Autor v. Blank
892 F. Supp. 2d 264
D.D.C.2012Background
- DOC and USTR barred federally registered lobbyists from ITAC membership, affecting six plaintiffs previously on ITACs or seeking ITAC roles.
- LDA registration requirements trigger the barred status, allegedly infringing First and Fifth Amendment rights by denying a governmental benefit for petitioning.
- Plaintiffs allege ITAC service is a valuable government benefit enabling influence and information access, and its denial burdens petition rights.
- Complaints note the White House Open Government Initiative aspiration against lobbyist appointments to boards and commissions.
- The complaint asserts the policy creates an unconstitutional classification, penalizing those who petition the government under the LDA.
- Court granted dismissal for lack of a stated constitutional violation, but found standing and proceeded to analyze the merits under rational basis review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the policy violate the First Amendment right to petition? | Autor argues policy burdens petitioning rights via ITAC exclusion. | Blank argues no constitutional right to ITAC membership and no retaliation for petitioning. | Policy does not violate First Amendment rights. |
| Does the policy implicate equal protection under the Fifth Amendment? | Policy unsettles equal protection by distinguishing petitioners from non-petitioners. | Classification does not target fundamental rights; no improper impairment shown. | Policy does not violate equal protection. |
| What level of scrutiny applies to the policy’s impact on constitutional rights? | Policy should be scrutinized as unconstitutional conditions on First Amendment rights. | Knight and Perry guidance suggest no First Amendment entitlement; rational basis suffices. | Rational basis review applies. |
| Is ITAC membership a valuable government benefit for unconstitutional-conditions analysis? | Membership constitutes a valuable benefit that could be conditioned on speech. | ITAC service is not a guaranteed valuable benefit; may be abstract or non-economic. | ITAC membership is not a valuable government benefit for Perry analysis. |
| Is the policy rationally related to a legitimate government interest under rational-basis review? | Policy is overbroad and flawed, undermining anti-influence aims. | Policy plausibly reduces special-interest influence and boosts public confidence. | Policy is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. |
Key Cases Cited
- Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (no constitutional right to participate in public policy decisions)
- Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (threatened cognizable injury when exercising First Amendment rights)
- Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (unconstitutional conditions require tying benefits to protected expression)
- Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (government may choose not to subsidize lobbying; no First Amendment entitlement)
- Lyng v. I.U.W., AFL-CIO, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (denial of benefits not required to subsidize all activities; no coercion found)
- Harriss v. United States, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (validity of anti-influence aims of anti-corruption policy in advisory contexts)