Baez v. Jetblue Airways Corp.
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12270
| 2d Cir. | 2015Background
- Baez missed her JetBlue flight; her checked bag remained on the plane. While upset, she made a remark about the possibility of a bomb in her luggage and criticized TSA.
- Gate agent Tiffany Malabet relayed Baez’s comments to her supervisor; the report reached JetBlue security and then law enforcement (FBI/TSA). Malabet later testified she did not personally view Baez as a real threat.
- The flight carrying Baez’s luggage was rerouted and all checked bags searched; no bomb was found, but marijuana residue was discovered in Baez’s bag.
- Baez was detained, questioned, charged with making a false bomb threat (later dropped), and pleaded guilty to misdemeanor drug charges; she sued JetBlue and Malabet for claims including negligence, defamation, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding they were immune under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. § 44941; the Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Malabet’s report was materially false (ATSA exception) | Baez: material falsity because Malabet misreported her words as an admission of having a bomb rather than a hypothetical question | Defs: any differences were immaterial; Baez’s references to a bomb would lead a reasonable security officer to investigate | Held: No reasonable jury could find material falsity; statements were not materially false for ATSA purposes |
| Whether resolution of materiality was improper on summary judgment | Baez: materiality is fact-intensive and for a jury | Defs: even accepting Baez’s version, the record permits only one reasonable conclusion; immunity can be decided early | Held: Summary judgment appropriate; immunity decided as a matter of law |
| Whether reporting to a supervisor (vs directly to TSA/law enforcement) defeats ATSA immunity | Baez: Malabet reported to her supervisor, not directly to TSA or law enforcement, so immunity shouldn’t apply | Defs: report to supervisor was part of a chain that resulted in voluntary disclosure to authorities; ATSA covers such reports | Held: Report to supervisor that led to law enforcement was covered by ATSA immunity |
| Scope and purpose of ATSA immunity — whether ambiguous/veiled statements lose protection | Baez: ambiguous language and context matter; mischaracterization can be material | Defs: ATSA protects employees who report suspicious statements so authorities can assess threats; precise wording requirement would undermine statute | Held: ATSA protects reasonable reports of references to bombs; ambiguous or veiled references can be material and covered by immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (defines ATSA material-falsity standard and purpose of immunity)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (summary judgment is proper where record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party)
- McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991) (when facts and law support only one conclusion, summary judgment is appropriate)
- Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage)
- United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2002) (ambiguous language can qualify as a threat under bomb-threat statutes)
- United States v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007) (context and formulation of bomb threats are relevant to assessing culpability)