Background - On April 30, 2015, Deputy William Durkin responded to a neighbor's complaint in Denham Springs, LA; an exchange with William Aubin led to Aubin saying “I’m gonna get you fired” / “I’m gonna have your job.” - Deputy Durkin arrested Aubin without a warrant for public intimidation, interference with an investigation, and resisting an officer; charges were later dismissed. - Plaintiffs sued Deputy Durkin (individual capacity), Sheriff Jason Ard (individual and official capacity), and Columbia Casualty Company, alleging battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, failure to train/supervise, and a facial challenge to Louisiana’s public intimidation statute. - Sheriff Ard moved to dismiss § 1983 claims (official and individual capacity) and a state-law failure-to-train claim; Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on state malicious prosecution, false arrest, and battery claims. - The court denied Sheriff Ard’s dismissal of official- and individual-capacity § 1983 claims (except dismissing the state-law failure-to-train claim as barred by Louisiana immunity), granted Aubin summary judgment on false arrest, denied summary judgment on malicious prosecution and battery, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to strike a probable-cause affidavit. - Key legal determinations: (1) an alleged Sheriff policy authorizing arrests for nonviolent threats to an officer’s employment is patently unconstitutional under the First Amendment; (2) arresting Aubin under Louisiana’s public intimidation statute was unreasonable because that statute criminalized protected nonviolent speech, so Aubin prevailed on false arrest. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---|---|---| | Official-capacity § 1983 (policy/custom) | Ard maintained a policy permitting arrests for threats to deputies’ jobs; two supervisors told Durkin so | Ard: Plaintiffs fail to plead an adopted policy or deliberate indifference | Denied dismissal — plausible official policy; patently unconstitutional (no need to plead deliberate indifference) | | Individual-capacity supervisory liability (§ 1983) | Ard failed to train deputies on First Amendment protections, making Aubin’s arrest a predictable consequence | Ard: insufficient specificity and no deliberate indifference alleged | Denied dismissal — allegations satisfy failure-to-train elements and deliberate indifference given the obviousness of the constitutional violation | | State-law false arrest (summary judgment) | Aubin: arrest without a warrant was unlawful because public intimidation statute is patently unconstitutional; no reasonable officer could rely on it | Durkin: probable cause exists and a judge later found probable cause; reliance on statute shields him | Granted for Aubin — arrested without warrant; statute was patently unconstitutional so reliance was unreasonable | | Malicious prosecution (summary judgment) | Aubin: elements met because charges were continued and later dismissed | Durkin: acted without malice and had probable cause | Denied for Aubin — factual dispute on malice and probable cause remains | | Battery (summary judgment) | Aubin: alleges striking with handcuffs, kicks, and force constituting battery | Durkin: disputes physical-abuse allegations and says force was reasonable during arrest | Denied for Aubin — genuine dispute of material fact over force used | ### Key Cases Cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (legal plausibility standard for pleadings) Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state a plausible claim) Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (municipal liability for official policy or custom) Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (definition and limits of “true threats”) City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (protecting speech critical of police from arrest) Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325 (elements for municipal § 1983 liability) Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (speech directed at police can be protected despite provocation) Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (reasonableness of officer reliance on statute for immunity)