Baginski v. Lynch
229 F. Supp. 3d 48
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- In 2004 Baginski was convicted in Massachusetts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence (a state misdemeanor) and sentenced to one year probation; Massachusetts law allows up to 2.5 years for the offense.
- Because the offense’s statutory maximum exceeds two years, federal NICS screening flagged Baginski as disqualified under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which bars firearm possession by anyone convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
- Section 921(a)(20)(B) excludes from that definition any state misdemeanor “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” Baginski sued federal officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting (1) a statutory claim that his misdemeanor falls within the § 921(a)(20)(B) safe harbor and (2) an as‑applied Second Amendment challenge.
- The government moved to dismiss both counts. The court considered whether “punishable by” in the misdemeanor exclusion refers to the maximum possible sentence or to whether a sentence of two years or less is merely capable of being imposed.
- The court dismissed Count I (statutory claim), holding that the statutory phrase refers to the predicate offense’s maximum possible punishment (so Baginski’s offense, punishable up to 2.5 years, is a disqualifying predicate). The court denied dismissal of Count II (as‑applied Second Amendment claim), finding Baginski plausibly alleged facts that could place him within the core Second Amendment protections and warrant further factual development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 921(a)(20)(B)’s phrase “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less” excludes any misdemeanor that a court could sentence to ≤2 years (i.e., refers to any sentence that can be imposed) | Baginski: “punishable by” means “capable of being punished by” two years or less; because courts can impose less than the statutory maximum, his misdemeanor is excluded | Government: “punishable by” refers to the statute’s maximum possible term; only misdemeanors whose maximum ≤2 years are excluded | Court: Held for government — “punishable by” means the predicate offense’s maximum possible punishment; Count I dismissed |
| Whether the complaint states an as‑applied Second Amendment claim challenging § 922(g)(1) | Baginski: His individual circumstances (nonviolent record, time since conviction, employment, trustworthiness) could place him within core Second Amendment protection | Government: § 922(g)(1) broadly disarms those with qualifying convictions and the claim fails as a matter of law | Court: Denied dismissal on Count II — plaintiff plausibly alleged facts that could support an as‑applied Second Amendment claim; discovery may be warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (Sup. Ct.) (actual sentence imposed is irrelevant; courts look to maximum possible punishment)
- Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir.) ("punishable by" refers to maximum potential punishment for § 921(a)(20)(B) analysis)
- Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (Sup. Ct.) (treats misdemeanor as predicate for § 922(g)(1) only if punishable by more than two years)
- United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968 (3d Cir.) (statutory language of § 922(g)(1) can be at odds with its plain wording; look to defined terms)
- S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (Sup. Ct.) (uses "punishable by" to refer to maximum authorized penalty in Sixth Amendment analysis)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (Sup. Ct.) (Second Amendment core protection framework referenced for as‑applied challenges)