237 So. 3d 1127
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2018Background
- Plaintiff Cortez (Guatemalan, resident of Miami-Dade since 2008) alleges Bantrab (a Guatemalan bank) hired agents/directors who attempted to murder him in Guatemala after he investigated Bantrab’s alleged money‑laundering tied to Florida.
- Cortez sued Bantrab and individual directors in Florida state court asserting multiple claims; relevant here are Count VIII (assault and battery) and Count XVI (Florida RICO).
- Cortez’s second amended complaint alleged Bantrab conducted a "Bancarization" project targeting Guatemalans in Florida, sent staff to Florida, maintained mini‑facilities, contracted with Florida money‑transfer firms, and traveled to Florida in furtherance of unlawful activity.
- Bantrab moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; the trial court (without jurisdictional discovery) denied dismissal, finding both general and specific jurisdiction as to the assault and RICO counts.
- On appeal, the court reviewed whether Cortez’s pleadings satisfied Florida’s long‑arm statute (section 48.193) and federal due‑process minimum contacts rules, and whether the trial court applied the correct standard for general jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Florida has general jurisdiction over Bantrab | Cortez alleged Bantrab engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity" in Florida (operations, advertising, contracts, staff, mini‑facilities, laundering through Florida). | Bantrab argued allegations, even if true, do not render it "essentially at home" in Florida under Daimler/Goodyear. | Reversed trial court on general jurisdiction and remanded for trial court to apply Daimler/Goodyear standard. |
| Whether Florida has specific jurisdiction over assault/battery (Count VIII) via alleged conspiracy in Florida | Cortez argued the conspiracy conducted in Florida suffices to base specific jurisdiction because the conspiracy led to the assault. | Bantrab argued the assault occurred in Guatemala and no element of the tort occurred in Florida, so connexity requirement fails. | Specific jurisdiction for assault reversed: conspiracy alone cannot satisfy §48.193(1)(a)(2) when no element of the underlying tort occurred in Florida. |
| Whether Florida has specific jurisdiction over Florida RICO (Count XVI) | Cortez alleged predicate acts and operations tied to Florida, supporting specific jurisdiction. | Bantrab contended the RICO claim was not yet adequately pleaded and jurisdictional ruling was premature. | Reversed as premature: trial court erred to resolve specific jurisdiction for RICO before determining whether a cause of action was stated; claim later dismissed by trial court. |
| Whether the trial court applied the correct constitutional standard for general jurisdiction | Cortez relied on the traditional "substantial, continuous, systematic" test tied to §48.193(2). | Bantrab argued Daimler/Goodyear require a stricter "essentially at home" inquiry. | Court held the trial court applied an incorrect due‑process standard and must reconsider general jurisdiction under Goodyear and Daimler. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (U.S. 2014) (general jurisdiction limited to where corporation is "essentially at home")
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (U.S. 2011) (framework for assessing general jurisdiction)
- Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989) (two‑part long‑arm inquiry under Florida law)
- Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002) (plaintiff must first state a cause of action before specific jurisdiction is resolved)
- Bristol‑Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (U.S. 2017) (limits on specific jurisdiction where injury did not occur in forum)
- Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1984) (scope of continuous and systematic contacts for general jurisdiction)