject matter jurisdiction; justiciability)
- Hawley v. Murphy, 1999 ME 127 (Me. 1999) (standing as threshold concept; governs invocation of court power)