Baker v. Coburn, 2:19-cv-00077

Background

Darion Baker and a companion stole an Infiniti in Los Angeles and were driving east when Stratford officers McHugh and Coborn observed the vehicle and followed it into a Pilot travel center.
Officers activated lights, approached the parked, dark‑tinted vehicle, and gave commands; Coborn stood at the front of the vehicle and McHugh at the passenger side near a pump.
Coborn fired multiple rounds into the windshield (dashcam/audio evidence indicates several shots) as the car began to move; McHugh fired after the vehicle accelerated and passed the officers.
Baker was struck twice (one fatal wound traversing his back/chest), lost control, and died on scene; companion was arrested.
Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive/deadly force (officers) and Monell liability (City).
The district court adopted parts of the magistrate judge’s report but granted summary judgment in full: officers entitled to qualified immunity and City not liable under Monell; motion to exclude expert denied as moot.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Coborn’s shooting violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive/deadly force)	Coborn fired before Baker put the car in gear or while Baker’s hands were below the dash to avoid bullets, so force was clearly unreasonable	Coborn reasonably believed Baker posed an immediate threat (reached below dash, brake lights/engine revving, officer standing directly in front)	Court: Fact dispute exists whether first shots preceded vehicle movement, so a constitutional violation could be found on Plaintiffs’ view, but resolution was unnecessary for immunity ruling
Whether the law was clearly established such that Coborn is not entitled to qualified immunity	Plaintiffs point to Fifth Circuit precedents (Edmond, Ougel, Putnal) and argue the case could be "obvious" under Garner	Defendants argue no controlling precedent squarely governs a situation with a fleeing suspect, a vehicle as a possible deadly weapon, and an officer positioned directly in front of the car	Held: Plaintiffs failed to identify clearly established law with sufficient factual specificity; qualified immunity granted to Coborn
Reasonableness of officers’ gunfire after the vehicle began moving (including McHugh’s shots)	Continued firing after car passed was unreasonable and, per magistrate, excessive when aimed into rear/trunk/center as car fled	Officers had split‑second reaction time, were in close proximity, and reasonably perceived ongoing threat from the vehicle; they ceased firing within ~2 seconds	Held: Post‑movement gunfire was objectively reasonable under the circumstances; officers entitled to qualified immunity
Municipal liability (Monell failure to train / policy/custom)	City’s policies or training caused constitutional violation and thus City liable	Plaintiffs failed to show an official policy/custom or deliberate indifference by a policymaker that was the moving force	Held: Plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue on Monell elements; City entitled to summary judgment

Key Cases Cited

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness test for use of force)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework)
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (on viewing summary judgment evidence in plaintiff’s favor)
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (clearly established law must be beyond debate)
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (need for particularized precedent to overcome immunity)
Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2007) (factors for force reasonableness when suspect flees in vehicle — time and proximity)
Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2009) (post‑pass firing may be unreasonable where ample time elapsed)
Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996) (factual disputes on perceived threat preclude summary judgment in some deadly‑force cases)
Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019) (discussion on specificity required for clearly established right)