Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC
135 S. Ct. 2158
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- ASARCO, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, retained two law firms under 11 U.S.C. § 327 to represent the estate and prosecute claims, recovering billions that enabled reorganization.
- The firms submitted fee applications under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1); ASARCO (post-reorganization) and others objected and litigated the fee requests.
- After discovery and a six-day fee trial, the Bankruptcy Court awarded about $120 million for estate work, a $4.1 million enhancement, and over $5 million for time spent defending the firms’ fee applications.
- The District Court affirmed recovery for fee-defense work; the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the American Rule applies unless a statute explicitly authorizes fee-shifting and § 330(a)(1) does not cover fee-defense litigation.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Fifth Circuit: § 330(a)(1) does not permit bankruptcy courts to award attorney’s fees for litigating in defense of fee applications.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) authorizes awarding attorney’s fees for litigating in defense of a fee application | Petitioners: fee-defense is part of the “services rendered” to the estate and thus compensable under § 330(a)(1) | United States/ASARCO: § 330(a)(1) does not cover fee-defense; the American Rule requires explicit statutory authorization | No — § 330(a)(1) does not authorize fees for defending fee applications; American Rule controls absent explicit statutory language |
| Whether courts may treat fee-defense costs as a component of “reasonable compensation” for underlying estate services | Petitioners/Govt: fee-defense dilutes net compensation and can be included in reasonable compensation for underlying services | Majority: § 330(a)(1) conditions awards on “actual, necessary services rendered”; fee-defense is not a service to the estate and thus not compensable | No — the text requires compensation for actual, necessary services; fee-defense is not within that text and cannot be folded into “reasonable compensation” absent clear congressional authorization |
Key Cases Cited
- Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010) (describing the American Rule and its statutory exceptions)
- Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (presumption against fee-shifting absent explicit statutory authority)
- Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (statutory fee-shifting must be specific and explicit)
- Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) (EAJA authorizes fees for fee-defense litigation under its text)
- Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 312 U.S. 262 (1941) (interpretation of predecessor to § 330 and meaning of compensable "services rendered")
- Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (1796) (historical roots of the American Rule)
- Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (factors for determining reasonable attorney’s fees; acknowledges possible enhancements)
