256 F. Supp. 3d 122
D.P.R.2017Background
- Petitioner Julio A. Atiles-Gabriel is serving a 144-year sentence after 1997 state convictions and filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence.
- The Federal Public Defender was appointed and concluded the petition was viable; the Commonwealth and the Warden were served.
- Before Respondents answered, Puerto Rico filed a Title III petition under PROMESA (May 2017), and the Commonwealth submitted a Notice of Automatic Stay invoking the Title III stay.
- The district court denied the Commonwealth’s requested stay, addressing whether PROMESA’s incorporation of Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) and § 922 stays applies to federal habeas petitions.
- The court concluded habeas petitions do not constitute a "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code and applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold Title III’s automatic stay does not bar habeas proceedings.
- The court denied Respondents’ motion to apply the PROMESA/Title III stay to Atiles-Gabriel’s § 2254 petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a PROMESA Title III automatic stay bars a § 2254 habeas petition | Habeas is an action protecting liberty, not a bankruptcy "claim"; staying it would unconstitutionally suspend the writ | Title III incorporates § 362 and § 922, producing an automatic stay that should halt litigation against the Commonwealth, including habeas actions | The stay does not apply; habeas is not a "claim" under the Code and applying the stay would raise serious constitutional problems, avoided by construction |
| Whether a habeas petition falls within § 362(a)(1)’s stay of "action or proceeding against the debtor" | Habeas is outside the scope because it seeks release, not enforcement of a debt; constitutional avoidance supports exclusion | The broad language of § 362(a)(1) covers "any judicial action," so it should encompass habeas proceedings against the Commonwealth | Court held § 362(a)(1) should not be read to reach habeas petitions; statute must be construed to avoid suspending the writ |
| Whether § 922 or § 362(a)(6) apply because they stay enforcement or collection of claims | N/A — petitioner emphasizes these sections deal with monetary or enforcement claims | Commonwealth argued § 922/§ 362(a)(6) bar actions against officers/inhabitants or acts to collect prepetition claims | Court found § 922 and § 362(a)(6) inapplicable because habeas relief is not a “claim” (right to payment or equitable remedy tied to payment) |
| Whether PROMESA’s text or purpose shows clear congressional intent to limit habeas jurisdiction | Habeas suspension would require clear statement from Congress, which is absent | Commonwealth relied on PROMESA’s broad stay provisions and fiscal emergency to justify suspension | Court applied the clear-statement rule and constitutional-avoidance canon; concluded Congress did not clearly intend to repeal or suspend habeas jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Peaje Inv. LLC v. García-Padilla, 845 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2017) (discussing PROMESA’s purposes and bankruptcy-like framework)
- United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (statutory interpretation begins with plain text)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (clear-statement rule for repeals of habeas jurisdiction)
- Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (habeas corpus has constitutional protection; suspension clause limits)
- Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30 (definition of "claim" includes equitable remedies only when monetary payment is an alternative)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (statutory constructions avoiding serious constitutional doubts)