Ballinger v. Board of Education for Prince George's County, 8:15-cv-03769

Background

Crystal Ballinger, a Prince George's County public school teacher at Oxon Hill Middle School (OHMS), alleges sexual assault by colleague Jeffrey Pearson during a September 19, 2014 staff retreat and later filed an internal harassment report.
Witness statements and conflicting accounts: Ballinger says Pearson forced pelvic thrusts while on the floor; Pearson and several witnesses describe consensual dancing that led to a fall and grinding.
OHMS principal Wendell Coleman and EEO advisor Amana Simmons investigated; Simmons found the initial dancing consensual and concluded both parties engaged in inappropriate conduct in a Letter of Determination. No Memoranda of Counsel were issued.
Ballinger was denied "assault leave" because she did not seek medical attention within 24 hours as required by Procedure 4154.
Ballinger also submitted evidence of prior incidents involving Pearson (March 2014), including affidavits alleging sexually inappropriate conduct witnessed by a vice principal.
Ballinger sued under Title VII and Title IX for sexual harassment and retaliation; the Board moved for summary judgment, which the court granted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Adequacy of employer's sexual-harassment policy	Ballinger: PGCPS policy (Admin. Policy 4170) is defective and lacks mandatory reporting by managers and recurring management training	Board: Policy requires immediate reporting and administrators received annual training; no evidence policy was deficient	Court: Policy was sufficient; no genuine dispute — summary judgment for Board
Imputation of knowledge from prior incidents to employer liability	Ballinger: Vice Principal Foster knew of Pearson's prior misconduct (Mar 2014); that knowledge imputes constructive notice to the Board	Board: Foster lacked authority to hire/fire/discipline; her knowledge cannot be imputed to the Board	Court: Under Fourth Circuit precedent, a principal/vice principal without hiring/firing authority does not make the district liable; summary judgment for Board
Retaliation based on Letter of Determination	Ballinger: Letter falsely blamed her (found both at fault) and threatened discipline, which was materially adverse and deterred her from pursuing complaint	Board: No adverse employment action occurred — no discipline, no pay/benefit change; Letter merely summarized investigation	Court: Letter alone without disciplinary consequences is not a materially adverse action; summary judgment for Board
Denial of assault leave	Ballinger: Denial was retaliatory (asserted earlier)	Board: Denial complied with Procedure 4154 because Ballinger failed to seek medical treatment within required 24 hours	Court: Ballinger abandoned this argument in opposition; denial lawful under undisputed policy compliance — summary judgment for Board

Key Cases Cited

Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizes sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standards and burdens)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine dispute of material fact on summary judgment)
Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (employer negligence liability when it knew or should have known of coworker harassment)
Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001) (school district liability under Title IX requires official with authority to take corrective measures to have actual knowledge)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (antiretaliation standard: materially adverse action that would dissuade a reasonable worker)
Jennings v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (Title IX institutional liability requires notice to an official with authority and deliberate indifference)
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) ("mere scintilla" of proof insufficient to defeat summary judgment)