236 A.3d 808
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2020Background
- Esteppe obtained a judgment against former Baltimore City police officer Adam Lewellen after proving Lewellen submitted a perjurious affidavit to obtain and execute a search warrant; Lewellen later pled guilty to perjury and misconduct in office and resigned.
- Esteppe then sought to collect that judgment from the Baltimore City Police Department under the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA), filing a “Motion for Declaratory Relief to Enforce Judgment” in the same civil action rather than a separate enforcement suit.
- The Department opposed on grounds including that Lewellen acted outside the scope of employment and that Esteppe had not properly joined it as a defendant; the Department nonetheless appeared and litigated the merits without objecting to joinder.
- The motions court ruled Lewellen acted within the scope of employment and ordered the Department liable to pay the judgment; the Department appealed.
- The Court of Special Appeals treated Esteppe’s filing as a summary-judgment–style enforcement proceeding, considered recent controlling authority (notably Potts), and reviewed whether the record showed Lewellen acted at least in part to further the Department’s interests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Esteppe) | Defendant's Argument (Department) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper procedure to establish LGTCA liability / joinder | Motion within the underlying case sufficed; Department was a necessary party and could be bound | Enforcement must be by an action naming the local government; Esteppe failed to join the Department | A plaintiff may either bring a separate enforcement action or seek relief within the underlying case, but the local government must be made a party and given an opportunity to litigate scope; Department waived joinder objection by appearing and defending on the merits |
| Whether Lewellen acted within scope of employment (basis for Department liability) | Lewellen performed police acts (warrant, search, seizure) that furthered Department goals; therefore scope exists even if motive was mixed | Lewellen’s conduct was motivated by personal reasons (to please a partner) and the record lacks evidence he acted to further the Department’s interests | Reversed: the record contained only evidence of a personal motive and no factual support that Lewellen acted, even in part, to further the Department’s interests; summary judgment for Esteppe on LGTCA liability was erroneous |
| Whether serious criminal/illegal acts are categorically outside scope of employment | (Esteppe) Police functions can be within scope even if illegal; scope depends on facts | (Department) Serious criminal acts cannot be within scope as a matter of law | Court applied Potts: illegality or tortious nature alone does not bar scope-of-employment treatment; no categorical rule excludes serious crimes, but factual showing of employer-related motive is required |
| Department’s estoppel argument (positions Esteppe took earlier) | Esteppe relied on trial record; scope can be litigated now | Department argued Esteppe was estopped by earlier litigating positions | Court declined to decide estoppel on appeal and remanded for further proceedings where the Department may raise it |
Key Cases Cited
- Baltimore City Police Dep’t v. Potts, 468 Md. 265 (2020) (Maryland Court of Appeals: illegality alone does not preclude finding that police misconduct occurred within scope of employment; apply Sawyer factors case-specifically)
- Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247 (1991) (established Sawyer two-prong test and ten-factor inquiry for scope of employment analysis)
- Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 233 Md. App. 43 (2017) (discussed enforcement procedures under the LGTCA and that plaintiffs may pursue local government liability)
- Johnson v. Francis, 239 Md. App. 530 (2018) (clarified that a plaintiff must establish local government liability by bringing an enforcement proceeding or other permissible mechanism and that the local government must be given the opportunity to defend on scope of employment)
- Allstate Ins. v. Atwood, 319 Md. 247 (1990) (court described procedure for insurers to litigate coverage post-judgment and guided treatment of similar post-tort proceedings)
- Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311 (2015) (noted that a stipulation that an officer acted within scope can bind parties if the local government is a party to the stipulation)
- Houghton v. Forrest, 412 Md. 578 (2010) (example where scope of employment was resolved as matter of law on undisputed record)
