Aurelio Duarte v. City of Lewisville, Texas
759 F.3d 514
5th Cir.2014Background
- Lewisville, Texas enacted an ordinance prohibiting persons required to register as child sex offenders from residing within 1,500 feet of "premises where children commonly gather" (parks, schools, day cares, pools, etc.), with misdemeanor penalties and a grandfather clause for preexisting residences or later-opened child premises.
- Aurelio Duarte, a registered child sex offender convicted of online solicitation of a minor, returned to Lewisville after prison; he and his family lived in a grandfathered one‑bedroom motel room but sought to buy or rent a house in the city.
- Over ~18 months Duarte’s wife contacted the Lewisville Sex Offender Registrar multiple times; several prospective properties were identified as within prohibited zones and some properties outside the zones were sold before the Duartes could acquire them.
- The Duartes sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive and monetary relief challenging the ordinance as unconstitutional. The district court dismissed for lack of standing and, alternatively, as moot. The Duartes appealed.
- The City submitted judicially noticed records showing the family later moved to Lake Dallas; the Fifth Circuit considered those records in assessing mootness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing to challenge residency ordinance | Duarte had concrete, imminent injury: he actively tried to rent/buy specific homes and was told the ordinance barred them; family forced into motel and later moved | No injury: Duarte lived in a grandfathered address, was never cited or prosecuted, and therefore lacked actual injury | Reversed: Duarte and his family have standing; ordinance targets Duarte and materially burdened the family’s housing options |
| Causation / redressability | The ordinance materially reduced available housing in Lewisville and a favorable judgment would make finding housing easier | Any housing difficulties are not fairly traceable to the ordinance or are market-driven | Duarte met traceability and redressability requirements; causation not too attenuated |
| Mootness because family moved out of Lewisville | Duartes still seek monetary relief (including nominal damages) and intend to return; claims for damages keep controversy live | Family’s relocation moots injunctive claims and possibly the case | Monetary claims prevent mootness; case not moot on appeal; remanded for further proceedings |
| Reliance on prior cases denying standing to sex offenders | N/A: plaintiffs distinguish those cases based on factual showing of concrete plans and application of the ordinance | Cites decisions (state and federal) where plaintiffs lacked standing or applicability | Court distinguished those authorities; Lujan and Time Warner Cable controls and support standing here |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized injury that is actual or imminent)
- Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. Hudson, 667 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2012) (plaintiffs who are targets of regulation have standing)
- Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (practical, concrete burdens can confer standing)
- Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (no need to risk prosecution before challenging a statute that deters constitutional rights)
- Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (traceability and redressability limits for standing)
- FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (standing analysis where plaintiffs did not fall within regulated category)
- Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2009) (claims for nominal or compensatory damages avoid mootness)