Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo v. Loretta E. Lynch, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5894

Background

Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to California Penal Code § 32 (accessory to a felony) and later served >1 year, triggering aggravated-felony risk under INA § 101(a)(43)(S).
DHS initiated removal, arguing a § 32 conviction is an offense “relating to obstruction of justice.” The IJ and BIA initially agreed and ordered removal.
After this court’s decision in Trung Thanh Hoang, which read earlier BIA precedent to require interference with an ongoing investigation or proceeding, the BIA sua sponte reopened Valenzuela Gallardo’s case.
A three-member BIA panel issued In re Valenzuela Gallardo, clarifying that the category requires an “affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice,” but that an ongoing investigation or proceeding is not an essential element.
The Ninth Circuit granted review and held the BIA’s revised formulation raises grave vagueness concerns under the Due Process Clause; the court remanded to let the BIA adopt a constitutionally adequate construction (or apply its earlier Espinoza‑Gonzalez formulation) rather than defer to the new, broader interpretation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether BIA’s new definition of “offense relating to obstruction of justice” is permissible under Chevron	Valenzuela Gallardo: the BIA’s broadened definition (requiring intent to interfere with “the process of justice” without nexus to an ongoing proceeding) is unconstitutionally vague	Government/BIA: the formulation is bounded by the mens rea (specific intent) and comparable to federal obstruction statutes; no temporal nexus required	Court: agency’s construction raises grave vagueness doubts; remand to BIA for a less constitutionally problematic construction or application of prior interpretation
Whether courts should defer to the BIA despite potential constitutional doubt	Petitioner: courts must avoid upholding agency constructions that push constitutional limits	Respondent: Brand X and Chevron compel deference to reasonable agency construction of ambiguous statute	Court: constitutional‑avoidance canon applies at Chevron Step One when agency interpretation raises grave constitutional concerns; no clear congressional intent to authorize such a boundary‑pushing interpretation; remand required
Whether requiring only specific intent (without nexus) supplies adequate notice	Petitioner: specific intent alone doesn’t define what must be interfered with, so notice is lacking	Respondent: specific intent plus the act requirement limits scope; analogous federal statutes (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512, § 1519) validate breadth	Court: specific intent alone is insufficient absent an intelligible definition of “process of justice”; vagueness concerns remain
Appropriate remedy (court construing statute narrowly vs. remanding to BIA)	Petitioner: court should reject or narrowly construe BIA’s interpretation to avoid vagueness	Respondent/Dissent: court should defer and either accept BIA’s plausible reading or, if narrowing needed, adopt a limiting construction itself	Court: remanded to BIA to provide a constitutionally adequate construction or apply its earlier one; declined to adopt limiting construction itself

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (void‑for‑vagueness analysis of a residual clause and warning about judge‑imagined abstractions)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (nexus requirement: intent to influence judicial or grand‑jury proceedings)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
Nat. Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (a court’s prior construction does not bar a reasonable subsequent agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute)
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (applying constitutional avoidance to decline deference to an agency interpretation that raised serious First Amendment concerns)
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (statute must be construed, if fairly possible, to avoid grave constitutional doubts)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (importance of accurate advice re: immigration consequences of guilty pleas)
Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011) (court previously deferred to BIA’s Espinoza‑Gonzalez interpretation requiring interference with ongoing proceeding or investigation)
Renteria‑Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2008) (example of prior deference to BIA construction of obstruction‑of‑justice phrase)