Atron Castleberry v. STI Group
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12611
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Two African-American laborers (Castleberry and Brown) were hired by staffing agency STI Group and worked on a Chesapeake Energy worksite; other Black crew members were fired or absent soon after their arrival.
- Plaintiffs allege multiple racial incidents: anonymous racist comments on sign-in sheets on several occasions, assignment to menial tasks despite greater experience, and a supervisor’s use of the N‑word accompanied by a threat of termination (confirmed by seven coworkers).
- After reporting the supervisor’s remark, Plaintiffs were fired twice (rehired once then terminated again for “lack of work”); they sued STI and Chesapeake under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for harassment (hostile work environment), disparate treatment, and retaliation; they also pleaded disparate impact.
- The district court dismissed all § 1981 claims at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, applying a “pervasive and regular” standard for hostility and finding the reported single incident insufficiently unlawful to support retaliation.
- The Third Circuit reviewed de novo, held that the correct hostile‑work‑environment standard is “severe or pervasive,” and concluded Plaintiffs pled plausible claims of harassment, disparate treatment, and retaliation that survive a motion to dismiss; disparate impact is not available under § 1981 and was not remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hostile work environment (harassment) | Single extreme use of racial slur plus repeated racist notes and discriminatory task assignments suffice under § 1981 | Isolated incident(s) insufficient; district court applied “pervasive and regular” standard | Court: correct standard is “severe or pervasive”; Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a hostile environment (severe or pervasive) and dismissal was improper |
| Disparate treatment discrimination | Being only Black males on site, assigned menial tasks despite greater experience, and two terminations show intentional race discrimination | Neutral nondiscriminatory reasons may explain adverse actions; district court dismissed for lack of additional facts | Court: allegations satisfy prima facie elements; dismissal improper pending McDonnell Douglas framework and discovery |
| Retaliation | They were fired after reporting the supervisor’s racial remark; reporting was protected activity based on reasonable belief of § 1981 violation | Single reported remark could not reasonably be believed unlawful; dismissal proper | Court: because a single severe incident can constitute an underlying § 1981 violation, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged protected activity and causal link; remand for discovery |
| Disparate impact theory under § 1981 | Policies and outcomes (no remaining Black males after terminations; assignment practices) produce discriminatory effects | § 1981 does not support disparate‑impact claims | Court: § 1981 provides remedy for intentional discrimination only; disparate impact unavailable — claim not remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for employment discrimination)
- Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (hostile work environment factors and objective standard)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (employer liability and severe/pervasive standard; isolated extreme acts may suffice)
- Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (adopts severe or pervasive standard for hostile work environment)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (plaintiff’s burden at pleading stage in discrimination cases before discovery)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility pleading standard under Rule 8)
- Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. treatment of § 1981 employment claims analogous to Title VII)
- Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157 (elements of hostile work environment under Third Circuit)