Baird v. State
2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 736
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2013Background
- Appellant employed Killian to care for his dog; Killian accessed the master bedroom and its computer during a stay.
- Killian found what appeared to be child pornography on the appellant’s computer and reported it to police.
- Appellant moved to suppress the evidence under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23, arguing Killian violated law by trespass and breach of computer security.
- Trial court denied suppression; the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Killian’s apparent consent allowed entry and computer use.
- Appellant pled guilty to ten counts of child pornography; remained sentences and appeals focused on the suppression ruling.
- Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, adopting a narrowed interpretation of ‘apparent consent’ under §1.07(a)(11).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of apparent consent | Appellant contends there was no consent to enter or use the computer. | Killian had apparent consent based on appellant’s conduct and statements. | Appellant had apparent consent to enter bedroom and use computer. |
| Trial court’s factual resolution | Factual disputes should favor appellant; Killian’s testimony is unreliable. | Trial court’s findings supported by Killian’s credible testimony should stand. | Trial court’s factual findings were supported; deference maintained. |
| Effect of consent on trespass and computer security | Killian’s access violated trespass and computer security absent express consent. | Appellant’s apparent consent negates violation of either statute. | Appellant’s apparent consent defeated criminal liability; no trespass or breach. |
| Statutory interpretation of assent in fact and apparent | Plain language supports strict limits on consent; no express assent. | Plain text allows apparent assent where assent is clear and manifest. | Court adopts plain-language reading; apparent consent means assent in fact, not necessarily express. |
| Comparison to Fourth Amendment concepts | Not addressed; focuses on Penal Code contexts. | Distinguishes apparent consent in Penal Code from apparent authority under Fourth Amendment. | Distinction maintained; Jardines context not controlling for Penal Code. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baird v. State, 379 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.-Waco 2012) (references suppression standards and credibility findings)
- Ivey v. State, 277 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (considers statutory definitions of consent and apparent authority)
- Cornet v. State, 359 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (discusses apparent consent in statutory context)
- Ex parte Rieck, 144 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (considers Article 38.23 suppression standards)
- Tapps v. State, 294 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (statutory interpretation and consent concepts)
- Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (credibility and fact-review framework for suppression rulings)
- Ross v. State, 32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (concepts on consent and authority in searches)
- Valtieira v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Legislative interpretation and statutory context)
- Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (statutory construction principles)
- Williams v. State, 253 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (relevant to suppression and consent standards)