25 Cal. App. 5th 115
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- Darren Burley was restrained face‑down by several Los Angeles County deputies after an assault; deputies used body weight, knee pressure, tasers, and flashlight strikes; Burley suffered cardiac arrest, brain death, and died 10 days later.
- Jury found Deputy Aviles liable for battery (intentional excessive force) and Deputy Beserra liable for negligence; jury allocated fault: Burley 40%, Aviles 20%, Beserra 20%, other deputies 20%.
- Jury awarded $8 million in noneconomic damages. Trial court entered separate judgments: Beserra & County liable for $1.6 million (20%); Aviles & County held liable for the full $8 million based on Aviles' intentional tort finding.
- Defendants appealed, arguing (inter alia) the noneconomic award must be apportioned by comparative fault under Civil Code § 1431.2; Plaintiffs cross‑appealed the summary adjudication dismissal of their Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) claims and denial of attorney fees.
- Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to Aviles' uncompromised liability for the full noneconomic award, affirmed other aspects of the judgment, reversed summary adjudication on certain Bane Act claims, and affirmed denial of attorney fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Civil Code § 1431.2 requires apportionment of noneconomic damages where a defendant is found to have acted intentionally | Plaintiffs (Burley's family) urged that Aviles' intentional battery made him fully liable for noneconomic damages | Defendants argued § 1431.2 mandates that each defendant be liable only for noneconomic damages in proportion to their percentage of fault | Court held § 1431.2 applies: noneconomic damages must be allocated proportionately to each defendant's fault even if one defendant's conduct was intentional; vacated Aviles' full liability judgment and directed proportionate separate judgments |
| Sufficiency of causation evidence for jury findings | Plaintiffs contended evidence supported jury causation findings | Defendants argued evidence was insufficient to tie deputies' conduct to Burley's death | Court found no reversible error — evidence supported the jury's causation determinations |
| Alleged trial counsel misconduct / irregularities deprived defendants of fair trial | Plaintiffs defended trial conduct and representation | Defendants asserted multiple misconduct instances required reversal | Court found no reversible error on these grounds |
| Whether summary adjudication on Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) was proper | Cross‑Appellants argued deputies' intentional excessive force satisfied § 52.1 without separate "independent coercion" requirement | Defendants relied on Shoyoye—arguing coercion inherent in an underlying civil rights violation is insufficient absent additional independent coercion | Court reversed summary adjudication: Bane Act requires specific intent to violate rights; where the interference is intentional (e.g., intentional excessive force), plaintiffs need not show coercion independent of the inherently coercive act; remanded for further proceedings |
| Denial of attorney fees under Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5 | T.E. sought private attorney general fees | Defendants opposed | Court affirmed denial of attorney fees |
Key Cases Cited
- DaFonte v. Up‑Right, Inc., 2 Cal.4th 593 (Cal. 1992) (§ 1431.2 imposes strict proportionate liability for noneconomic damages)
- Thomas v. Duggins Constr. Co., Inc., 139 Cal.App.4th 1105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (held § 1431.2 inapplicable to intentional tortfeasors; court declined to follow)
- Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (held Bane Act requires deliberate or spiteful interference; discussed "independent coercion" rule)
- Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (interprets § 52.1 to require specific intent; rejects requirement that coercion be independent from inherently coercive violations)
- Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2018) (adopted Cornell’s specific‑intent standard for Bane Act claims in excessive‑force context)
- Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1188 (Cal. 1988) (background on Proposition 51 limiting joint and several liability)