B. P. J. v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 649 F.Supp.3d 220

Plaintiff B.P.J. is an 11-year-old transgender girl (biologically male) who sought to play on girls’ middle school cross-country and track teams; she began taking puberty blockers before endogenous male puberty progressed.
West Virginia enacted H.B. 3293 (W. Va. Code § 18-2-25d), defining “female/girl” and “male/boy” by biological sex at birth and requiring public secondary-school teams to be designated male, female, or coed based on biological sex; female teams are closed to males for competitive or contact sports.
After the law passed, the school barred B.P.J. from trying out for girls’ teams; she sued the State, boards of education, WVSSAC, and officials alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX.
The court previously granted a preliminary injunction allowing participation; summary judgment motions and intervention by a cisgender female athlete followed.
The court ruled WVSSAC is a state actor, found insufficient evidence of unconstitutional legislative animus, applied intermediate scrutiny to the sex-based classification, and concluded the statute is substantially related to the important government interest in equal athletic opportunities for females; Title IX challenge also failed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
State-action status of WVSSAC	WVSSAC is not a state actor and thus not subject to §1983/Equal Protection	WVSSAC is entwined with state government and functions as a state actor	WVSSAC is a state actor; its summary-judgment motion denied
Equal Protection — sex-based classification	H.B. 3293 unlawfully excludes transgender girls by defining “girl” by sex at birth; not substantially related to interest	Classification by biological sex is substantially related to preserving equal athletic opportunities for females	Intermediate scrutiny applies; statute upheld as substantially related to important interest
Legislative animus	Legislature enacted the law to harm/target transgender youth	Law responds to perceived competitive fairness issues, not bare animus	Record insufficient to find unconstitutional animus; claim fails
Title IX — exclusion from girls’ teams	Law violates Title IX by excluding transgender girls from girls’ teams and effectively from sports	Title IX permits sex-separated teams based on biological sex for competitive/contact sports; statute mirrors that schema	Statute does not violate Title IX; plaintiff’s Title IX motion denied

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (sex-based classifications require exceedingly persuasive justification)
Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing transgender persons as quasi-suspect class for intermediate scrutiny)
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (distinction between gender identity and biological sex for some statutory purposes)
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (private entities may be state actors when entwined with government)
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (state-action analysis principles)
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (animus doctrine: bare desire to harm invalidates legislation)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection framework)
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny standard for sex classifications)
Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993) (Title IX context: purpose of sex-separation in athletics)